If you found this file in an archive use the keyword "nutteingd" in a
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February 2004
Sections
Intro Technical Terms Data Protection Act - Subject
Access - Forensic Science Service Cases Highlighting Problems with DNA
Profiling
False Matches
A New Variant of Miscarriages of Justice 2001 Criminal Justice and Police
Act section 82 The Wider Implications of DNA Profiles - the Attribution
Problem Vulnerability of the UK NDNAD Technical Problems with DNA
Profiles Lies,Damn Lies and Statistics Ethnic Normalisation of DNA
Profiles Co-ancestry and Allele Frequency
Losers of the police/forensic DNA lottery Ethnic Normalisation of DNA
Profiles
The D2S1338 Anomaly in the UK International Normalisation Data Relating
to AmpFISTR SGM Plus DNA Profiles Disturbing Developements for the
Orwellian/Kafkaesque Future Death knell for DNA profiles? They hound your
family, even after death, and through your children A New Racism ?
Un-investigated Spontaneous Mutations John Doe Indictments
In recent years, great reliance has been placed on the reliability of DNA
profiling as a foolproof method of establishing guilt or innocence of a
defendent. In many instances, DNA profiles have been responsible for the
conviction of suspects when no other evidence of their guilt has been found. In
some cases, profiles have been presented as establishing guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt despite other evidence which points to the accused innocence.
If, as is claimed, the chance of two people sharing the same DNA profile
is greater than one in 100,000,000,000, a positive match between a suspect's
profile and a profile obtained at the scene of a crime would, indeed, appear to
be damning evidence. As that is more than this planets population over all time,
it would be difficult to argue against the two profiles, having come from the
same source, although how the DNA came to be at the scene of the crime would
still have to be established.
The Promega company, that manufactures the kit for doing DNA profile
analysis, trumpets this on their web-page: ABI SGM Plus ( the system used in
the UK ) - Chance for a random match- more than 1 in 100 Billion i.e.
100,000,000,000 or 20 times the population of the earth. This statement is
criminal in its falsity. About 2/3 way down this file
http://www.promega.com/geneticidproc/eusymp2proc/11.pdf
As attested by the number of people 'caught' because their DNA profile just
happens to match a scene-of-crime sample profile. The figure for false matches
is now about 1 in 240,000 and going down fast. There are many pairs of people
around, with different DNA, but matching DNA profiles.
DNA is unique (twins excepted) but DNA profiles are not unique.
More
insurmountable problems, concern the lack of validation of the process. The last
proper International validation exercise in 1997 showed an enormous number of
errors. Then the number of "unresolved matches" in DNA databases that forensic
science will not address. And finally, inter-relatedness/co-ancestry, if
factored into the analyses, brings the "match probability" figures down
dramatically.
Technical Terms
The technical bit. I will keep it to a minimum ,but
of necessity, some technical words appear in this article. The following is a
brief explanation and glossary.
A locus is a specific area on a chromosome that can be readily identified
and in this article usually concern, unusually, sequences of DNA ,e.g.
...CGATCGATCGATCGAT... which is CGAT repeated 4 times. These repeats are highly
variable in number hence their usefulness (VNTR = Variable Number Tandem
Repeat). The number 4 , in this case, is the allele (variant ) which becomes
just one of the 20 numbers in the (UK) DNA profile. For each pair of chromosomes
there is one from the mother and one from the father. So ,4, from one parent and
perhaps 6 times the CGAT repeat from the other parent, so number 6. So for this
one locus a pair of alleles/variants (4,6), smaller number first by convention,
as the origin of each i.e. mother or father, remains unknown. Then 9 other loci
on different chromosomes giving 10x2 numbers in each profile in the UK NDNAD
(National DNA Database) .
The average number of possible alleles at each locus is 14. So permutations
of selecting from 14 numbers , 2 at a time, 10 times over is truly a very large
number. But ,a very big BUT, the chance of inheriting a particular allele is not
equal through the range of possible alleles. STR- Short Tandem Repeat;
short, repetitive sequence elements of 2-5 bases. STR's used in DNA profiling
are polymorphic, which is to say that the number of repeat elements varies
between individuals in a population. Consider the locus called
THO1 Variant Allele (fractional allele) - an STR allele with an incomplete
allele. A common THO1 variant allele is 9.3. This allele has 9 full repeats plus
3 nucleotides. Nucleotide- a building block of DNA or RNA
From a private communication between myself and Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys
to clarify some of this material. "Amelogenin is used to establish gender.
the other markers are not on X or Y; for markers named DmSnnn (e.g. D2S1338 ), m
stands for the number of the chromosome on which the marker is found. The
columns give the marker types found in an individual; e.g. this person has VWA
alleles (variants) type 17 and 19. There's no significance to the order in which
pairs of markers are presented; it's conventional to give the smaller first.
Hence the numbers in the right column are always as big as or bigger than those
in the middle column." Regards Alec Jeffreys
Some more general information regarding DNA profiles Automsomes occur in
pairs, each individual receives one from their mother and one from the father.
Therefore, at each marker included in SGM+ (the proprietary system used in the
UK), a person will receive one from their mother and one from their father. The
child is a composite of the parents. A child will receive one each of a parents
22 autosome pairs 1 to 22. The child will also receive one of the mother's X
chromosomes (mothers are XX) and either an X chromosome from the father (female
child) or a Y chromosome from the father (male child)- fathers are XY. There is
a 50% chance that any given child will receive one or the other chromosome pair
from each parent.
The following is for the benefit of people like Fian Dawson who should have
a test done with the same markers assuming a proper "chain of custody". This is
to avoid sleight-of-hand, at the taking of samples, or swapping of samples, and
verification of identity, so the results are forensically admissible. In a
standard paternity test that includes the mother, child and man alleged-to-be
the father, the DNA profile of the child is first compared to that of the mother
to identify what the mother and child have in common using Punnet squares. Then
the remaining components in the child's DNA profile must have come from the
biological father. If the man being tested does not demonstrate those components
in his profile then that would represent exclusionary evidence. If on the other
hand, if the tested man does demonstrate those components in his profile, then
that would represent inclusionary evidence. Therefore, a child is 50% related to
both parents, and 50% related to it's siblings, assuming the siblings have the
same mother and father.
Naturally occurring changes in the DNA can create an "apparent" single
exclusion or inconsistency at one marker. They are rare but do occur and should
must be taken into account. For example, in comparing the SGM+ profile of a
mother and her child, if at a single marker the mother and child did not share
anything, but did match at the other 9 SGM+ markers, then that single
inconsistency probably resulted from a mutation during oogenesis.
Data Protection Act - Subject Access - Forensic Science Service
Text of the above letter: An Executive Agency of the Home
Office Information Systems Division Forensic Science Service Trident
Court 2920 Solihull Parkway Birmingham Business Park Birmingham B37 7
YN
Direct Line +44 (0)121 329--- Facsimile +44 (0)121 770 3686 02
January 2002 Subject Access Request In response to your request for
information under the Data Protection Act a search was carried out on the
national DNA Database on 2 January 2002. The attached sheet contains the
information that was retrieved from the Database. Under recently enacted
legislation ,the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, there is no legal
reqirement for a record to be removed from the National DNA Database provided
the sample was lawfully taken. The details will only be used, however, for the
for the (sic) prevention and detection of crime, for the investigation of an
offence or for the conduct of prosecution (including crimes committed or
prosecutions brought outside the UK ).
You have also requested information from our other database collections. The
Forensic Science Service (FSS) are obliged to reveal the existence of all
evidential material held by the FSS in a criminal case to the defence lawyer
under the Criminal Procedures and Investigation (CPI) Act. The Data Protection
Act gives you the right to information relating only to yourself; this is less
than the information you are entitled to under the CPI Act. Under the Data
Protection Act it is illegal to reveal information to you that relates to
someone else. The nature of our records is such that a name and date of birth is
not sufficient to ensure that the correct case records are retrieved for a
subject access request. In order to retrieve the relevant information from our
computers we require. the date of the offence the FSS case reference
number the year the case was processed FSS laboratory where it was
processed for each case that relates to you. Your legal representative should be
able to supply you with this information; alternatively you may be able to
obtain this information from the Police. It will take a considerable effort to
retrieve the information from all the databases and copy it to you, I would be
grateful if you would reconsider whether the information from the DNA Database
is sufficient for your needs. However, if you do wish to obtain the information
from the other databases please send me the case information specified above.
Yours sincerely Dr. P E Cage and sig. Chief Executive: Dr Janet Thompson
Headquarters :Priory House Gooch Street North Birmingham B5 6QQ Laboratories
Birmingham Chepstow Chorley Huntingdon London Wetherby
A valid phone
number in Dec 2001 for this lot is 0121 606 2950 So for my entry in the UK
FSS National DNA Database ( NDNAD ).
Text of the field designations and text of this form Data Protection Act
Subject Access Request Search Name ; Search DoB ; Date of search The
National DNA Database is used for different types of data sources; consequently
some of the following items may have no data recorded against them if it is not
appropriate for the purpose for which the record mas(sic) made. Name ; DoB ;
Alias 1 ; Alias 2 ; Gender ; Country ; Paternity Id ; Ethnic Origin: White
Skinned European ; Sample Barcode ; Sample Type 3 - Buccal cells ; Case Class
Code:SA - Suspect Control from RCCJ recordable offences ; Case Reference ;
Arrest Summons ; Batch Reference ; No in Batch - at NDU ; Gel Number ; Track No
; Test Type: 3 - 3rd Generation System (SGM+) The following IDs are used to
link personal details with the sample and amplified sample details. They have no
meaning out side(sic) the National DNA Database. Person ID ; Sample ID Each
DNA sample is tested against a number of different DNA markers or Loci. Each
test is expected to detect two values, one from each parent. Sometimes the same
result will be obtained from both parents. The Amelogenin marker (Amel) is
indicative of the persons gender.
Locus Type Low High
-------------------------------------
Amel X Y
VWA 1a 1b
THO1 2a 2b
D6S502 3a 3b
FGA 4a 4b
D21S11 5a 5b
D18S51 6a 6b
D2S1338 7a 7b
D16S539 8a 8b
D19S433 9a 9b
D3S1358 10a 10b
End of Form
All the actual numbers (weeded) labelled b in the right hand column, are
greater or equal to, the numerical values in the middle column marked with "a".
The above DNA profile form is appallingly constructed. To a layman
the X and Y at the top of the columns suggest that the numbers tabulated below
the X refer to data from the X chromosome and under Y from the Y chromosome,
which is erroneous. The reader of such a table, without any previous knowledge,
would assume the figures under the X would relate to the X chromosome and Y
chromosome under the Y with immediate implications to blood relatives. The
amelogenin row should be removed from the table and placed elsewhere.
Some history of the UK NDNA database
45,000 profiles in the
database in 1991 135,000 in 1995 300,000 in 1998 840,000 in spring
2000 over 1 million in 2001 1,886,000 25 March 2003 [Germany had 36,000
in its BKA DNA database in spring 2000 ] Up till 2002 the figures for false
DNA match was about 1 in 500,000 February 2003 dropped to about 1 in
330,000 May 2003 dropped to about 1 in 240,000 If the 'Milly Dowler' case
was a false match then the figure drops to about 1 in 200,000 - going down fast
now. "Operation Ruby", reported on http://www.itv.com/news/2093001.html
August 08,2003 concerning an implicated parishioner of St Paul's church
,Ryhope,Sunderland. 'Milly Dowler'
From
Ireland http://www.online.ie/news/viewer.adp?article=%203040050 Man freed
after DNA evidence deemed not enough Quote 2003-10-14 : A Dublin man on
trial for murder walked free today when the Central Criminal Court jury was
directed to acquit because DNA evidence alone could not be relied upon. Mr
Justice Butler's direction to the jury to acquit on murder and firearms charges
followed defence submissions that, as there was no corroborative evidence to
support the DNA evidence, the jury should be instructed to acquit the accused
Frederick Howe. ... End Quote
And now from the UK The
Case of Raymond Easton or Internet archive
source the severely disabled 'cat burglar' from Swindon,Wiltshire,the
case that led to the police having to increase the number of markers ( loci )
tested from 6 to 10 in the UK DNA profiles
A second case where unbelievably someone was sentenced to 6 years in prison
for having a "DNA match" after a trawl through the FSS database and the
following "corroborative evidence" "The prosecution relied upon some matters
as providing support: firstly, that the applicant was a smoker or, more
accurately, that he had admitted in interview that he had been on his way to
purchase a packet of cigarettes; secondly, the Crown said it was relevant that
the applicant lived in the general locality of the burglaries (Birmingham); and
thirdly, that the appellant was a man and most safe crackers were male. " Just
because some fag butts were found at the Scene-of-Crime - ask yourself - How
many professional burglars hang around smoking a cigarette while on a job
? The
Case of Robert Watters,Birmingham Primary source for the Watters appeal
court judgement is on Butterworths Lexis Nexis.
