The Deaf Mutes Supply Trucks for Afghan Genocide

"The (American) businessmen who built the Soviet Kama River truck plant should be shot as traitors." Avraham Shifrin, former Soviet Defense Ministry official

Although the military output from Gorki and ZIL was well known to U.S. intelligence and therefore to successive administrations, American aid for construction of even large military truck plants was approved in the 1960s and 1970s.

Under intense political pressure from the deaf mute blindmen, U.S. politicians, particularly in the Johnson and Nixon administrations under the prodding of Henry Kissinger (a long-time employee of the Rockefeller family), allowed the Togliatti (Volgograd) and Kama River plants to be built.

The Volgograd automobile plant, built between 1968 and 1971, has a capacity of 600,000 vehicles per year, three times more than the Ford-built Gorki plant, which up to 1968 had been the largest auto plant in the USSR.

Although Volgograd is described in Western literature as the "Togliatti plant" or the "Fiat-Soviet auto plant," and does indeed produce a version of the Fiat-124 sedan, the core of the technology is American. Three-quarters of the equipment, including the key transfer lines and automatics, came from the United States. It is truly extraordinary that a plant with known military potential could have been equipped from the United States in the middle of the Vietnamese War, a war in which the North Vietnamese received 80 percent of their supplies from the Soviet Union.

The construction contract, awarded to Fiat S.p.A., a firm closely associated with Chase Manhattan Bank, included an engineering fee of $65 million. The agreement between Fiat and the Soviet government included:

The supply of drawing and engineering data for two automobile models, substantially similar to the Fiat types of current production, but with the modifications required by the particular climatic and road conditions of the country; the supply of a complete manufacturing plant project, with the definition of the machine tools, toolings, control apparatus, etc.; the supply of the necessary know-how, personnel training, plant start-up assistance, and other similar services.

All key machine tools and transfer lines came from the United States. While the tooling and fixtures were designed by Fiat, over $50 million worth of the key special equipment came from U.S. suppliers. This included:

1. Foundry machines and heat-treating equipment, mainly flask and core molding machines to produce cast iron and aluminum parts and continuous heat-treating furnaces.

2. Transfer lines for engine parts, including four lines for pistons, lathes, and grinding machines for engine crank-shafts, and boring and honing machines for cylinder linings and shaft housings.

3. Transfer lines and machines for other components, including transfer lines for machining of differential carriers and housing, automatic lathes, machine tools for production of gears, transmission sliding sleeves, splined shafts, and hubs.

4. Machines for body parts, including body panel presses, sheet straighteners, parts for painting installations, and upholstery processing equipment.

5. Materials-handling, maintenance, and inspection equipment consisting of overhead twin-rail Webb-type conveyors, assembly and storage lines, special tool 'sharpeners for automatic machines, and inspection devices.

Some equipment was on the U.S. Export Control and Co-Corn lists as strategic, but this proved no setback to the Johnson Administration: the restrictions were arbitrarily abandoned. Leading U.S. machine-tool firms participated in supplying the equipment: TRW, Inc. of Cleveland supplied steering linkages; U.S. Industries, Inc. supplied a "major portion" of the presses; Gleason Works of Rochester, New York (well known as a Gorki supplier) supplied gear-cutting and heat-treating equipment; New Britain Machine Company supplied automatic lathes. Other equipment was supplied by U.S. subsidiary companies in Europe and some came directly from European firms (for example, Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics of the United Kingdom supplied six industrial robots). In all, approximately 75 percent of the production equipment came from the United States and some 25 percent from Italy and other countries in Europe, including U.S. subsidiary companies.

In 1930, when Henry Ford undertook to build the Gorki plant, contemporary Western press releases extolled the peaceful nature of the Ford automobile, even though Pravda had openly stated that the Ford automobile was wanted for military purposes. Notwithstanding naive Western press releases, Gorki military vehicles were later used to help kill Americans in Korea and Vietnam.

In 1968 Dean Rusk and Wait Rostow once again extolled the peaceful nature of the automobile, specifically in reference to the Volgograd plant. Unfortunately for the credibility of Dean Rusk and Wait Rostow, there exists a proven military vehicle with an engine of the same capacity as the one produced at the Volgograd plant. Moreover, we have the Gorki and ZIL experience. Further, the U.S. government's own committees have stated in writing and at detailed length that any motor vehicle plant has war potential. Even further, both Rusk and Rostow made explicit statements to Congress denying that Volgograd had military potential.

