>(Norman Dodd was head of research for the Reece
Committee which was looking into the tax-free
>foundations in the 50's.)
>ED GRIFFIN: At what point in your career did you become connected with the
>NORMAN DODD: 1953.
>ED GRIFFIN: And what was that capacity, sir?
>NORMAN DODD: That was in the capacity of what they called Director of
>ED GRIFFIN: Can you tell us what the Reece Committee was attempting to do?
>NORMAN DODD: Yes, I can tell you. It was operating and carrying out
>instructions embodied in a resolution passed by the House of
>Representatives, which was to investigate the activities of foundations as
>to whether or not these activities could justifiably be labeled
>un-American without, I might say, defining what they meant by
>"un-American". That was the resolution, and the committee had then the
>task of selecting a counsel, and the counsel in turn had the task of
>selecting a staff, and he had to have somebody who would direct the work
>of that staff, and that was what they meant by the Director of Research.
>ED GRIFFIN: What were some of the details, the specifics that you told the
>Committee at that time?
>NORMAN DODD: Well, Mr. Griffin, in that report I specifically, number one,
>defined what, to us, was meant by the phrase, "un-American." We defined
>that in our way as being a determination to effect changes in the country
>by unconstitutional means. We have plenty of constitutional procedures,
>assuming we wish to effect a change in the form of government and that
>sort of thing; and, therefore, any effort in that direction which did not
>avail itself of the procedures which were authorized by the Constitution
>could be justifiably be called un-American. That was the start of
>educating them up to that particular point. The next thing was to educate
>them as to the effect on the country as a whole of the activities of
>large, endowed foundations over the then-past forty years.
>ED GRIFFIN: What was that effect?
>NORMAN DODD: That effect was to orient our educational system away from
>support of the principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence and
>implemented in the Constitution; and the task now was the orientation of
>education away from these briefly stated principles and self-evident
>truths. That's what had been the effect of the wealth, which constituted
>the endowments of those foundations that had been in existence over the
>largest portion of this span of 50 years, and holding them responsible for
>this change. What we were able to bring forward, what we uncovered, was
>the determination of these large endowed foundations, through their
>trustees, to actually get control over the content of American education.
>ED GRIFFIN: There's quite a bit of publicity given to your conversation
>with Rowan Gaither. Would you please tell us who he was and what was that
>conversation you had with him?
>NORMAN DODD: Rowan Gaither was, at that time, president of the Ford
>Foundation. Mr. Gaither had sent for me when I found it convenient to be
>in New York, asked me to call upon him at his office, which I did. Upon
>arrival, after a few amenities, Mr. Gaither said: "Mr. Dodd, we've asked
>you to come up here today because we thought that possibly, off the
>record, you would tell us why the Congress is interested in the activities
>of foundations such as ourselves?" Before I could think of how I would
>reply to that statement, Mr. Gaither then went on voluntarily and said:
>"Mr. Dodd, all of us who have a hand in the making of policies here have
>had experience either with the OSS during the war or the European Economic
>Administration after the war. We've had experience operating under
>directives, and these directives emanate and did emanate from the White
>House. Now, we still operate under just such directives. Would you like to
>know what the substance of these directives is?"
> I said, "Mr. Gaither, I'd like very much to know," whereupon he
>made this statement to me: "Mr. Dodd, we are here operate in response to
>similar directives, the substance of which is that we shall use our
>grant-making power so to alter life in the United States that it can be
>comfortably merged with the Soviet Union."
> Well, parenthetically, Mr. Griffin, I nearly fell off the chair.
>I, of course didn't, but my response to Mr. Gaither then was: "Well, Mr.
>Gaither I can now answer your first question. You've forced the Congress
>of the United States to spend $150,000 to find out what you've just told
>me." I said: "Of course, legally, you're entitled to make grants for this
>purpose, but I don't think you're entitled to withhold that information
>from the people of the country to whom you're indebted for your tax
>exemption, so why don't you tell the people of the country what you just
>told me?" And his answer was, "We would not think of doing any such
>thing." So then I said, "Well, Mr. Gaither, obviously you've forced the
>Congress to spend this money in order to find out what you've just told
>ED GRIFFIN: Mr. Dodd, you have spoken before about some interesting things
>that were discovered by Katherine Casey at the Carnegie Endowment. Can you
>tell us that story, please?
>NORMAN DODD: Yes, I'd be glad to, Mr. Griffin. This experience that you
>just referred to came about in response to a letter that I had written to
>the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, asking certain questions
>and gathering certain information. On the arrival of that letter, Dr.
>Johnson, who was then president of the Carnegie Endowment, telephoned me
>and said, did I ever come up to New York. I said yes, I did more or less
>each weekend, and he said, "Well, when you're next here, will you drop in
>and see us?" Which I did.
> On arrival at the office of the endowment I found myself in the
>presence of Dr. Joseph Johnson, the president - who was the successor to
>Alger Hiss - two vice presidents, and their own counsel, a partner in the
>firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. Dr. Johnson said, after again amenities,
>Mr. Dodd, we have your letter. We can answer all those questions, but it
>would be a great deal of trouble, and we have a counter suggestion. Our
>counter suggestion is: If you can spare a member of your staff for two
>weeks and send that member up to New York, we will give to that member a
>room in the library and the minute books of this foundation since its
>inception, and we think that whatever you want to find out or that
>Congress wants to find out will be obvious from those minutes.