From the Court of Appeal
judgement concerning Regina v. Watters heard on 19 Oct 2000 Quote The
other evidence results from more stringent tests that have been done on the DNA
material that was available in this case. That is partly as a result of a case
in which a 6 point match was found to produce two possible suspects, one of whom
had been charged despite living at the other end of the country and had to be
acquitted when it was appreciated that the DNA matched a second person. End
Quote
A Case Devastating to the FSS A story from 14 Feb 2003 that confirms the
worst aspect of the above ,the case of - Peter
Hamkin of Liverpool Implicated as a murderer in a murder that occurred
in Florence,Italy a thousand miles away. and then Peter
Hamkin follow-up 17 Feb 2003 It seems patently obvious to me but to few
other people that this is another case of an unrelated false match. Peter
Hamkin follow-up 10 March 2003 and the second page of the article. I
was proven correct . MAKE AS MUCH NOISE AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE PETER HAMKIN
CASE The only newspaper, of January 2004, that has caught on to all this is
Le Monde (23 dec
2003) http://www.lemonde.fr/web/imprimer_article/0,1-0@2-3226,36-346852,0.html At
least they would appear to use the term false positive matches. I object to the
term adventitious match as there is nothing accidental about all this - it is
criminal 'scientific' incompetence at best and corruption at worst.
Now there is an Interpol hook-up this disgusting activity will become more
and more common unless campaigners like me put a stop to it. I have seen an
unconfirmed report that this "match was made" using 6 loci from the Italian
profile and 6 from Mr Hamkin's FSS 6 loci profile. So these dangerous bastards
have painted themselves even blacker if they, post-Easton, are still making
uncorroborated "matches" on 6 loci. From my computer simulation of a large DNA
profile database A
simulation of a large DNA profile database - the result being a match on 10 loci
in just 2 million 'parthenogenic' profiles i.e. no kinship, relatedness,
co-ancestry of an astounding result. The UK FSS were using 6 loci ,as the
forensic statistitians were telling them, chance of false match 1 in 37 million.
But I now know that if they had continued to the current (2003) total of 2
million in the NDNAD then there would be more than 27,168 pairs of false
matches 1231 triples 110 quadruples 14 quintuples It beggars belief
that the FSS had such faith in 6 loci right up to the Raymond Easton case that
forced the issue.
The Italians use 13 loci, 8 of which are the same as
the UK set of loci, so maybe 8 loci match - we will have to wait and see what
emerges about the case. As Peter Hamkin was arrested in 2001 his profile would
have been on 10 loci.
The
first, reported, case of a false DNA profile match, to someone in Goettingen
,Germany göttingen prisoner gottingen thomas klinge gunter heinz hanover bicycle
DNA profile DNA profiles DNA profiling Profil d'cAdn Profils d'cAdn Profilage d'cAdn
Profilo del DNA Profili del DNA Delineamento del DNA Perfil do DNA Perfis do DNA Perfilar do DNA
DNA-Profil DNA-Profile DNAPROFILIEREN profil de dna profils de dna profilage de dna
If
this German was not incarcerated and had been at the time of the murder then he
would have got the Easton/Hamkin treatment ,especially as this bod had a
criminal record for sex and violent offences. The story, in German, in
Die Welt The
Goettingen Prisoner story placed here for easy access 20 June 2003 and
the 'Milly Dowler' serological sample in Surrey match with a Sunderland
parishioner. From Australia the first instance of an innocent female
implicated as a murderer - the Werribee rape victim,October 2003
http://www.heraldsun.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5478,7442645%255E2862,00.html and
http://www.heraldsun.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5478,7433016%255E2862,00.html "The
accuracy of Victoria's DNA system will be on trial during the Jaidyn Leskie
inquest next month. The Herald Sun yesterday revealed that DNA found on a bib
Jaidyn was wearing the day he is presumed to have been killed matches the DNA of
a rape victim. Police have interviewed the 22-year-old Werribee woman and say
she is not connected with Jaidyn's disappearance.
There was unidentified
DNA found on a bib Jaidyn was wearing the day he disappeared. The bib was found
in a plastic bag, with some of Jaidyn's other clothing, in Blue Rock Dam near
where Jaidyn's body was discovered in January 1998. All the obvious females who
might have come into contact with the bib were DNA tested at the time. Jaidyn's
mother nominated a number of other women she thought should be tested and the
new investigation ensured each of these woman was checked.
None of them
were found to be a match. As a matter of routine, the DNA from the bib was run
through the police DNA database to see if it matched any of the thousands of DNA
samples taken from criminals and victims and which are stored on the database.
It turned out to match DNA obtained from the outside of a condom used by a
rapist to rape a woman. Police have interviewed the 22-year-old rape victim and
told the coroner they do not believe she was in any way involved in the
disappearance of Jaidyn, but can't explain why her DNA was on Jaidyn's
bib."
Later appraisal suggests this was another case of unexplainable lab
cross-contamination.
Which is the more reliable evidence ? "Evidence"
from theoretical forensic scientists or evidence from real life such as Messrs
Easton and Hamkin and the Goettingen prisoner. This is the Birmingham FSS
quoted in Forensic Science International 88 (1997) 33-42: "In recent months
we [the FSS] have had a very clear steer from the appeal court that forensic
scientists should concern themselves with frequencies and be ready to present to
the courts the probability of other individuals possessing the same profile. The
UK population is about 60,000,000. The combined TGM and SGM statistics [now
called SGM+ ] translates to a frequency of 1 in 1,000,000,000,000,000 (in many
billions)."
I would be interested in finding confirmation/clarification of any of the
following broadcast on 04 Dec 2002 ,9pm on the Sci-fi TV channel in a
documentary series this one programme entitled "DNA in the Dock" - [ A US
anthropologist discovered a 14 point match between two unrelated people who
lived 2000 miles apart. He mentioned that the two samples in question were from
South America and Mexico respectively. There was also a mention of a perfect
match in two non-family members of a certain small in-bred tribe consisting of a
few hundred people [ full reference on my dnay.htm file ] . 300 "matches" in the
UK NDNAD ascribed to mistakes,re-tested people giving aliases (an unrelated
match of 2 DNA profiles and unrelated conventional fingerprints would be in the
billions to one against) etc ].
From "trade" journal Forensic Science International 95 (1998)
p30. Concerning data in the UK DNA database as of 04 October 1996 when there
were only 6311 samples from the London area and 573 from the Cardiff area. "A
small number of unresolved duplicate pairs of profiles were present in the
regional data :10 pairs within the London region and 1 pair in Cardiff. The most
common cause of duplicate entries is the use of aliases by suspects who have
been arrested on several occasions. For administrative reasons ,it is not always
possible to resolve such duplicates by exhaustive police investigation."
This statement is absolute tosh. At the same time a DNA sample is extracted,
from an arrested person, his conventional fingerprints are taken as well. It
could not be easier to cross-correlate conventional and DNA fingerprints from 2
data sets. The chances then of a false matching of both types of "fingerprint"
would truly be in the trillions to one against. If just one of these 10 is a
genuine unrelated false match then you can throw forensic statistics out of the
window. Are they telling us that the police are unconcerned about having
duplicate criminal records for one criminal - tell that to the fairies. I smell
a cover-up of the most grave kind because it concerns people who consider
themselves scientists not administrators/politicians and the like.
The PRIORITY is to fully investigate all such occurrances - I have a
scientific background and I find the deliberate non-investigation of anomalies
to be absolutely abhorrent and an affront to the scientific ethic. There is this
incredibly dangerous mindset that they cannot have unrelated false matches so
ring-fence them out of consideration.
Bear in mind this was from the
situation as it was in 1996 to 1998 and is no different in concept now despite
increasing from 6 to 10 loci tested. It is an absolute scandal that I seem to be
the only person who seems to be investigating this appallingly lax state of
affairs in forensic "science".
My MP agreed to table a written
parliamentary question. If submitted to parliament in the form I had
envisageded then the reply would likely have come back as too complex or costly
to answer. So more than likely, no reply - was my MP's (been there before )
helpful response. He advised splitting into 2 questions over time. The first
one to get the number of current DNA profile matches for whatever reason
answered and written into Hansard. A figure of ???? or whatever would almost
guarantee some sort of qualification referring to aliases. Then with any luck
there may be more than me and my MP asking that this figure be resolved into the
component parts. That is pairs of unrelated individuals with matching DNA
profiles and same persons recorded twice or more using aliases. This is a
copy of my letter to my MP as I had heard/seen nothing about it. 15 Nov 2003
by post and 05 Dec 2003 by hand. " Dear Mr - , On 04 July 2003 I visited
your surgery at - -. You agreed to ask a written Parliamentary Question. The
form of the question to the Home Office was to be something of the cut-down
nature, "How many DNA profile matches are within the UK NDNAD ? (National DNA
Database)". I have not seen reference to the question or answer on the internet
public accesss Hansard site or any follow-up communication from yourself "
Then 8 months later http://tinyurl.com/23ovx or original This
question and answer in Hansard 5 Feb to 11 Feb 2004 Quote Dr.
Whitehead: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many DNA
profile matches exist within the UK national DNA database. Ms Blears: The
figures relating to the DNA profile matches reported by The National DNA
Database since its inception in April 1995 to January 2004 inclusive are
described as follows: a total of 459,903 matches have been reported between DNA
profiles obtained from individuals and DNA profiles collected from unsolved
crime scenes; and a total of 28,116 scene-to-scene matches have been reported
between DNA profiles collected from unsolved crime scenes. End
Quote Unfortunately not disclosing the far more significant number of matches
in the CJ (arrestee ) side of the NDNAD
Restriction on use
and destruction of fingerprints and samples (1) Section 64 of the 1984 Act
(destruction of fingerprints and samples) shall be amended as follows. (2)
For subsections (1) and (2) (obligation to destroy fingerprints and samples of
persons who are not prosecuted or who are cleared) there shall be substituted-
"(1A) Where- (a) fingerprints or samples are taken from a person in
connection with the investigation of an offence, and (b) subsection (3)
below does not require them to be destroyed, the fingerprints or samples may be
retained after they have fulfilled the purposes for which they were taken but
shall not be used by any person except for purposes related to the prevention or
detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a
prosecution. "
Note it says "may be retained" not "must be retained"
The effect of this section 82 was confirmed directly, face to face, from the
horse's mouth.- January 2002 I bumped into ,socially, the Home Office Minister,
John Denham. Some leading opinion on section 82 of the Criminal Justice and
Police Act 2001. John Yorke Denham gloating about his coup (New Scientist 24
August 2002 - "The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 swept away the
obligation on the police to destroy DNA samples taken from suspects who are
acquitted, or where charges are later dropped or convictions quashed on
appeal." I have found nothing in Hansard relating to discussion of this
section 82 in parliament so in my books that makes it an illegal
imposition. Helena
Kennedy QC on this matter If this article fails to emerge from the Guardian
archive then click again.
Sir Alec
Jeffreys,inventor of DNA profiling on this matter If this article fails to
emerge from the Guardian archive then click again. Also quoted in a New
Scientist article of 05 May 2001 "Deep down they (police authorities) believe
that innocent people who've had a brush with the law are more likely than not to
be criminals... There is only one way to prevent any abuse (returning to the
samples later in a trawl for data matching with physical characteristics say) of
the DNA samples - destroy them all after a DNA sample has been obtained... Any
checking of results should be carried out on a fresh sample obtained from the
suspect... Suspects who are cleared should have the right to remove their DNA
profiles or more radically the database should contain everyone's DNA
profile,filed at birth." Sir Alec
Jeffreys more recently on this matter
I sent a proper request to FSS
Birmingham but they refused to destroy my DNA sample and the derived biometric
data. I have had one of my civil liberties removed by this Dr P E Cage. I
did not volunteer to have a DNA sample taken from me and as I have no criminal
record I do not see any moral justification for them keeping it. The only
reason to have my DNA profile permanently on record is to stitch me up with a
crime at some point in the future - via falsely matching it to some
scene-of-crime sample.
