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DNA Profiles

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File updated February 2004


Technical Terms
Data Protection Act - Subject Access - Forensic Science Service
Cases Highlighting Problems with DNA Profiling
False Matches
A New Variant of Miscarriages of Justice
2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act section 82
The Wider Implications of DNA Profiles - the Attribution Problem
Vulnerability of the UK NDNAD
Technical Problems with DNA Profiles
Lies,Damn Lies and Statistics
Ethnic Normalisation of DNA Profiles
Co-ancestry and Allele Frequency
Losers of the police/forensic DNA lottery
Ethnic Normalisation of DNA Profiles
The D2S1338 Anomaly in the UK
International Normalisation Data Relating to AmpFISTR SGM Plus DNA Profiles
Disturbing Developements for the Orwellian/Kafkaesque Future
Death knell for DNA profiles?
They hound your family, even after death, and through your children
A New Racism ?
Un-investigated Spontaneous Mutations
John Doe Indictments

In recent years, great reliance has been placed on the reliability of DNA profiling as a foolproof method of establishing guilt or innocence of a defendent. In many instances, DNA profiles have been responsible for the conviction of suspects when no other evidence of their guilt has been found. In some cases, profiles have been presented as establishing guilt beyond any reasonable doubt despite other evidence which points to the accused innocence.

If, as is claimed, the chance of two people sharing the same DNA profile is greater than one in 100,000,000,000, a positive match between a suspect's profile and a profile obtained at the scene of a crime would, indeed, appear to be damning evidence. As that is more than this planets population over all time, it would be difficult to argue against the two profiles, having come from the same source, although how the DNA came to be at the scene of the crime would still have to be established.

The Promega company, that manufactures the kit for doing DNA profile analysis, trumpets this on their web-page:
ABI SGM Plus ( the system used in the UK ) - Chance for a random match- more than 1 in 100 Billion i.e. 100,000,000,000 or 20 times the population of the earth.
This statement is criminal in its falsity.
About 2/3 way down this file

As attested by the number of people 'caught' because their DNA profile just happens to match a scene-of-crime sample profile. The figure for false matches is now about 1 in 240,000 and going down fast. There are many pairs of people around, with different DNA, but matching DNA profiles.

DNA is unique (twins excepted) but DNA profiles are not unique.

More insurmountable problems, concern the lack of validation of the process. The last proper International validation exercise in 1997 showed an enormous number of errors. Then the number of "unresolved matches" in DNA databases that forensic science will not address. And finally, inter-relatedness/co-ancestry, if factored into the analyses, brings the "match probability" figures down dramatically.

Technical Terms

The technical bit.
I will keep it to a minimum ,but of necessity, some technical words appear in this article. The following is a brief explanation and glossary.

A locus is a specific area on a chromosome that can be readily identified and in this article usually concern, unusually, sequences of DNA ,e.g. ...CGATCGATCGATCGAT... which is CGAT repeated 4 times. These repeats are highly variable in number hence their usefulness (VNTR = Variable Number Tandem Repeat).
The number 4 , in this case, is the allele (variant ) which becomes just one of the 20 numbers in the (UK) DNA profile. For each pair of chromosomes there is one from the mother and one from the father. So ,4, from one parent and perhaps 6 times the CGAT repeat from the other parent, so number 6. So for this one locus a pair of alleles/variants (4,6), smaller number first by convention, as the origin of each i.e. mother or father, remains unknown. Then 9 other loci on different chromosomes giving 10x2 numbers in each profile in the UK NDNAD (National DNA Database) .

The average number of possible alleles at each locus is 14. So permutations of selecting from 14 numbers , 2 at a time, 10 times over is truly a very large number. But ,a very big BUT, the chance of inheriting a particular allele is not equal through the range of possible alleles.
STR- Short Tandem Repeat; short, repetitive sequence elements of 2-5 bases. STR's used in DNA profiling are polymorphic, which is to say that the number of repeat elements varies between individuals in a population.
Consider the locus called THO1
Variant Allele (fractional allele) - an STR allele with an incomplete allele. A common THO1 variant allele is 9.3. This allele has 9 full repeats plus 3 nucleotides.
Nucleotide- a building block of DNA or RNA