> Well, my first reaction was they'd lost their minds. I had a
>pretty good idea of what those minutes would contain, but I realized that
>Dr. Johnson had only been in office two years, and the other vice
>presidents were relatively young men, and counsel seemed to be also a
>young man, and I guessed that probably they'd never read the minutes
>themselves. So I said I had somebody; I would accept their offer.
> I went back to Washington and I selected a member of my staff who
>had been a practicing attorney in Washington. She was on my staff to see
>to it that I didn't break any congressional procedures or rules, in
>addition to which she was unsympathetic to the purpose of the
>investigation. She was level-headed and a very reasonably brilliant,
>capable lady. Her attitude toward the investigation was: What could
>possibly be wrong with foundations? They do so much good.
> Well, in the face of that sincere conviction of Katherine's I went
>out of my way not to prejudice her in any way, but I did explain to her
>that she couldn't possibly cover 50 years of written minutes in two weeks,
>so she would have to do what we call spot reading. I blocked out certain
>periods of time to concentrate on, and off she went to New York. She came
>back at the end of two weeks with the following on dictaphone tapes:
> We are now at the year 1908, which was the year that the Carnegie
>Foundation began operations. In that year, the trustees, meeting for the
>first time, raised a specific question, which they discussed throughout
>the balance of the year in a very learned fashion. The question is: "Is
>there any means known more effective than war, assuming you wish to alter
>the life of an entire people?" And they conclude that no more effective
>means than war to that end is known to humanity.
> So then, in 1909, they raised the second question and discussed
>it, namely: "How do we involve the United States in a war?"
> Well, I doubt at that time if there was any subject more removed
>from the thinking of most of the people of this country than its
>involvement in a war. There were intermittent shows in the Balkans, but I
>doubt very much if many people even knew where the Balkans were. Then,
>finally, they answered that question as follows: "We must control the
>State Department." That very naturally raises the question of how do we do
>that? And they answer it by saying: "We must take over and control the
>diplomatic machinery of this country." And, finally, they resolve to aim
>at that as an objective.
> Then time passes, and we are eventually in a war, which would be
>World War I. At that time they record on their minutes a shocking report
>in which they dispatched to President Wilson a telegram, cautioning him to
>see that the war does not end too quickly.
> Finally, of course, the war is over. At that time their interest
>shifts over to preventing what they call a reversion of life in the United
>States to what it was prior to 1914 when World War I broke out. At that
>point they came to the conclusion that, to prevent a reversion, "we must
>control education in the United States." They realize that that's a pretty
>big task. It is too big for them alone, so they approach the Rockefeller
>Foundation with the suggestion that that portion of education which could
>be considered domestic be handled by the Rockefeller Foundation and that
>portion which is international should be handled by the Endowment. They
>then decide that the key to success of these two operations lay in the
>alteration of the teaching of American history.
> So they approach four of the then-most prominent teachers of
>American history in the country - people like Charles and Mary Byrd - and
>their suggestion to them is: will they alter the manner in which they
>present their subject? And they got turned down flat. So they then decide
>that it is necessary for them to do as they say, "build our own stable of
> Then they approach the Guggenheim Foundation, which specializes in
>fellowships, and say: "When we find young men in the process of studying
>for doctorates in the field of American history and we feel that they are
>the right caliber, will you grant them fellowships on our say-so?" And the
>answer is yes. So, under that condition, eventually they assembled
>assemble twenty, and they take this twenty potential teachers of American
>history to London, and there they're briefed on what is expected of them
>when, as, and if they secure appointments in keeping with the doctorates
>they will have earned. That group of twenty historians ultimately becomes
>the nucleus of the American Historical Association.
> Toward the end of the 1920's, the Endowment grants to the American
>Historical Association $400,000 for a study of our history in a manner
>which points to what can this country look forward to in the future. That
>culminates in a seven-volume study, the last volume of which is, of
>course, in essence a summary of the contents of the other six. The essence
>of the last volume is: The future of this country belongs to collectivism
>administered with characteristic American efficiency. That's the story
>that ultimately grew out of and, of course, was what could have been
>presented by the members of this Congressional committee to the congress
>as a whole for just exactly what it said. They never got to that point.
>ED GRIFFIN: This is the story that emerged from the minutes of the
>NORMAN DODD: That's right. It was official to that extent.
>ED GRIFFIN: Katherine Casey brought all of these back in the form of
>dictated notes from a verbatim reading of the minutes?
>NORMAN DODD: On dictaphone belts.
>ED GRIFFIN: Are those in existence today?
>NORMAN DODD: I don't know. If they are, they're somewhere in the Archives
>under the control of the Congress, House of Representatives.
>ED GRIFFIN: How many people actually heard those, or were they typed up, a
>transcript made of them?
>NORMAN DODD: No.
>ED GRIFFIN: How many people actually heard those recordings?
>NORMAN DODD: Oh, three maybe. Myself, my top assistant, and Katherine. I
>might tell you, this experience, as far as its impact on Katherine Casey
>was concerned, was she never was able to return to her law practice. If it
>hadn't been for Carol Reece's ability to tuck her away into a job in the
>Federal Trade Commission, I don't know what would have happened to
>Katherine. Ultimately, she lost her mind as a result of it. It was a
>terrible shock. It's a very rough experience to encounter proof of these
>The Goals of the Communist Party as they appeared in the Congressional
>Record on January 10, 1963 included this one:
>17. Get control of the schools. Use them as transmission belts for socialism and current Communist propaganda. Soften the curriculum. Get control of teachers' associations. Put the party line in textbooks.
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