On 13 March 2002 there will be a test case on section 82 of the Criminal
Justice and Police Act 2001. It is against Yorkshire Constabulary, conducted by
Howells Solicitors of Sheffield, acting for a Michael MARPER. The grounds being
that it be read incompatible with article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and must be read down. They can only retain finger-prints,DNA samples etc
if there is original and compelling reason e.g. another criminal case. The
following is an update on the high court test case published 23 March 2002 where
the background material almost looks as though it was lifted from this file.
Section
82 ,CJPA 2001 Test Case If the article fails to emerge first time click
again Section 82 ,CJPA
2001 Appeal court decision by Justice Leveson and Justice Rose 22 March 2002
More nasties concerning
s82 of the 2001 CJPA from justices Waller,Woolf and Sedley
The Wider Implications of DNA Profiles - the Attribution
Problem
Beware! Police DNA database and postage stamps
Please be aware all criminals or non-criminals like me (courtesy of section
82 of the 2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act) who have had DNA samples taken
from them and the profile placed permanently on the Birmingham Forensic Science
Service (FSS) database. DO NOT lick postage stamps before sticking on
envelopes - use damp cloth or sponge. As evinced in these files there are
dangerous and corrupt people around who fabricate testimony and evidence to
present to the police. It would have been very easy for any of my opposition to
obtain stamps, licked by me ,and now, know my DNA profile is on this database.
All they had to do was soak off a stamp. Then use it to dampen the gum on a
fresh stamp, stuck to a "bomb threat" letter or smear on clothing to fabricate
an "assault" or daub on a cigarette stub (previously smoked through a
cigarette-holder) and leave it at a "burglary" or even a murder scene say. Cor!
the perfect crime - murder one of your enemies AND get another of your enemies
convicted for your crime. Forensic testers will look for the presence of DNA
,not be testing for the presence of gum unless pre-advised to do so
. Previously, to do the same by lifting fingerprints and transferring to a
crime scene artefact required substantial knowledge and skill. Now any old moron
can falsely implicate anyone if they know they have been arrested and a DNA
sample taken from them.
So a public information broadcast for all
practising criminals who may read this file
The next time you go out to do a burglary or whatever. A simple way to
reduce the chance of you being discovered and also mess up the forensic service
more generally. Make a collection of cigarette stubbs,used snot rags /tissues
etc from public areas and obtain used gloves, hats ,combs etc from jumble /
rummage sales, garage / car boot sales or charity shops. Wheelie-bins would
probably contain useful material. Then leave behind ONE of these items near your
entry or exit point. DO NOT handle any of these items yourself, keep in a
plastic bag until you "drop" it. If the Soco boys find a nice item covered in
DNA they are more likely not to do the normal full range of dusting, casting and
snapping and proceed to the next assignment. Get enough people to adopt this
strategy and the national DNA database will be totally discredited. Masons
solicitor multiple
Surprisingly for a UK law firm it has details of how this pernicious
proposal can be defeated by deliberately leaving other people's DNA at scenes of
crime. No problem of implicating innocent citizens, as the police only use
evidence, with guaranteed association with a crime or criminal - don't they.
Even the police are now concerned how easy it is to 'fit-up' someone
(police this time) by planting someone else's DNA at a crime-scene From 17
Aug 2003 http://www.scotlandonsunday.com/scotland.cfm?id=902562003 Partial
Quote Police outrage over demand for their DNA
by JASON
ALLARDYCE
PLANS to force police to give DNA samples have sparked a
rebellion among rank-and-file officers. It is understood all eight of Scotland's
police forces are about to demand that in future new recruits hand over samples
to be included in a national genetic database. This would allow any body matter,
such as hair or saliva, found at a crime scene, to be compared with the DNA
records of officers, so investigations are not thrown off course through
accidental contamination by officers working there. But rank-and-file police
fear that calculating criminals with a grudge against members of the force could
manipulate the system to damage the careers of innocent officers. Members of the
Scottish Police Federation believe criminals could deliberately contaminate the
scene with officers' DNA, either to implicate them in serious crimes or to give
the impression that they had planted evidence. A federation spokesman said: "A
point made by many of our members is that it is relatively easy for anyone so
minded to obtain DNA traces of a police officer - for example from a discarded
cigarette butt - and to deliberately contaminate a locus with it. "Apart from
the suspicion which may or may not fall on the officer, it has the potential to
diminish the evidential value of any DNA traces of the real perpetrator of the
crime." End Quote
In the full Scotland on Sunday article the
policewoman McKie case and the disputed dermal finfger-prints are referred to
http://onin.com/fp/problemidents.html#second_case as high resolution images -
interesting viewing Another case of fingerprint wrong identification
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2004/02/02/
a_blow_to_the_credibility_of_fingerprint_evidence/
Then from the
criminal fraternity someone being implicated by person or persons unknown,
presumably an enemy of his, in Exeter reported 14 Aug 2003.
http://www.thisisexeter.co.uk/displayNode.jsp?nodeId=101955&command=displayContent&sourceNod
e=99871&contentPK=6705317 Quote A man accused of burgling a city home
after bloody tissues found at the scene matched his DNA profile has been cleared
by a court. Jonathan Bowskill said he had nothing to do with the burglary at
Alpha Street, Heavitree, in the early hours of November 29. A jury at Exeter
Crown Court yesterday found him not guilty. During the trial, prosecutor David
Evans said Peter Holmes went to bed and left a window open and his wallet in his
leather jacket. He got up at 5am and went to work. He later found the tissues on
the floor and his wallet missing. Bowskill told police although he was a heroin
addict, he "didn't do burglaries", and did not know how the tissues came to be
there. End Quote
This one I've not found reference to the woman
involved being prosecuted for attempt to pervert the course of justice or
whatever. It may be just reported fantacising by the prosecution to explain a
very awkward situation. But I've included anyway. Turner was charged with
three rapes last year after police matched samples of his DNA to that from
fluids found on the victims. Turner claimed he was innocent. He acknowledged
that the genetic material taken from the rape victims matched his but argued
that it must have come from another man, an unknown rapist with the exact same
genetic code. Milwaukee authorities just laughed. They knew that unless Turner
had an identical twin -- which he didn't -- the chance of someone sharing his
genetic code was about 3 trillion to 1. Turner was convicted in March 1999. A
few months later, as Turner sat in jail waiting to be sentenced, something
astonishing happened. Police investigating a new rape compared the alleged
attacker's DNA with samples from other sex crimes, and found a match. It was
Turner, who of course had an ironclad alibi — he was in jail. Was Turner
innocent all along? Against astronomical odds, could there really be another
rapist with his DNA profile in the Milwaukee area? If so, that would shatter the
entire premise of DNA technology. As it turned out, the DNA was indeed Turner's.
Milwaukee authorities discovered a clever scam: Turner, determined to cast doubt
on the science upon which his conviction was based, had smuggled a sample of his
own semen out of jail, concealed in what had been a ketchup packet. Family
members then paid a woman $50 to use the sperm to stage a phony rape. Turner
wound up being sentenced to 120 years in prison.
This is one of the
biggest flaws with DNA profiles. There is no problem in its use to identify a
dead body, say, as it is known for certain that the sample came from the body in
question. Likewise, no problem in its use as evidence of exclusion from a crime.
But and a its a very big BUT unless there is strong independent conventional
evidence, as well, how can anyone say where a few cells containing DNA came
from.
In the same vein (nudge,nudge) when I first saw this story I did
not believe a word of it. But it is all officially documented and even video
tape of one of the blood
samplings. http://canada.com/national/story.asp?id=0C850589-3255-4AEE-8FA1-1857F3A29D00
Quote ... The case unfolded in 1992 when an unwed mother told police
she'd been drugged and raped in hospital by her family doctor. The scene was
Kipling, Sask., a small farm town where the doctor was not only wealthy, but
popular. Few believed his accuser and instead bought into his claim she was bent
on extortion. Three voluntary blood tests and seven years later, the semen found
on the woman's underwear still didn't match the doctor's DNA, baffling his
victim. John Schneeberger was only charged after she hired a private
investigator to steal lip balm from his truck to perform an independent DNA
test. Weeks later, RCMP plucked 25 hairs from Schneeberger's head and finally
matched his DNA to the semen. In 1999, the doctor told a packed courtroom the
woman broke into his home, stole a used condom and wiped its contents on her
underwear to frame him. Because he needed to protect his family and wealth from
this woman, he devised a plan. With a surgeon's scalpel, he sliced deep into his
lower bicep and implanted a plastic vein under the skin. In a Penrose drain, he
stored another man's blood so that when police came to collect a sample to match
DNA, he was prepared. Instead of removing blood from Schneeberger's vein it was
drawn from the plastic tube.
Vulnerability of the UK NDNAD
Just for the record the address of where the UK NDNAD store of DNA samples
is printed on page 229 of the HMSO "National Asset Register, 2001" in any major
UK library Frontispiece states "Presented to Parliament by the Prime
Minister, by command of Her Majesty ,July 2001" Also on the internet at HM Treasury
site Named with inspired lunacy after Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys the
inventor of DNA profiling note not Jeffrey's in the address. Oldbury
Facility, Jeffreys House, 1 Wharfside, Rounds Green Road, Oldbury, West
Midlands, B69 2BU: a purpose built industrial building used partly as a store
and partly fitted as office and laboratory space. Occupied from 1997 on a
20-year lease until 2017; 1012 square metres. And further background again
in the public domain from 5 May 2001 New Scientist Pages 10-12.
http://www.newscientist.com (archive free but registration
required) Quote
The DNA Police By David Concar IN THE US, it would be protected by
steel doors and armed guards. In Britain, anonymity does the job. Tucked away on
an industrial estate near Birmingham, you'd scarcely know the brick-and-glass
building was there-let alone that it houses the biggest collection of human DNA
in the world. A collection that's getting bigger and more contentious-by the
day. For years, police in Britain have been quietly exercising their right to
collect saliva swabs from almost anyone they take into custody. Those swabs now
fill scores of industrial freezers in the basement of the anonymous looking
building. Upstairs, a database holds over a million DNA profiles based on these
samples. And because crime never stops, up to 3000 new samples arrive every
day. End Quote They have to have this backstop, of stored DNA samples, for
everyone profiled because the science is flaky. No one can be sure a particular
DNA profile truly represents a DNA sample, until it is multiple-tested. They
also need it for cross-comparison on international database trawls, to test with
loci not used in the UK.
Technical Problems with DNA Profiles
Lack of Validation
Conventional fingerprint forensic evidence has been around for over 100
years and you would think it was tried and tested technology but not the case.
See the cases of police detective Shirley McKie and David Asbury in Scotland Shirley Mckie the forensic
fingerprint details are worth downloading to look at. and another cock-up
concerning friction ridge, dermal fingerprints Rick
Jackson ,Upper Darby, Pa,USA
I still have not found a proper validation study where someone has taken DNA
material ,divided it and sent it to different forensic labs for analysis. The
series in Analytical Chemistry "Inter-laboratory Comparison of Autoradigraphic
DNA Profiling measurements" part 1 ,Oct 16 1994; part 2 April 1 1995; part 3
June 1 ,1996 and part 4 May 15 1997 relate to RFLP rather than PCR
processing. If tested by different labs, on different machines, but looking
at the same loci and the results came back as differing alleles where would all
this DNA profiling be then ?
Take some blood samples, divide up and send to different labs to process
under normal batch processing ,do 10 loci profiles and collate the results. Not
surprising, no-one has done so because I recently found this report in Forensic
Science International Vol 86 (1997) p25-33
This experiment limited itself to just 2 of the loci used in the 10 loci UK
Forensic Science Service DNA database. 7 blood samples were taken and divided
and sent to 16 different laboratories around the world. These were tested
knowing the significance and not part of routine (possibly less rigorous ) batch
processing .
The multinationals, surprise surprise, do not release this information and
no-one outside the industry, unbelievably, would seem to have done such
validation. For all I know this industry could be a house of cards build on
sand. The nearest I have is from FSI Vol 86,1997,p25-33 Source reference:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T6W-3W0G0CK-3&_user=10&_handle=W-WA-A-A-AY-MsSAYVW-UUW-AUDDEAAUEW-WZZZEWCAW-AY-U&_fmt=summary&_coverDate=04%2F18%2F1997&_rdoc=3&_orig=browse&_srch=%23toc%235041%231997%23999139998%2375689!&_cdi=5041&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=4d7a6643c27f043e66bfe63e3729a47c Abstract of the FSI article 7 samples
divided ,sent to 16 labs and checked blind on the 2 loci D21 and FGA then as 2
alleles per locus 448 data-points in total. Bear in mind all the labs knew these
were validation samples so could easily have been on their "best behaviour".