It must be noted that these Executive Branch statements were made in the face of clear and known evidence to the contrary. In other words, the statements can only be considered as deliberate falsehoods to mislead Congress and the American public.

It was argued by Washington politicians that a U.S. jeep engine is more powerful than the engine built at Togliatti. The engine is indeed about two-thirds as powerful as the jeep engine, but a proven vehicle of excellent capabilities utilizing a 1,500 cc. 4-cylinder Opel engine developing 36 horsepower: this same engine later powered the Moskvitch-401 and the Moskvitch-402 (Moskva) military cross-country 4-wheel drive version of the 401, produced at the MZMA in Moscow.

In brief, there already existed a tested and usable military vehicle capable of transporting men or adaptable for weapons use and powered by a !,500 cc. engine, the same size as the engine supplied for Togliatti. Therefore statements by U.S. officials to the effect that the Togliatti plant has no military capabilities are erroneous.

Military possibilities for such a small engine include use in a special-purpose small military vehicle (like the American jeep), or as a propulsive unit in a specially designed vehicle for carrying either personnel or weapons. Soviet strategy is currently toward supply of wars of "national liberation." The Togliatti vehicle is an excellent replacement for the bicycle used in Vietnam. The GAZ-46 is the Soviet version of the U.S. jeep, and we know that such a vehicle figures in Soviet strategic thinking.

The War Potential of the Kama Truck Plant

Up to 1968 American construction of Soviet military truck plants was presented as "peaceful trade." In the late 1960s Soviet planners decided to build the largest truck factory in the world. This plant, spread over 36 square miles situated on the Kama River, has an annual output of 100,000 multi-axle 10-ton trucks, trailers, and off-the-road vehicles. It was evident from the outset, given absence of Soviet technology in the automotive industry, that the design, engineering work, and key equipment for such a facility would have to come from the United States.

In 1972, under President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, the pretense of "peaceful trade" was abandoned and the Department of Commerce admitted (Human Events, Dec. 1971) that the proposed Kama plant had military potential. Not only that, but according to a department spokesman, the military capability was taken into account when the export licenses were issued for Kama.

The following American firms received major contracts to supply production equipment for the gigantic Kama heavy truck plant:

Glidden Machine & Tool, Inc., North Tonawanda, New York Milling machines and other machine tools.

Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., New York, N.Y. A contract for $20 million of equipment.

Holcroft & Co., Kovinia, Michigan Several contracts for heat treatment furnaces for metal parts.

Honeywell, Inc., Minneaspolis, Minnesota Installation of automated production lines and production control equipment.

Landis Manufacturing Co., Ferndale, Michigan Production equipment for crankshafts and other machine tools.

National Engineering Company, Chicago Illinois Equipment for the manufacutre of castings.

Swindell-Dresser Company (a subsidy of Pullman Incorporated), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Design of a foundry and equipment for the foundry, including heat treatment furnaces and sine;ting equipment under several contracts ($14 million).

Warner & Swazey Co., Cleveland, Ohio Production equipment for crankshafts and other machine tools.

Combustion Engineering: molding machines ($30 million). Ingersoll Milling Machine Company: milling machines.

E. W. Bliss Company

Who were the government officials responsible for this transfer of known military technology? The concept originally came from National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who reportedly sold President Nixon on the idea that giving military technology to the Soviets would temper their global territorial ambitions. How Henry arrived at this gigantic non sequitur is not known. Sufficient to state that he aroused considerable concern over his motivations. Not least that Henry had been a paid family employee of the Rockefellers since 1958 and has served as International Advisory Committee Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, a Rockefeller concern.

The U.S.-Soviet trade accords including Kama and other projects were signed by George Pratt Shultz, later to become Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration and long known as a proponent of more aid and trade to the Soviets. Shultz is former President of Bechtel Corporation, a multi-national contractor and engineering firm.

