Back in 1973 this author published National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union, itself a sequel to a three volume academic study, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, published by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. These four books are detailed verifiable catalogs of Western technology used and in use by the Soviet Union, acquired by gift, purchase, illegal diversion or theft.
Taken together, these four volumes constitute an extraordinary commentary on a basic weakness in the Soviet system and an equally extraordinary weakness in Western policy making. The Soviets are heavily dependent on Western technology and innovation not only in their civilian industries, but also in their military programs.
Technology is, of course, the life blood of modern economic development: technology is the difference between the Third World and the advanced 21st century development epitomised by Silicon Valley in California.
Regrettably, most economists are not qualified to explore the role of technology in economic development. Technology is assumed as a "given," whereas it is in fact a dynamic factor, the most dynamic factor many would argue, in modern economic development. Similarly, State Department planners, essentially political scientists, are not at home with technology — sufficiently so that in 1963 State issued papers to the effect that the Soviets had only self-generated technology. Even today State and Commerce appear barely conversant with the extent of Soviet "reverse engineering." Fortunately, Department of Defense is more attuned to technology and among all government departments is alone aware of the magnitude of the problem to be described in The Best Enemy Money Can Buy.
The deaf mute blindmen — to quote from Lenin — are those multinational businessmen who see no further than the bottom line of the current contract. Unfortunately, these internationalist operators have disproportionate influence in Washington. Consequently, arguments based on the flimsiest of evidence and the most absurd logic that fly in the face of all we know about the Soviets are able not only to be heard in Washington, but even form the basis of our policy.
An inevitable conclusion from the evidence in this book is that we have totally ignored a policy that would enable us to neutralize Soviet global ambitions while simultaneously reducing the defense budget and the tax load on American citizens. Whether we like it or not, technology is a political tool in today's world. And if we want to survive in the face of Soviet ambitions, we will have to use this weapon sooner or later. At the moment the combined efforts of the deaf mute blindmen have been successful. Only an informed, aroused electorate has sufficient potential power to counter their suicidal ambitions.
Antony C. Sutton,
California, January 1986.