E.g. not (say) using an unbalanced centrifuge in the lab at the same time, that
could mechanically vibrate the DNA processor, or (say) not using a known
electrically noisy motorised bit of kit that pumps noise spikes down the mains
etc etc. There were 18 errors in that returned data the worst being (23,23)
returned as (21,21) i.e. 2 bins away from the "correct". 'Invalidation ' of
DNA profiling - FGA 'Correct'
results (majority in agreement) are in the first two columns. Erroneous results
highlighted next to red blobs. Lab '13' would not have been aware of any
problems as for all they knew some false de-natured samples could have been
included. HUMFIBRA is also known as FGA. Note [8] is Urquart to Moeller
conversion formula.
'Invalidation ' of DNA profiling - D21 So with an
error rate of 18 in 448 or 1 in 25, one of the figures in my (un-fudged) profile
could easily be incorrect - who would know ? Until it is repeated on different
machines, with different personel, at different times, at different labs, with
different reagent batches, and a concencus "correct" result emerges, then no-one
knows. Again there is the same uncertainty to any SoCo sample, one figure in 20
can easily be wrong by one or more. The "correct result" [i.e. most labs in
agreement (there is a whole treatise just on this aside, as everything in DNA
"science" is inferred ) ] from 13 of the labs was for locus HUMFIBRA ( FGA ) 2
alleles per sample and 7 samples 21,25 ; 23,24 ; 22,22.2 ; 23,23 ; 18,23 ;
18,22 ; 23.2,24 but for lab "1" ; 23,24 returned as 22,26 for lab "11" ;
22,22.2 returned as 22,22 and for lab " 13" ; 23,23 returned 21,21 ; 18,22
returned 17,19.2 and 23,24 returned as no result obtained and 23.2,24 returned
as no result obtained i.e. just 3 of the 7 samples matched. Well at least
they were honourable enough to report it all. On the second locus D21S11
better agreement 7 consensus 'correct' results
59,63;63,67;63,65;61,65;61,70;61,63;59,65 - only one lab at variance the
61,65 pair returned as 61,63 ; 59,65 returned as 61,63 and no result found for
the 63,67 pair.
As far as I know no-one has analysed and published the
results of checking for co-ancestry and independence i.e. say inheriting a 17 on
D2 does not predispose to inheriting a 15 on D18 say , by checking hundreds of
thousands of such profiles.
I can be pretty certain my following critique of DNA profiling will not be
published in the likes of Forensic Science International. Proponents of mass
DNA profiling like to trot out large googol type numbers giving the probability
of 2 people having the same DNA profile, seemingly derived from little more
than, some sort of product rule of number of markers and the number of possible
sites on these markers. They use some pretty impenetrable statistics to show
there is no aliassing between these DNA markers. That is, they are of the
opinion that the inheritance of these marker sites is independent. Saying, if
you inherit one set of "numbers" on one marker then you are NOT predisposed to
inherit a given set of "numbers" on another site. I would rather rely on figures
derived from real life.
I tried getting full details from Professor Chaseling but she did not reply
to my email enquiries of 20 Jan, 2002 and 14 April ,2002. In Australia a Prof
Janet Chaseling of Griffith University did an experiment taking DNA samples from
the likes of politicians and blood donors; reported in the Sydney Morning Herald
22/04/2000. The
Sydney article no longer available from the original site or SMH Article I assumed it
would be in her recent FSI article "Implications for DNA identification
arising from an analysis of Australian forensic databases" authors K.L. Ayres,
J. Chaseling and D.J. Balding Published in Forensic Science International 2002,
Vol. 129 90-98. but I read too much into the word "implications". Someone
anonymously, kindly sent me a copy, of the FSI article. No reference at all to
this 7 loci match just observations on the advisability of maintaining separate
databases for different ethnic groups. Caucasian, Asian and Australian
aboriginal in this Oz situation, if you want to estimate probabilities of false
positive matches. Neither Chaseling nor Ayres will confirm this 7 loci match by
me emailing them.
From a forensic scientist ,as of October 2002, soon to submit for
publishing " I have examined the Australian forensic databases, and I have
found instances of 7-locus matches" ;notice the plural, not the one case, so far
released to the public domain.
To my understanding, a definition of a science is, it must be consistent and
reproducible which this plainly isn't. Another problem area for reliability
of DNA profiling from Analytic Chemistry 2001 V73,1345 - 1349. When the DNA
samples are amplified they are held at specific temperatures but should this
temperature fluctuate even marginally from the set temperature then false
readings particularly at the longer repeat lengths. "...oscillations in the
capillary's temperature result in significant degradation in the number of
theoretical plates, the resolution between adjasent peaks and the number of
bases of DNA sequence determined from the electrophoresis data. Temperature must
be held stable to within 0.1 degree C to obtain long read lengths"
There is a serious problem with locus HUMFIBRA ( FGA ) from Forensic Science
International 112 (2000) 151 - 161 "Validation of the AMPFISTR SGM Plus system
... ". e.g. a 19,26 pair of alleles measured by one technique will record as
19,19 on a different technique.
DNA Processing Machines treated as Dishwashers
I was dumbfounded when I
read this piece that an American had written, as an aside, on a Usenet golfing
user-group. "Making your own clubs is a lot of fun and can add a lot to your
enjoyment of the game. It does not require any sort of high tech qualifications
or excess of expertise. My colleagues think it is a big deal that I can fix my
thermal cycler (PCR machine) and automated DNA sequencer... it's not. They are
simple electrical/mechanical devices and pulling a board or replacing a pump is
no different than doing the same for a cheap radio or a dishwasher." You
don't tinker with these sort of machines, however well intentioned. Just moving
a wiring loom could upset the calibration. He, being in the States, could have
condemned someone to death by his actions.
Lies,Damn Lies and Statistics
The following statistics is something like the "birthday problem" - what is
the probability that, in a room with N people in it, everyone has a different
birthday? If there are at least 23 people, then the probability that everyone
has a different birthday is less than 1/2. In other words, with at least 23
people, you would expect at least one matching birthday. This is, a lot lower
than the number of people in a room before there is a probability of someone
with a specified birthday
The Australian Chaseling study I am interested in totalled 5,500 from which
the DNA profiles were determined using 9 markers. The results showed no matches
concerning all 9 markers or any 8 markers but for 7 markers there was a match.
For the moment I will assume there are 12 possibilities on each of the 9 markers
Here we don't have 365 possible birthdays, but have 12^7 marker position
possibilities (or 12^8, or 12^9; in other words, the number of positions per
marker, to the power of the number of markers). And have N=5500 people. Assuming
that these 8 or 7 of 9 were chosen in advance, i.e., that it was
not the case that a set of 7 was chosen, no match was found, so
a different set of 7 was chosen, and so on, until finally a match was found.
From a proper statistician the maths in this case is
With 7 markers, the
probability of at least one match is around 1/3. With 8 markers, the
probability is around 1/30. With 9 markers, the probability is around
1/350. With 10 markers, the probability is around 1/4000. With 9 markers,
a sample of N=85,000 gives a probability of at least one match of around 1/2.
With 10 markers, you would need N=290,000.
(Note that the above
probabilities are very different from the probability that a specified person
matches a randomly chosen marker position set [or equivalently, that a specified
marker set matches a randomly chosen person]. The latter is 1/12^(number of
markers), again assuming independence and equi-probability.) Or one in 36
million for 7. If there was a city of 85,000 people there is probably 2 people
with the same matched set of 9 markers but no one would be aware of this.
Neither is likely to have left a hair sample etc at a scene of crime or had
their profile registered on a DNA database. In the UK the database held 940,000
in 2001 and increasing at the rate of 3000 a day to an expected 3 million in
2004. So buried in this database, there are probably already numerous matches
concerning 9 markers and 3 or so for all 10 and hundreds if the whole UK
population is considered. I challenge any forensic scientist with access to this
database or similar to reveal the true extent of false matches buried in these
data.
Each marker is used twice over ,one from the father and one from
the mother of the giver of the sample. There may be 2x 20 possible sites on a
marker but some of them are so rare as never in practicality turn up. Varying
from one site, on one particular marker occurring with frequency of 0.35 ,two
per person ,so approx. 1 in 4 of any person tested down to substantially less
than 0.001 for the rarely occurring sites. An unfortunate individual with a set
of sites of the most frequently occurring pairs could be in for a rough ride.
For the 7 markers below the most common occurrances are 1 in 4,4,5,7,8,15,17
giving a "product rule" of only 1 in 1.1 million, decreased even more if
co-ancestry is taken into account. Result from simulations - for people with
the same sort of ancestry as myself, all alleles of my profile have an allele
frequency greater than 8 per cent. For that subset of the general population
with 4 - fourths English background then there would probably be between 50 and
80 10 loci matches within 2 million such people. See dnas6.htm file in this
series.
Co-ancestry and Allele Frequency
Interestingly, quite a variation in frequency of occurring, between
Caucasian and Afro-Carribbean descent. In the following table I have rounded the
figures to disguise the figures a bit as they are derived from my actual DNA
profile and, similarly, anonymously labelled the markers. Headings are :markers
a to g, possible sites per marker excluding rarities ,then for the actual
profile and pairs of numbers for each marker the (Caucasian) frequency of
occurrance as 1 in x people, then 1 in y people of African descent for the same
site pairs if this individual had been African in descent. Number of sites on a
locus excluding very rare occurrances of less than .01 ,average number per
allele of about 2x6 = 12.
Marker No of sites f/Cauc f/Afr
a 2x5 110 110
b 2x6 20 30
c 2x7 60 50
d 2x7 20 30
e 2x8 30 70
f 2x5 10 30
g 2x5 15 25
In the actual profile each marker has 2 numbers (alleles) e.g. 17 and 19
,the site 17 from one parent and the site 19 from the other parent. This police
web-site then gives the likelihood of occurrance of a match on all these 7 pairs
of markers by just multiplying the frequencies together so for the 3rd column a
(rounded) figure of 1.2 E10 people and the 4th column 2.6 E11 i.e. many orders
of magnitude from that derived from a real-life occurrance of 1 match contained
within 5,500 .Even including the choice of markers used in the Australian tests,
would be a different seven, it is still a large difference between 5,500 and
12,000,000,000. For 10 such markers then, they would have us believe, the
probabilities were seriously in the googles. For anyone interested in Civil
Rights issues if the above profile had been derived from a scene of crime sample
then just from the markers e and f the police would be able to say the suspect
was 7 times more likely to be white than black (22 times more likely using all 7
markers). Other combinations would point to a black rather than white suspect or
red haired (MC1R variant gene in this case, Prof Rees, Edinburgh University)
suspect etc. New Scientist
Article
Acccording to John Stead of Leicester University the THO1 locus can reveal a
person's genetic predisposition to Type 1 diabetes.
The 5,500 Australian sample result correlates with the situation of the
number of sites per marker effectively being only between 3 and 4 ( 3.4^7
=~5,500) similar to the maximum frequencies of occurrance on each marker.
Even if the Birmingham FSS increased the number of loci tested to 15
then there is still the possibility of a crime scene sample falsely matching
someone else's DNA profile already held in the database.
These are allele frequencies for
D3S1358,VWA,FGA,D5S818,D8S1179,D18S51,D21S11,D13S317 and D7S820 for Australian
Caucasian, Asian and Australian Aborigine backgrounds Australian allele
frequencies The following info deserves putting in the public domain from
the FSI journal article referred to above. There are 4 pages of data on allele
frequencies for Australia. So here goes ,ignoring frequencies less than 1 per
cent. Figures for single alleles. C - Caucassian, P - Pure Australian
Aboriginal, A - Asian. Columns are Locus / no. of possible alleles C/ maximum
frequency of all alleles C// no. of possible alleles P/max f of all alleles P //
no. of possible alleles A / max f of all alleles A
The following people with the most commonly occurring alleles are the most
likely to have rude awakenings by the police arresting them due to false
matches. That is if their two alleles per locus equal or are within one number
of the central value. If any single allele is two or more removed from this
central, frequent, value then you are probably fairly safe from false positive
matches. The columns in this case centred on the most common allele for that
locus in each ethnic group. C / P / A .( There is an anomaly with VWA and Asian
origin as there are 2 peaks, one at allele 14 and one at 17 with low frequencies
of .03 for 15 and .13 for 16 in between)
Losers of the police/forensic
DNA lottery (Australia)
And for the UK FSS DNA database and their choice of loci the worst case
situation is for UK Caucasians ,Afro-Caribbean and "Indian" Asian from
articles Int. J. Legal Medicine (1997) 110:5-9 and Int. J. Legal Medicine
(2001) 114:147-155 placed on UK SGM+ Allele
Frequencies
Assuming equivalence of D8S1179 = D6S502 [ D8S1179 is
listed as D6S502 because of a labelling error in the Co-operative Human Linkage
Center database from which this STR was chosen (Oldroyd et al, 1995, Barber and
Parkin 1996). -Forensic DNA Typing, John Butler, Academic Press, page 72.