American taxpayers underwrote Kama financing through the Export-Import Bank. The head of Export-Import Bank at that time was William J. Casey, a former associate of Armand Hammer and now (1985) Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Financing was arranged by Chase Manhattan Bank, whose then Chairman was David Rockefeller. Chase is the former employer of Paul Volcker, now Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank. Today, William Casey denies knowledge of the military applications (see page 195), although this was emphatically pointed out to official Washington 15 years ago.

We cite these names to demonstrate the tight interlocking hold proponents of miltiary aid to the Soviet Union maintain on top policy making government positions.

On the other hand, critics of selling U.S. military technology have been ruthlessly silenced and suppressed.

Critics of Kama Silenced and Suppressed

For two decades rumors have surfaced that critics of aid to the Soviet Union have been silenced. Back in the 1930s General Electric warned its employees in the Soviet Union not to discuss their work in the USSR under penalty of dismissal.

In the 1950s and 1960s IBM fired engineers who publicly opposed sale of IBM computers to the USSR.

Let's detail two cases for the record; obviously this topic requires Congressional investigation. At some point the American public needs to know who has suppressed this information, and to give these peri sons an opportunity to defend their actions in public.

The most publicized case is that of Lawrence J. Brady, now Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Administration. Ten years ago Brady was a strong critic of exporting the Kama River truck technology. In his own words (in 1982 before a Senate Investigating Committee) is Brady's view on Kama River.

Mr. Brady: Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege for me to be here again. I have testified before this subcommittee previously. As a matter of fact, it is 3 years ago this month that I testified over on the House side before the House Armed Services Committee in which I disagreed with the political appointees of the Carter administration and indicated that the technology which we were licensing to the Soviet Union, specifically for the Kama River plant, was being diverted to the Soviet military. It is 10 years ago this month that the President of the United States inaugurated the era of detente with a trip to Moscow.

A central component of that historic trip was the hope that greatly expanded trade ties between the East and the West would lead to mutual cooperation and understanding.

Obviously, those hopes have not taken place. In that 10-year period, as we in the administration have indicated in the last year, we have been exploited both legally and illegally by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This technology which has helped the Soviet immensely in their military industrial infrastruture. Again, 3 years ago, I personally disclosed the failures of the Commerce Department in the licensing process, referring to it, as I said in my testimony, as a shambles.12

Brady went on to note that his reward for surfacing vital information was criticism and suppression.

Chairman Roth [presiding]: Thank you, Mr. Brady. Mr. Brady, the members of the subcommittee are, of course, aware of your personal commitment to this important area, but | believe it is important that the record reflect fully your position on the specific question of export technology and particularly reference the efforts some years ago to help the Soviet Union construct some trucking facilities.

Would you, for the purposes of the record, explain your role in this matter?

Mr. Brady: Mr. Chairman, about 3 years ago, the Export Administration Act was up for review for extension. As part of that review, the House Armed Services Committee decided that it was going to hold hearings on that extension, in addition to the committee of appropriate jurisdiction, namely the Foreign Affairs Committee on the House side.

There were some statements being made on both sides in Congress that were not totally consistent with the facts. We had intelligence information that trucks were being produced at the Kama River plant for the Soviet military and, in fact, being distributed to Eastern Europe for use in East European endeavors.

An administration witness was asked about that and denied it. I was asked about it and confirmed it. And, as a result of that, I was labeled a whistleblower and eventually left the Department of Commerce. In point of fact, that was the tip of the iceberg. There had been apparently intelligence through the 1970s, particularly the latter half of the seventies, indicating that there was substantial diversion taking place (and) . . . for some reason the intelligence just didn't get to the top. So that was my role. I eventually had to leave Government for it.13

However, Mr. Brady was unaware of a similar and much earlier story of suppression in the Kama case which paralleled his own.

In the years 1960-1974 this writer authored a three volume series, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, published between 1968 and 197:3 by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, where the author was Research Fellow. This series cataloged the origins of Soviet technology from 1917 down to the early 1970s. The series excluded the military aspects of technical transfers. However, the work totally contradicted U.S. Government public statements. For example, in 1963 State Department claimed in its public pronouncements that all Soviet technology was indigenous, a clear misunderstanding or dismissal of the facts.

By the early 1970s it was clear to this author that a significant part of Soviet military capability also came from the West, even though this assessment was also refuted by U.S. government analysts. Quietly, without government or private funding, this author researched and wrote National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union. The manuscript was accepted by Arlington House. Both author and publisher maintained absolute silence about the existence of the manuscript until publication date.