Still being printed as D6S502 on FSS forms in 2002 ] and the D21 /D21S11
alleles I have converted using the Urquhart to Moller conversion on p32 of For.
Sci. Int. 86 (1997)
Losers of the police/forensic DNA lottery ( UK )
Allele / Caucasian / Afro-Caribbean / Indian-Asian most common locii
VWA 17 / 15 / 16
THO1 9.3 / 7 / 6
D8S1179 13 / 14 / 14
FGA 21 / 23 / 24
D21S11 30 / 28 / 29
D18S51 14 / 17 / 14
D2S1338 20 / 22 / 19
D16S539 12 / 11 / 11
D19S433 14 / 13 / 13
D3S1358 15 / 16 / 16
( For THO1 adjasent alleles to 9.3 are 9 and 10 )
Frequency of occurrance for these most common alleles
of loci used in the UK for the Caucasian population.
VWA 0.27
THO1 0.30
D6S502 0.33 (D8S1179)
FGA 0.19
D21S11 0.26
D18S51 0.16
D2S1338 0.18
D16S539 0.29
D19S433 0.38
D3S1358 0.26
The straight product rule of these is only 920,000, that is before
factoring in any co-ancestry alliasing between alleles.
Ethnic Normalisation of DNA Profiles
Consider a variant of football pools coupons. Instead of 49 games just
consider 10. Here we are not interested in who won but the score line. That is
for this purpose a score of 2,1 is the same as 1,2 . With teams in the same
league score lines of say 0,1 or 2,2 or 1,2 are far more likely than scores like
5,8 or 1,9. So we have a set of 10 scores consisting of mainly low numbers. Now
if we allow games between different leagues then the teams are less matched and
the scores are more likely to include higher numbers. The different leagues are
then analogous to different ancestral backgrounds i.e. in the UK Celtic, Viking,
Anglo-Saxon, other European, African, Asian etc. Generally speaking the majority
of people stay within their own ancestral group (or football league in the
analogy). "Expert witnesses", quoting likelihood of false matches in billions,
are using the whole population case rather than factoring-in common ancestry. Do
that and the 10 loci false match chance figures come down to more like 1 in
100,000.
The central i.e. most likely profile for a UK Caucasian and using the 10 UK
NDNAD markers of VWA,THO1,D8,FGA,D21,D18,D2,D16,D19,D3 is notionaly
centred on
(17,17)(6,9.3)(13,14)(21,21)(29,30)(14,14)(A,B)(11,12)(14,14)(15,16) in
the same order, 2 for each marker - one from each parent, for D2 (A,B) see
below.
Now my own DNA profile (Caucasian) slightly altered for obvious reasons is
(17,19)(8,9.3)(13,13)(20,22)(29,29)(13,15)(18,19)(12,12)(12,14)(16,18) still
a bewildering array of numbers but if you take the differences between both sets
of numbers you get a profile of (assuming D2 allele 20) and for the fractional
alleles like the 9.3 example then 8 minus 9.3 equals -2 for this
purpose. (0,-2)(2,0)(0,1)(1,-1)(0,1)(1,-1)(2,1)(-1,0)(2,0)(-1,-2) and you
start to see things in proportion relative to UK Caucasians. A profile in this
representation is far more accessible and far less daunting than the string of
large numbers. In this form (my invention unless someone can show otherwise ) is
no less valid but has lost the bamboozlement of apparently large numbers and
implied rarity. With a touch of antonomasia (or synecdoche, hyponymy, eponymy or
whatever) I will call this process Nutteing Ethnicity Normalisation. I only have
data for the whole UK population's principal ethnicities . If I was of Asian
background then the THO1 value is much more likely to be (6,6) rather than
(9.3,9.3) for example. Restrict to more localised/in-bred communities then the
situation worsens.
The closer you are within plus or minus 1 of a "score draw" (0,0) for each
of the 10 then the more likely there will be a false match sometime in the
future to YOUR own DNA. It would have been comforting to see some 3s to make
sure I was well out of the firing line. Incidentely as far as European D3
alleles is concerned, allele 18, is most common for the Baranya Romany
population of Hungary ,fascinating where this sort of conjecture can lead one.
Only considering data for UK Caucasians.
Table of Modes (M) and M + or -1 and M + or -2 allele frequencies of
occurrance (% ,per cent, of the population) for the 10 UK FSS NDNAD
loci Locus / M / M+-1 / M +- 2 VWA 27 71 88 THO1 30 45 56 D6,D8 33
68 84 FGA 19 49 63 D21 26 51 74 D18 16 43 71 D2 14 28 39 D16 29
74 82 D19 38 78 91 D3 26 65 84
So in forensic science terms (unique identifier) D19 is worst as only 9
percent of population have alleles outside of +-2 of the mode and 38% in the
modal group. Best case is D2, which is the triple peak one, with nearly equal
frequency peaks at alleles 17,20 and 24 Note THO1 is highly assymetric - the
peak is at 9.3 but only 1 % of people have an allele higher than 9.3
In the following I will only consider the situation equivalent to myself, or
worse. There will be many people further away from the all (0,0) situation than
myself ,especially if non-Caucasian. My normalised profile
again (0,-2)(2,0)(0,1)(1,-1)(0,1)(1,-1)(2,1)(-1,0)(2,0)(-1,-2) Now just
considering myself and people in a worse situation than myself. For the first
pair of alleles ,permutations from 0,1 and 2, is 3 so combined is
3,3,2,4,2,4,6,2,3,6 Then making the assumption of no co-ancestry ,no unknown
half-cousins etc ,so all independent, then multiplying together gives only
124,418. From my simulation (see end of file ) of people with similar
background to myself ie all alleles having a frequency more than 8 per cent I
now know this figure is less than 270,000 to one
Normalisation sequences
for UK
Afro-Caribbean (15,15)(7,7)(14,14)(23,23)(28,28)(16,17)(19,19)(11,12)(13,14)(15,16) UK
Asian (16,17)(6,7)(13,14)(23,24)(29,29)(14,14)(19,23)(11,11)(13,14)(16,16) Oriental
(NK = not known
) (17,17)(9,9)(14,14)(23,23)(29,30)(14,15)(NK)(12,12)(NK)(16,16) Arabic (16,17)(6,7)(13,14)(23,23)(30,31)(13,14)(NK)(NK)(NK)(NK) Italian (17,17)(6&9.3)(13,14)(20,21)(29,30)(12,13)(NK)(11,12)(NK)(15,16) so
marginally distinguishing from UK Caucasian by THO1 and D18 and the 5 extra
loci TPOX,CSF1PO,D7,D13,D5 (8,8),(11,12),(10,11)(11,12)(11,12) Italian allele frequencies Glasgow, Scotland population (not autochthonous - unspecified parental
lineage) (17,17),(6,9.3),(13,13),(21,21),(30,30),(12,16),(NK),(11,12),(NK),(15,16) unfortunately
2 separate allele peaks on loci THO1 and D18 but a distinct variation from the
UK Caucasian average on locus D16 Glasgow allele frequencies And another very localised result from FSI 95 (1998) p27-37 if a profile was
from the Cardiff/Neath area then if the VWA allele was (16,16) then twice as
likely to be from someone from Cardiff than Neath (data from 743 samples) A
central German normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as
above (17,17)(6,7)(13,13)(21,22)(29,29)(14,15)(17,17)(11,12)(13,14)(16,16) German and Austrian SGM allele
frequencies A Slovenia normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same
order as
above (17,18)(6&9.3)(13,14)(22,22)(29,29)(14,14)(17&20)(11,12)(13,14)(16,16) Slovenia allele frequencies
An Austria normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as
above (17,17)(6&9.3)(13,13)(21,22)(29,30)(14,15)(17,17)(11,12)(13,14)(16,16) Austrian allele frequencies
A Czech normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as
above (17,17)(6&9.3)(13,13)(22,22)(30,30)(15,15)(17,17)(11,12)(14,14)(16,16) Czech allele frequencies A
New Zealand (Caucasian) normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order
as
above (17,17)(6&9.3)(13,13)(21,22)(29,30)(14,15)(17,17)(11,12)(14,14)(16,16) New Zealand allele frequencies for
Caucasian, Maori, Samoan, Tongan, Nuiean and SE Asian descent A NZ East
Polynesian normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci ,in same order as
above (17,17)(7&9.3)(10&13)(23,24)(30,30)(15&17)(19&21)(11,11)(14&15.2)(15,16) A
NZ West Polynesian normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as
above (17,17)(7,7)(13,14)(23,24)(28,29)(15&17)(19&22)(11,11)(13&15.2)(15,16) A
NZ Asian normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as
above (14&17)(7&9)(14,14)(23,24)(29,30)(15,15)(23,24)(9&11)(13,14)(15,16)
Showing
how much difference can be found in different sub-groups within the same
geographical area - compare the following 2 sets Taiwan Han population
normalisation
sequence (14&17)(9,9)(14,14)(22,23)(29,30)(13,14)(NK)(11,12)(NK)(15,16) and
the Taiwan Bunun population normalisation
sequence (14&17)(7,7)(10,10)(22,22)(31.2,32.2)(14,15)(NK)(9,10)(NK)(17,17)
And
just to show not to take this sort of analysis too seriously the figures for an
ethnic group you would assume was most genetically removed from all these ethnic
profiles - Australian
Aborigine (17,17)(6,6)(13,15)(23,24)(29,30)(13,14)((NK)(11,11)(NK)(16,16) not
so different from the rest.
For Israeli populations using Israeli allele frequencies
for loci
THO1,TPOX,CSF1PO,vWA,FESFPS,F13A01,D13S317,D7S820,D16S539 Normalisation
sequence for Jewish
Israeli (6&9)(8,8)(11,11)(17,17)(10,11)(5&7)(11,12)(10,11)(11,12) Normalisation
sequence for Arab
Israeli (6&9)(8,8)(10,11)(16,17)(11,11)(6,6)(11,12)(10,10)(11,12)
Above data derived from journal articles Int J Legal Med (1997)
110:5-9 Int J Legal Med (2001) 114:147-155 Forensic Science International
114 (2000) 7-20 F S I 129 (2002) 90-98 F S I 116 (2001) 187-188 FSI 122
(2001) 189-195 FSI 119 (2001) 107-108 FSI 122 (2001) 181-183 FSI 115
(2001) 107-109 FSI 97 (1998) 53-60 FSI 132 (2003) 84-86 J Forensic
Science Sept 2002 ,V47,N 5 IJLM (2002) 116: 184-186 Including the
electronic-version-only journals are available in print form via Inter-Library
loan and the British Library Document Supply Centre costing about 2 pounds per
article and 2 weeks turn-around
From
source www.cm-uj.krakow.pl/ArchMedSadKrym/2_2001/93-96.htm Allele
frequencies of 10 STR loci from the AmpFISTR SGM Plus in the South Polish
population. A South Polish normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same
order as
above (17,18)(9.3,9.3)(12,13)(21,22)(29,30)(16,16)(17,17)(11,12)(14,14)(15,16) So
main differences from UK Caucasian is on D18 and D2
My profile (assuming D2 Allele 20 UK subgroup ) normalised relative to UK
Caucasians is
(0,-2)(2,0)(0,1)(1,-1)(0,1)(1,-1)(2,1)(-1,0)(2,0)(-1,-2) "Normalised "
relative to Afro-Caribbean
is (-2,-2)(-1,-3)(1,1)(3,1)(-1,0)(3,2)(1,0)(-1,0)(1,0)(0,-2) Some 3s
,evidence, but of course not conclusive indication, that I am not of
Afro-Caribbean origin. Now "Normalised" relative to Asian using best case D2
allele of 19
is (-1,-2)(-2,-3)(0,1)(3,3)(0,0)(1,-1)(1,0)(-1,-1)(1,0)(0,0) Now 3
examples of 3s is strongly but of course not conclusive indication I am not of
Asian origin (again true as far as I know). I pity the poor sods who have a
normalised profile something close (i.e. -1,0 and 1s) to the average Joe
(0,0)(0,0)(0,0)(0,0)(0,0)(0,0)(0,0)(0,0)(0,0)(0,0)
I hope their NDNAD records are flagged so plod doesn't keep arresting
them. A further test for my simplified ethnic analysis for a profile case
study included in Forensic Sci. Int. 119 (2001) p20 The situation was a
DNA profile derived from semen in a rape, but was it from the rapist reported as
Afro-Caribbean or the victim's sexual partner, Caucasian , who had left the
country. It was from the time when they were using 6 loci. The profile for
VWA,THO1,D8,FGA,D21,D18
was (14,18),(7,9.3),(10,11),(22,23),(28,28),(11,12) so normalised against
UK Caucasian gives (3,-1),(3,0),(3,3),(-1,-2),(1,2),(3,2) and against the
UK Afro-Caribbean norm (1,-1),(0,-3),(4,3),(1,0),(0,-1),(5,5) So the 4
and 5s strongly suggest the profile was not likely to be Afro-Caribbean.
This agrees with the FSS formal numerical analysis which deemed the sample
to be 28 more times likely to be Caucasian than Afro-Caribbean and the pursuit
of the rapist via DNA database trawl was abandoned. Interestingly and
disturbingly this profile is more removed from the UK Caucasian average than my
own (6 loci only ).
The D2S1338 Anomaly in the UK
As time goes by more and more data will come available concerning ethnicity.
I suspect the split peaks of 17,20 and 24 in the UK allele frequency
distribution of locus (marker) D2 (D2S1338) goes back to something like Celtic
or Anglo-Saxon origin (research in progress).
Until I have found out the significance of alleles 17,20 and 24 on D2S1338 I
cannot improve on my normalisation factors. I am trying to find population
analyses of D2 and Welsh or Scottish or Irish versus Germanic/Flemish to see if
it corresponds to Celtic/Anglo-Saxon split. For the moment comparing data on D2
in the South Polish population and UK population then allele 17 may relate to
Saxon and allele 24 to Celtic ancestry. Again, data consistent with my
hypothesis from the D2 Central German data below. A test for this would be a
study on D2 in an autochthonous (same ethnicity of parents and grandparents)
population in deepest Wales say. If anyone does know the inside gen could they
tell me ? For the moment, for ethnic normalisation, choose the peak allele/s
that closest matches the given allele. More data /info required for loci/alleles
UK Caucasian D2 alleles 17,20 and 24 ; Asian D2 alleles 19 and 23 ;Oriental VWA
alleles 14 and 17.
Of course anyone in the UK reading this and has obtained their DNA profile
from the FSS, I would be interested in seeing what the results of my
normalisation process produces, on their profile.
International Normalisation Data Relating to AmpFISTR SGM Plus DNA
Profiles
Nutteing Ethnicity Normalisation Sequences
Country /Ethnicity
VWA
THO1
D8S1179
FGA
D21S11
D18S51
D2S1338
D16S539
D19S433
D3S1358
UK-Caucasian
17,17
6&9.3
13,14
21,21
29,30
14,14
17&20&24
11,12
14,14
15,16
UK-African
15,15
7,7
14,14
23,23
28,28
16,17
19,19
11,12
13,14
15,16
UK-Asian
16,17
6,7
13,14
23,24
29,29
14,14
19 & 23
11,11
13,14
16,16
UK-Oriental
17,17
9,9
14,14
23,23
29,30
14,15
NK
12,12
NK
16,16
South Chinese
17,17
9,9
13,14
23,23
29,30
14,14
NK
9&11
NK
15,16
Taiwan Han
14&17
9,9
14,14
23,23
29,30
13,14
NK
11,12
NK
15,16
Taiwan Bunun
14&17
7,7
10,10
22,22
31.2,32.2
14,15
NK
9,10
NK
17,17
UK-Arabic
16,17
6,7
13,14
23,23
30,31
13,14
NK
NK
NK
NK
UK-Glasgow
17,17
6&9.3
13,13
21,21
30,30
12 & 16
NK
11,12
NK
15,16
Italian
17,17
6&9.3
13,14
20,21
29,30
12,13
NK
11,12
NK
15,16
S. Polish
17,18
9.3,9.3
12,13
21,22
29,30
16,16
17,17
11,12
14,14
15,16
Slovenia
17,18
6&9.3
13,14
22,22
29,30
14,14
17&20
11,12
13,14
16,16
Austria
17,17
6&9.3
13,13
21,22
29,30
14,15
17,17
11,12
13,14
16,16
Czech
17,17
6&9.3
13,13
22,22
30,30
15,15
17,17
11,12
14,14
16,16
NZ Caucasian
17,17
6&9.3
13,13
21,22
29,30
14,14
17,17
11,12
14,14
15,16
NZ E Polynese
17,17
7&9.3
10,13
23,24
30,30
15&17
19&21
11,11
14&15.2
16,16
NZ W Polynese
17,17
7,7
13,14
23,24
28,29
15&17
19&22
11,11
13&15.2
15,16
NZ SE Asian
14&17
7&9
13,14
23,24
29,30
15,15
23,24
9&11
13,14
15,16
Central German
17,17
6,7
13,13
21,22
29,29
14,15
17,17
11,12
13,14
16,16
E. Indian
17,17
6&9
13,14
21&23
29,30
14,14
NK
11,12
NK
15,16
Japanese
17,17
9,9
13,14
23,23
29,30
14,15
NK
9,10
NK
15,16
Texas Black
16,16
7,8
14,15
22,23
28,29
16,16
NK
11,11
NK
15,16
Aus. Aborigine
17,17
6,6
13 & 15
23,24
29,30
13,14
NK
11,11
NK
16,16
Country /Ethnicity
VWA
THO1
D8S1179
FGA
D21S11
D18S51
D2S1338
D16S539
D19S433
D3S1358
NK=Not Known, & indicates separated
peaks so use most appropriate values in given situation
To use the above
table write your own profile numbers and then underneath each number write out
each of the 20 numbers of the normalisation sequence. Subtract in each of the 20
numbers the second line element from the first line element .
Chinese
data from www.37c.com.cn/literature/analecta/ data/fyxzz/200001/001.html The
pairs in the first 2 tables represent first South Chinese / North (Han) Chinese
and the second pair of tables are for Chinese Uygur / Hui data Taiwanese data
from Forensic Science Journal 2002,1;31-37 Japanese, E. Indian and Texas
Black data from Toronto CFS http://www.csfs.ca/databases/index.htm For USA
readers using the CFS data Relative to USA Black gives a Nutteing
normalisation profile for D3,vWA,FGA,D8,D21,D18,D5,D13,D7,D16,THO1,TPOX,CSF
of
(15,16)(15,16)(22,23)(14,15)(28,30)(16,17)(12,12)(12,12)(10,10)(11,11)(7,7)(8,9)(10&12)
Relative to USA Caucasians gives a Nutteing normalisation profile
for D3,vWA,FGA,D8,D21,D18,D5,D13,D7,D16,THO1,TPOX,CSF of
(15,16)(17,17)(21,22)(13,14)(29,30)(14,15)(11,12)(11,12)(10,11)(12,12)(6&9.3)(8&11)(11,11)
For species non-Chauvinism from FSI article 112 (2000) p151-161, mentioned
before, by FSS, Birmingham staff using SGM+ DNA profile of a Chimpanzee named
- Bobby Amel. X,Y ; D8 (10,12) ; D21 (28,29) converted ; vWA (12,12) ; FGA
(17.3,23.3) ; D3 (14,14) ; THO1 (6,7) ; D2 (21,22) ; D16 (9.3,9.3)
For a
forensic scientist,George R. Carmody of Ottawa
(http://www.carleton.ca/~gcarmody/), who has placed his DNA profile on the
internet
for D3,vWA,FGA,D8,D21,D18,D5,D13,D7,D16,THO1,TPOX,CSF (15,15)(16,16)(20,21)(13,13)(30,31.2)(12,15)(12,12)(8,12)(11,13)(12,12)(7,9.3)(8,11)(12,12) Nutteing
normalised to Caucasians
gives (0,-1)(-1,-1)(-1,-1)(0,-1)(-1,2)(-2,0)(1,0)(-3,0)(1,2)(0,0)(1,0)(0,0)(1,1) Just
one 3 and a lot of 0s,rather close to the 'Average Joe' Nutteing normalised
to Blacks
gives (0,-1)(1,0)(-2,-2)(-1,-2)(2,2)(-4,-2)(0,0)(-4,0)(1,3)(1,1)(0,3)(0,2)(2,0) Doing
full allele frequency analysis he is 1070 times more likely to be Caucasian than
Black. That was generally through the loci, only 2 of the 26 alleles showed a
'Black' frequency greater than ' Caucasian'. His picture looks decidedly
Caucasian.
Disturbing Developements for the Orwellian/Kafkaesque Future
Antoni Imiela Case
My Usenet posting of 23 Oct 2002
Title: Serial rapist and those 3000 DNA swabs The only information (as
released to the media) the police have so far is he is white , aged 30 to 50 and
may live in London, Surrey, Kent or Berkshire. But they do have the suspect's
DNA profile. So how come they are only swabbing 3000 targets to find a match,
what is their criteria ?
Previous mass swabbs have been for a village or
part of a town where there was an offence but these offences were spread over 4
or 5 counties. Buried in these DNA profiles is an indication of the person's
ethnic background. I know, from my own DNA profile, just concerning the alleles
(numbers) on just 2 of the 10 loci (markers) i.e. D18S51 and D16S51 I or anyone
else would know I was 20 times more likely to be white than black (true). With
the computer and data systems available to the police I am sure there are
combinations that would similarly give a greater likelihood of being say Greek
or Polish or Zambian origin or whatever. From that construct a list of surnames
of that origin. Especially if this rapist's profile has thrown up a rare
locus/allele combination. The PNC Boolean computer search would then be (men on
PNC for sex crime now aged 30 to 50) AND (never been DNA profiled ) AND (living
in one of the 4 counties) AND (having surname relating to ethnicity) It is
the last factor that seriously cuts down the possibilities.
There is a specific gene that expresses as red hair for example.
(supplemental- In November 2003 in an Amsterdam conference a company reported
98% success rate at determining eya iris colour from DNA ). Given a complete DNA
sample is available, there are more and more physical characteristics that are
becoming dicernable with medical research. In the obsessive genealogy (family
history) groups there are people taking DNA samples and profiling the different
branches of their own families. Now when this data gets cross-referenced to PNC
computers then there is real big brother, sort-power. Unfortunately the police
will have to swab all active and past milkmen in this country to make full use
of the facility. End Quote
Then my follow-up posting 2.5 months
later Title: Operation Orb /Serial rapist / Charged suspect / DNA profiling
This posting gets a bit technical but there are fundamentally important
implications. The following is a follow-up of a posting I made 23 Oct 2002
(title: Serial rapist and those 3000 DNA swabs ). I would be interested in
anyone's thoughts on my reasoning. It could imply a new triumph for the DNA
profiling technology or the start of more abuse of process or infringement of
civil liberties and racist overtones.
Anyone would think I had hacked into PNC and Holmes, concerning the Home
Counties serial rapist "of being say Greek or Polish or Zambian origin or
whatever" . My posting 23 Oct 2002 Google
Archive article
On 04 Dec 2002 an Antoni Imiela was arrested as suspect for the "Trophy
Rapes". He was German born but of more significance here his surname and so
probably his genetic origins would be Polish. Looking at a Polish site (in
Polish) at www.cm-uj.krakow.pl there is a table of allele frequencies for the
(South) Polish population using the SGM plus 10 loci (markers) as used in the
UK. 7 of the loci/allele groupings are much the same as the UK. But for 2 ,that
is, for D18S51 ,UK 14 and Poland 16 and for D2 UK triple and Poland 17. I would
suggest the DNA profile obtained after one of the rapes showed (centred on ,as 2
alleles per locus) D8 /16 and D2 /17. This would have lead perhaps to the (only)
3000 DNA samples out of the whole population of London and the Home Counties.
i.e. only men of right age and Polish surnames. Over the 6 weeks or so those
3000 would have been reduced to perhaps just a page of (Polish) names that had
not ,for the usual reasons, been traced and profiled. I would suggest Mr Imiela
was one of these names circulated to police in the Kent area and stopped in a
traffic stop-check.