When news of publication reached Stanford, there was immediate reaction a hostile reaction. A series of meetings was called by Hoover

Institution Director W. Glenn Campbell. Campbell's objectives were:

1) to withdraw the book from publication,

2) failing that, to disassociate Hoover Institution from the book and the author.

Campbell initially claimed that National Suicide was a plagiarism of the author's works published by Hoover. This was shown to be nonsense. In any event an author can hardly plagiarize himself. The objective, of course, was to persuade author and publisher to withhold publication. Both the author and Arlington House refused to withdraw the book and continued with publication. The book was published and sold over 50,000 copies.

After the unsuccessful attempt at suppression Glenn Campbell arbitrarily removed the title Research Fellow from the author and removed both his name and that of his secretary from the personnel roll of the Hoover Institution. This effectively disassociated Hoover Institution from the book and its contents. The author became a non-person. Two years later the author voluntarily left Hoover Institution and assumed a private role unconnected with any research foundation or organization. These events happened some years before Mr. Brady of Commerce took his own personal stand and suffered a similar fate.

By a strange quirk of fate, Glenn Campbell is today Chairman of Mr. Reagan's Intelligence Oversight Committee.

Who were the Deaf Mute Blindmen at Kama River?

Clearly, the Nixon Administration at the highest levels produced more than a normal number of deaf mutes those officials who knew the story of our assistance to the Soviets but for their own reasons were willing to push forward a policy that could only work to the long run advantage of the United States. It is paradoxical that an Administration that was noisy in its public anti-communist stance, and quick to point out the human cost of the Soviet system, was also an Administration that gave a gigantic boost to Soviet military truck capacity.

Possibly campaign contributions had something to do with it. Multina-tionals listed below as prime contractors on Kama River were also major political contributors. However, the significant link never explored by Congress is that Henry Kissinger, the key promoter of the Kama River truck plant at the policy level, was a former and long-time employee of the Rockefeller family and the Rockefellers are the largest single shareholders in Chase Manhattan Bank (David was then Chairman of the Board) and Chase was the lead financier for Kama River. This is more than the much criticised "revolving door." It is close to an arm's length relationship, i.e., the use of public policy for private ends.

Here are the corporations with major contracts at Kama River, listed with the name and address of the Chairman of the Board in 1972.

1 Gulf and Western Plaza, New York NY 10023
Tel. (212) 333-7000
Chairman of the Board: Charles G. Bluhdorn
Note: Charles Bluhdorn is also a Trustee of Freedoms Foundations
at Valley Forge and Chairman of Paramount Pictures Corp.

E. W. BLISS CO. (a subsidiary of Gulf & Western)
217 Second Street NW, Canton, Ohio 44702
Tel. (216) 453-7701
Chairman of the Board: Carl E. Anderson
Note: Carl E. Anderson is also Chairman of the American-Israel
Chamber of Commerce & Industry

277 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Tel. (212) 826-7100
Chairman of the Board: Arthur J. Santry, Jr.

12062 Market Street, Livonia, Mich. 48150
Tel. (313) 261-8410
Chairman of the Board: John A. McMann

2701 4th Avenue S., Minneapolis, Minn. 55408
Tel. (612) 332-5200
Chairman of the Board: James H. Binger

707 Fulton Street, Rockford, ILL 61101
Tel. (815) 963-6461
Chairman of the Board: Robert M. Gaylord

20 N. Wacker Drive, Chicago, ILL 60606
Tel. (312) 782-6140
Chairman of the Board: Bruce L. Simpson

200 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, ILL 60604
Tel. (312) 939-4262
Chairman of the Board: W. Irving Osborne, Jr.

SWINDELL-DRESSLER CO. (Division of Pullman, Inc.)
441 Smithfield Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Tel. (412) 391-4800
Chairman of the Board: Donald J. Morfee

11000 Cedar Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44106
Tel. (216) 431-6014
Chairman of the Board: James C. Hodge

Chairman of the Board: David Rockefeller



12United States Senate, Transfer of United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 97th Congress Second Session, May 1982, Washington, D.C., p. 263.

13Ibid., pp. 267-8.