Now, when profiled, did his profile exactly match the rapist's profile ? If
it did (or near match) then his solicitor should have demanded a full 15 loci
profile to be made of the rape sample and his client's sample. But are there
independent forensic labs that could do this with, proof of sample identity and
custody ? If there was a full 15 loci match on both samples on the same batch
process on the same machine with the same thermo-cycling with ruled out chance
of cross-contamination/"sleight of hand" etc then I'm afraid he would be very
much bagged to rights. If not a match, on 10 loci let alone 15, i.e. absolute
confirmation of exclusion, what are the grounds for his continued detention?
Remember there was pre-selection so he was nabbed in effect on 8 loci and not a
full 10.
Hannah Foster Murder Case
And another suspicious case - my Usenet
posting of 12 April 2003 Re: Murder of Hannah Foster -Southampton
teenager Release to the media that the prime suspect is of Asian background.
Don't release why there is such a designation, i.e. no eyewitness. At the same
time don't confirm they have obtained DNA profile of the suspect. If they have
no DNA profile what harm in saying so.
Post "Lawrence" they must not show racial bias. A DNA profile can easily
show up an ethnic likelihood. If the profile showed alleles centred on
THO1(6),FGA(24) and D18(14) in the common alleles then 5 times more likely to be
Asian rather than Caucasian background. It only takes ONE allele in the 1 to 2%
frequency of occurrance such as D16(8,any) or D19(14.2,any) and it is pushed to
20 times more likely, two such and 60 to 100 times likely.
If you go to
the Asian newspaper sites this supposed suspect is fully named (full 3 names)
because in India he is considered innocent. Reason quoted for leaving Hampshire
- close relative in a coma in India since December and intervening time selling
his house to move to India to be close to her.
Compare with UK media and this suspect "fled the country". Now ,of course,
before 6 Hampshire Police officers go on a jolly to India they confirmed whether
he left the UK in a pre-planned ,orderly ,manner or "fled". Well of course they
did - they would be crass idiots not to, wouldn't they. Left pre-planned then
just get local Indian police to do a routine call-on to confirm a few details.
If "fled" then yes go off to India.
Meanwhile the Southsea connection is downgraded to minor area of
investigation, the real suspect perhaps being Caucasian but with a colonial
grand-parent or whatever. I've no idea which version is correct but the Indian
newspaper versions carry an otherwise irrelevant reference to a family dispute
and implication that an "aggrieved" in this dispute informed UK Crimewatch. Now
where have I come across people in an awkward family dispute deliberately lying
to the police to "solve" an awkward family situation.
and my follow-up
10 May 2003
Here is the chronology as I see it. 14 March 2003 murder of Hannah
Foster 19 March release to the media police searching for an Asian as suspect
murderer. 26 March Crimewatch program about the murder. An "aggrieved" in
a family dispute takes the opportunity to stitch-up her Asian relative by
anonymously informing Crimewatch. Knowing that her relative had left the country
a few days after the murder and that he lived fairly local to the abduction
site. Then the rest takes a momentum of its own
English language version of Indian newspaper report 10 April 2003 so
accessible to Hants police as easily as myself. Quote "In fact,
Maninderpal has been attached to his mother who in December last year received a
serious head injury after an accident with a bus. Since then she has been in
coma. He wanted to come and settle down in India. That is why he sold his flat
in England. He has some problems with his in-laws," says Mr I- holding that
Maninderpal had gone to England in 1994 on marriage basis. His wife is a
simpleton, says I -, but it is the "mother-in-law, who has been the trouble
maker". The only other time Maninder came to India was in 1997, he said
revealing that Maninderpal did not even come to attend his wedding. "Our family
has been passing through a tough time. Even after more than four months, my
mother is in coma. After two months in the Intensive Care Unit at the PGI, the
doctors advised us to take her home. Since I live on the first floor of a flat
in Sector 44, we moved to a vacant flat of a relative in Phase X of SAS Nagar
because of my mother," adds I- Singh. End Quote
Easy for police to confirm whether Maninder had sold his flat and enquire at
Home Office/Foreign Office about passport problems. Both being reasons for the
timing of Maninder's pre-planned journey to India. Now police are, in all
probability, searching for a totally innocent bod and investigation for the real
killer is put on the back-burner and any possible leads gone cold.
Tony Jasinskyj
Background reported story
(with added twaddle) His DNA profile placed in the public domain by BBC1
programme "Watching the Detectives" on 13 Aug
2003 VWA,THO1,D8,FGA,D21,D18,D2,D16,D19,D3 14,16;6,9.3;12,15;25,26;28,32.2;13,15;17,19;9,11;14,18.2;15,17;X,Y Normalised
relative to UK Caucasians is
(-3,-1)(0,0)(-1,1)(4,5)(-1,-2)(-1,2)(-1,1)(0,-1)(-2,-1)(0,4)(0,1) Allele
frequencies range from 4% to 38% except for one interesting exception. That is
D19 18.2 is very rare ,in many countries with small databases, not one recorded
case. In the UK Caucasian it is about 0.2% so 1 in 250 people. In Central Europe
though D19 18.2 is 5 times more common than the UK. The rape and murder was
of a Marion Crofts, 14, between Fleet and Aldershot, 06 June 1981. Tony
Jasinskyj was a serial wife-batterer but no criminal conviction until 2000 and
after kicking his wife he was arrested and DNA sampled. He was one of 10,000
males interviewed at the time in 1981 and lived and worked about 1.5 miles from
the murder site, but no suspicion as to being the murderer until the DNA profile
match with crime scene semen stain. Spot the error in the following recording of
interview by Aldershot police.
CID : FACT, your semen is on her jeans,
YOUR semen, explain this please. Jasinskyj: She could quite possibly picked
it up somehow CID: WHERE ?,comes out of your penis that's how you should
know.
In court 3.5 weeks of prosecution case and 6 hours of defence case
,only one witness, Jasinskyj - no DNA expert (say) for the
defence. Prosecution QC: Where did your DNA come from ? Jasinskyj : It's
planted, someone put it there
30 police re-investigating, 15,000
documents, 3 full profiles taken from different bits of the victim's clothing
,how many man - hours ? must be many thousands.
Nowhere was there mention
of extended loci re-testing. And repeated over and over again the equating of
DNA profile with DNA, as far as uniqueness presumption. No one informed him that
a DNA profile is not unique, and that there is a far more rational reason how a
DNA profile matching his could have been found on the girl's clothing.
Death knell for DNA profiles?
The following is a copy of an email
(25 April 2003)I sent to the inventor of DNA profiling. He had replied to my
previous two technical queries but not to this email
To Prof Sir Alec
Jeffreys Since your reply to my query last year I have learnt a lot about DNA
profiling.
Recent report by Reuters concerning your recent speech. "At the moment,
we have a criminal DNA database ( NDNAD ) of about 2 million profiles in the
UK," he told reporters, as scientists met at Britain's top scientific body, the
Royal Society, to celebrate the discovery of DNA 50 years ago." "The real
problem in a typical crime is that even if you get DNA from a crime scene, you
can't pick up a suspect because they don't have a record. So one possibility is
to extend the database to include the entire population."
These are the
principal reasons against such a move
Unrelated false matches Ask Raymond Easton of Swindon whether he thinks
the NDNAD should be expanded Newspaper report http://tinyurl.com/aac4 or
original URL
http://www.thisiswiltshire.co.uk/wiltshire/archive/2000/08/15/swindon_news10
ZM.html Then again just in the last few months ask Peter Hamkin of
Liverpool, newspaper report http://tinyurl.com/9dzd or original URL
http://icliverpool.icnetwork.co.uk/0100news/0100regionalnews/page.cfm?object
id=12718961&method=full&siteid=50061 ( supplemental - since this em,
the Gottingen prisoner case )
Lack of reported independent validation This is the last publicly
reported proper validation exercise in DNA profiling in the forensic literature
that I can find. By proper I mean dividing up some samples ,sending to 16 (in
this case) different laboratories ,testing blind and collating the results
Forensic Science International vol 86 (1997) p25-33 Threr were 448 data-points
and an error rate of 17 in 448 or 1 in 26. Some not just 1 allele out but some 2
alleles out from the "true" profile. Frankly I am amazed this report ever got
published.
Unresolved matches in the NDNAD (National DNA Database) From Forensic
Science International 95 (1998) p30. Concerning data in the UK DNA database as
of 04 October 1996 when there were only 6311 samples from the London area and
573 from the Cardiff area. "A small number of unresolved duplicate pairs of
profiles were present in the regional data :10 pairs within the London region
and 1 pair in Cardiff. The most common cause of duplicate entries is the use of
aliases by suspects who have been arrested on several occasions. For
administrative reasons ,it is not always possible to resolve such duplicates by
exhaustive police investigation." This published statement is absolute tosh.
At the same time a DNA sample is extracted from an arrested person his
conventional fingerprints are taken as well. It could not be easier to
cross-correlate conventional and DNA fingerprints from 2 data sets. The chances
then of a false matching of both types of "fingerprint" would truly be in the
trillions to one against. I have a scientific background and the idea that such
anomalies are not immediately and thoroughly investigated is an insult to the
wider scientific community. These unresolved false match numbers have increased
to 300 now according to ch4 documentary "DNA in the Dock". Not resolved because
the results would be devastating to the FSS (Forensic Science Service)
Too close for comfort The modal profile for a UK Caucasian (data from
various FSI and Int J Legal Medicine articles 1997 to 2001) is
(17,17)(6&9.3)(13,14)(21,21)(29,30)(14,14)(A,B)(11,12)(14,14)(15,16) for
loci VWA,THO1,D8,FGA,D21,D18,D2,D16,D19,D3 Now my own DNA profile (Caucasian),
slightly altered for obvious reasons
(17,19)(8,9.3)(13,13)(20,22)(29,29)(13,15)(18,19)(12,12)(12,14)(16,18) still a
bewildering array of numbers but taking the differences between both sets of
numbers one gets a normalised profile of (A,B assuming D2 allele 20 as triple
peaked allele frequencies at 17,20 and 24)
(0,-2)(2,0)(0,1)(1,-1)(0,1)(1,-1)(2,1)(-1,0)(2,0)(-1,-2) This normalisation
process, starkly shows, how close my profile is to the "average Joe" with a
consequential much increased likelihood of being arrested just because my
profile matches some scene of crime sample somewhere in ,now, Europe (post
Hamkin) not just the UK. That is, before factoring in errors, in arrestee or
crime scene profile, co-ancestry or possible non-independence of alleles across
loci. I just hope the "average Joe" with normalised all (0,0)s is flagged up on
the NDNAD.
You won't be surprised to learn that I find the construction,
expansion and trawling of the NDNAD absolutely repugnant.
----- Original
Message ----- From: "Sir A. Jeffreys" [...@leicester.ac.uk]
Sent:
Friday, January 11, 2002 8:35 AM Subject: Re: DNA Database and s82 of the
2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act...
They hound your family, even after death, and through your children.
Joseph Kappen Case
This family now has a stigma attached to them that
they cannot get release from. Case of Joseph
Kappen "He is named as Joseph William Kappen, who at the time of the
murders was 32 years of age and lived with his family in Port Talbot. He was
working as a bus driver and on a casual basis as a doorman at local clubs."
By the sins
of the children Operation Magnum: "He checked it to see if it contained
the DNA profile of someone who could be related to the killer. This was the
first time the NDNAD had been used in this way. Results The search
produced a list of more than 100 men who could be related to the offender due to
similarities in their DNA profiles. This intelligence, combined with existing
evidence held by South Wales Police, led to one local man becoming a strong
suspect."
World's End Murders
Repeated again in
Scotland - Helen Scott and Christine Eadie murders "It is understood
Lothian and Borders Police, who already have a DNA profile of one of the men
they believe was responsible for the World's End murders, will begin a second
mass screening of potential suspects later this year using the same process.
By eliminating non-related profiles, police hope they will be able to
whittle down the list of suspects. A police source said: "We could be looking
for a father and getting to him through his son." "
Gafoor Trawling
And
in the same manner ,Jeffrey Gafoor "(Jeffrey) Gafoor's genetic
fingerprint was not held in the national DNA database, which contains the
profiles of more than two million criminals, but his 15-year-old nephew's was --
for a minor car crime". More detail from someone directly involved with the
Gaffoor case Debate
with Forensic 'Scientists'
A New Racism ?
Proceedings of the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Human Rights ,22 May 2003 Letter submitted from Lord Falconer Part
Quote ... A typical DNA profile on the database would consist of a string of
paired numbers, each pair relating to a specific marker (e.g. 14,17; 6,9.3;
13,16; 20,22; 29,31; 18,21; 17,19; 11,12; 14,16; 16,17; X,Y)... End Quote
He could of said that this profile shows a male who is 68 times more likely
to be Caucasian than Afro-Carribean. It is quite a straightforward calculation
when you have the relevant data from International Journal of Legal Medicine
1997 v110:5-9 and 2001 v114 147-155 But of course it was for a Human Rights
committee so shtum on that aspect. The Caucasian combined frequency being 8.06x
10^-18 and Afro-Caribbean 1.19x 10^-19 so 80.6/1.19 = 68 Normalised relative
to UK Caucasians
is (-3,0)(0,0)(0,2)(-1,1)(0,1)(4,7)(0,-1)(0,0)(0,2)(1,1)
Technical
note - the 18,21 pair on D18S51, glaringly obvious in the "Nutteing Normalised"
presentation as (4,7) is interesting because the 21 allele occurs in less than
1% of the general population. It is quite conceivable that this D18, (18,21) was
deliberately altered from someone's actual profile as it was only being given as
an example of structural representation.
Un-investigated Spontaneous Mutations
In 2003 a Colin Waite was
prosecuted and sentenced on a 19 point match not 20 point match. A 19 point
match and one point mis-match is excuplatory evidence , not evidence of guilt.
There was no DNA profile expert for the defence and a forensic scientist Fay
Southern managed to get this one past the defence. I've only seen a newspaper
report of her testimony rather than transcript. She appears to have used the
cover of "spontaneous mutation". Perfectly valid if proven but there was no
reference to anyone having done so, the other key-phrases are heterogeneity and
somatic mosaicism. Most dramatically displayed by people with different coloured
eyes, where the mutation occurs at the embryo stage of developement.
It
is theoretically possible for someone to show 2 differing DNA profiles if one
sample is from, say, semen and the other, say, buccal cells. A mutation can
occur in a cell and over time by division then this mutated cell-line form a
substantial proportion of that cell-type. Male mutation rates for the loci used
in SGM+ (from American Association of Blood Banks data ) are for vWA 0.3%
THO1 0.01% D8 0.2% FGA 0.3% D21 0.15% D18 0.21% D2 0.02%
D16 0.11% D19 0.1% D3 0.13% Most of these mutation rates are
significantly more than the average locus, probably precisely the reason these
loci were chosen for forensic purposes in the first place. This fudge can only
be applied within 1 allele from the original allele - any further is extremely
rare. A 13 year-old male has had 36 sperm-cell divisions,age 20 then 200
divisions, age 30 then 430 and by age 45 then 770 divisions. If they are relying
on mutation then there should have been further biological testing to confirm
what is otherwise conjecture. Otherwise finding DNA profile matches using any 19
numbers from 20 then that increases the chance of false matches 50 fold or more.
John Doe indictments
For American readers here is a published USA DNA
Profile, from the Denver Post 17 Aug
2003 http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~53~1575322,00.html Arapahoe
County investigators know who bludgeoned three members of the Bennett family to
death in their Aurora home on Jan. 16, 1984. He is D3S1358: 15/16, vWA:
17/17, FGA: 22.5/ 25, D8S1179: 12/13, D21S11: 30.2/31, D18S51: 13/ 14, D5S818:
12/12, D13S317: 11/12, D7S820: 7/9, D16S539: 10/11, THO1: 6/9, TPOX: 8/11,
CSF1PO: 11/11 and DQ alpha 4/4 Using the Toronto CFS data I've frequency
analysed on 13 of the loci Again there is a zero element in the table for FGA
22.2 for the black (as CFS defined) population. Caucasian and Asian also as
defined by the Toronto CFS. Results on all 26 alleles excluding 'black'
data. He is 30 times more likely to be Caucasian than Asian. On 25 alleles
for all 3 sub-groups. 29 times more likely Caucasian than Black 13 times
more likely Caucasian than Asian Then factoring in a less than minimum figure
for 'black' FGA 22.2 then you can multiply those figures by greater than 3 so 90
times and 40 times more likely Caucasian. Relative to USA Caucasians gives a
normalised profile from D3,vWA,FGA,D8,D21,D18,D5,D13,D7,D16,THO1,TPOX,CSF of
(0,0)(0,0)(1,3)(-1,-1)(1,1)(-1,-1)(1,0)(0,0)(-3,-2)(-2,-1)(0,-1)(0,0)(0,0) ok
2 that are 3 away from the multi-mode but still surprising for a profile that
contains one allele frequency of 0.3% and 2 of 0.8%, 22 of the 26 normalised
alleles are 0s and 1s . So close to the modal USA Caucasian that they should
fairly soon arrest their man - not necessarily the right man, of course, but
what does that matter.
Second US John Doe,DNA profile from
http://www.nwaonline.net/291300297266088.bsp 11 Nov,2003 Supposed to
be a Caucasian rapist of a former Tillery Elementary School teacher, Arkansas
D3S1358: (15, 16), vWA: (18, 20), FGA: (21, 23), D8S1179: (11, 12), D21S11:
(28, 30), D18S51: (12, 14), D5S818: (11, 13), D13S317: (9, 13), D7S820: (11,
12), D16S539: (12, 12), THO1: (7, 9), TPOX: (8, 9), CSF1PO: (10, 12), PENTA E:
(7, 11) Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US
Caucasians (0,0)(1,3)(0,1)(-2,-2)(-1,0)(-2,-1)(0,1)(-2,1)(-2,1)(-1,1)(0,0)(1,-1)(0,-2)(-1,1) Only
one allele, 3 away, from the multi-modal 'Average Joe' Doing allele frequency
analysis on all but the Penta E, he is 7 times more likely to be Caucasian than
Black.
Third US John Doe,DNA profile from Wisconsin Unknown ethnicity
(15,16)(17,19)(22,25)(14,14)(29,30)(12,16)(12,13)(11,12)(8,9)(8,13)(7,9)(8,8)(7,7) Giving
Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US
Caucasians (0,0)(0,2)(1,3)(1,0)(0,0)(-2,1)(1,1)(0,0)(-2,-2)(-4,1)(1,-1)(0,-3)(-4,-4) Giving
Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US
Blacks (0,0)(2,-3)(0,-2)(0,-1)(1,0)(-4,-1)(0,1)(-1,0)(-2,-1)(-3,2)(0,2)(0,-1)(-3,-5) The
final pair (7,7) of CSF1PO are rare, both in Black or Caucasian populations, so
highly significant For the first 12 pairs,doing allele frequency analysis
there is equal probability of being Black or Caucasian but that final (7,7)
would suggest more than 600 times more likely to be Black than Caucasian , or of
course from some under-represented population. Possibility of a Gafoor trawl
here. On a commercial medical site I saw reference to a cell line from the
mammary gland of a 56 year-old Black woman with CSF1PO (7,8) close enough to be
of interest to anyone doing a Gafoor Trawl if there was no (7,7) in their
database.
Fourth US John Doe,DNA profile from California, ethnicity not
known
(15,15)(18,19)(22,24)(12,15)(28,28)(20,20)(8,13)(10,11)(8,11)(9,10)(7,7)(6,9)(10,11)
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US
Caucasians (0,-1)(1,2)(1,2)(-1,1)(-1,-2)(6,5)(-3,1)(-1,1)(-2,0)(-3,-2)(1,-3)(-2,-2)(-1,0)
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US
Blacks (0,-1)(3,-3)(0,-1)(-2,0)(0,-2)(4,3)(-4,1)(-2,-1)(-2,1)(-2,-1)(0,0)(-2,0)(0,-1) Doing
frequency analysis, over 5 MILLION times more likely to be Black than Caucasian
generally through the loci but especially D5 (8) and TPOX (6).
Fifth US
'John' Doe, a Jane Doe, DNA profile,Caucasian
(15,18)(16,17)(23,23)(13,14)(29,30)(12,17)(9,11)(8,13)(8,10)(10,12)(7,9)(10,10)(11,12)
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US
Caucasians (0,3)(-1,0)(2,1)(0,0)(0,0)(-2,2)(-2,-1)(-3,1)(-2,-1)(-2,0)(1,-1)(2,-1)(0,1)
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US
Blacks (0,2)(1,1)(1,0)(-1,-1)(1,0)(-4,0)(-3,-1)(-4,1)(-2,0)(-1,1)(0,2)(2,1)(1,0) Doing
frequency analysis 10 times more likely to be Caucasian than Black mainly from
D5 (9).
Post Script
I have no criminal conviction,no criminal record or court appearance at any
time. Because of corrupt Wiltshire Social Workers ( story - nutteing3 in a
search-engine ) I have been drawn into this Kafkaesque world.
After the CPS dropped all this nonsense I wanted to retrieve my
involuntrarily extracted DNA sample and data but by then snagged by s82. I sent
of my 10 GBP,after being told this was necessary for removal ,more lies. Instead
I get my DNA profile in the post. Concerning the FSS forms at the top of this
file. The second line of text on the above form ending "the record mas made".
THIS IS A DYSLEXIC ERROR - letter reversal/inversion - not a typing error, w and
m are nowhere near on a keyboard (also occurs in dyslexics concerning letters u
and n, d and b etc). The other indicator for dyslexia is this erroneous initial
letter is the same as the initial letter of the next word. Typing letter q, e,
a, s or d instead of w is just sloppy fingers on the keyboard a letter m
indicates a sloppy mind. If this person is involved with the likes of labelling
DNA samples or batches then god help us. What do defence attourneys make of such
evidence of incompetence when it arrives on their desks from this country's
supposed leading national forensic laboratory. On 14 January 2002 I received
another recorded letter from this lot in Birmingham. Enclosed was the same 2
sheets as previously; a printout from the DNA database and a covering letter
that the incompetent Dr P E Gage put his signature to. The only differences
(same 2 spelling/proof reading errors) was change of date and natural variation
of signature or very subtle mimiograph of course. These incompetent idiots don't
even know that what they think is D6S502 on the 6th chromosome is in fact
D8S1179 on the 8th chromosome. Only one of the 10 markers used in the UK NDNAD.
If this is representative of the competence of Birmingham Forensic Science
Service then all I can say is be grateful the UK no longer has capital
punishment. I WOULD NOT ALLOW THIS PILE OF INCOMPETENTS TO RUN A KIDS STAMP
CLUB. ( I would be interested to hear from anyone else with such examples of
incompetence of this shower in Birmingham). This was the standard of care shown
by the public face of the FSS - what on earth was going on behind closed doors ?
This file and supplementatry files is the result. If the world's forensic
science services find the contents of this file,uncomfortable - tough titty.
Different people around the world have highlighted small fractions of the
problems analysed in this file. But I seem to be the only one who has explored
the full enormity of the confidence trick played on the world by people who call
themselves scientists. Over 700,000 pages on Google containing the words DNA and
profiles. I'm proud to say, putting just those two words in the Google search
box, returns this page at the top of the heap. Just putting the two words DNA
and profile in the search box then this file comes second in 1,240,000.
This is the only place you will be able to read such material other than
Le
Monde 23 December 2003 outside the UK has published a lot of the
material (cribbed ? ) from this site. Nothing mainstream published in the UK
because the special branch or their ilk must have a "D notice" or somesuch in
place. I interested a Nick Davies, crime writer for the Guardian newspaper
but he will not communicate with me now. Alec Jeffreys was perfectly happy
to communicate with me, while I was learning, but not now. My MP was quite
happy to ask a written parliamentary question but he will not communicate with
me now. I am one of the few to stand up against the dangerous powers-that-be in
this blighted country.
I would be interested to hear from any whistle-blowers (anonymously if
required ) from any of the world's forensic science labs, with the inside gen on
any of the material exposed on this site and related sites. email Paul Nutteing ,remove all but
one dot
It shows the very dangerous
blinkered mindset of forensic scientists. I have to assume the same attitude is
prevalent within the police and the judiciary.