From a private communication between myself and Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys to clarify some of this material.
"Amelogenin is used to establish gender. the other markers are not on X or Y; for markers named DmSnnn (e.g. D2S1338 ), m stands for the number of the chromosome on which the marker is found. The columns give the marker types found in an individual; e.g. this person has VWA alleles (variants) type 17 and 19. There's no significance to the order in which pairs of markers are presented; it's conventional to give the smaller first. Hence the numbers in the right column are always as big as or bigger than those in the middle column."
Alec Jeffreys

Some more general information regarding DNA profiles
Automsomes occur in pairs, each individual receives one from their mother and one from the father. Therefore, at each marker included in SGM+ (the proprietary system used in the UK), a person will receive one from their mother and one from their father. The child is a composite of the parents. A child will receive one each of a parents 22 autosome pairs 1 to 22. The child will also receive one of the mother's X chromosomes (mothers are XX) and either an X chromosome from the father (female child) or a Y chromosome from the father (male child)- fathers are XY. There is a 50% chance that any given child will receive one or the other chromosome pair from each parent.

The following is for the benefit of people like Fian Dawson who should have a test done with the same markers assuming a proper "chain of custody". This is to avoid sleight-of-hand, at the taking of samples, or swapping of samples, and verification of identity, so the results are forensically admissible. In a standard paternity test that includes the mother, child and man alleged-to-be the father, the DNA profile of the child is first compared to that of the mother to identify what the mother and child have in common using Punnet squares. Then the remaining components in the child's DNA profile must have come from the biological father. If the man being tested does not demonstrate those components in his profile then that would represent exclusionary evidence. If on the other hand, if the tested man does demonstrate those components in his profile, then that would represent inclusionary evidence. Therefore, a child is 50% related to both parents, and 50% related to it's siblings, assuming the siblings have the same mother and father.

Naturally occurring changes in the DNA can create an "apparent" single exclusion or inconsistency at one marker. They are rare but do occur and should must be taken into account. For example, in comparing the SGM+ profile of a mother and her child, if at a single marker the mother and child did not share anything, but did match at the other 9 SGM+ markers, then that single inconsistency probably resulted from a mutation during oogenesis.

Data Protection Act - Subject Access - Forensic Science Service

 Forensic Science Service 1

Text of the above letter:
An Executive Agency of the Home Office
Information Systems Division
Forensic Science Service
Trident Court
2920 Solihull Parkway
Birmingham Business Park
Birmingham B37 7 YN

Direct Line +44 (0)121 329---
Facsimile +44 (0)121 770 3686
02 January 2002 Subject Access Request
In response to your request for information under the Data Protection Act a search was carried out on the national DNA Database on 2 January 2002. The attached sheet contains the information that was retrieved from the Database. Under recently enacted legislation ,the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, there is no legal reqirement for a record to be removed from the National DNA Database provided the sample was lawfully taken. The details will only be used, however, for the for the (sic) prevention and detection of crime, for the investigation of an offence or for the conduct of prosecution (including crimes committed or prosecutions brought outside the UK ).

You have also requested information from our other database collections. The Forensic Science Service (FSS) are obliged to reveal the existence of all evidential material held by the FSS in a criminal case to the defence lawyer under the Criminal Procedures and Investigation (CPI) Act. The Data Protection Act gives you the right to information relating only to yourself; this is less than the information you are entitled to under the CPI Act. Under the Data Protection Act it is illegal to reveal information to you that relates to someone else. The nature of our records is such that a name and date of birth is not sufficient to ensure that the correct case records are retrieved for a subject access request. In order to retrieve the relevant information from our computers we require.
the date of the offence
the FSS case reference number
the year the case was processed
FSS laboratory where it was processed for each case that relates to you. Your legal representative should be able to supply you with this information; alternatively you may be able to obtain this information from the Police. It will take a considerable effort to retrieve the information from all the databases and copy it to you, I would be grateful if you would reconsider whether the information from the DNA Database is sufficient for your needs. However, if you do wish to obtain the information from the other databases please send me the case information specified above. Yours sincerely Dr. P E Cage and sig.
Chief Executive: Dr Janet Thompson
Headquarters :Priory House Gooch Street North Birmingham B5 6QQ Laboratories Birmingham Chepstow Chorley Huntingdon London Wetherby

A valid phone number in Dec 2001 for this lot is 0121 606 2950
So for my entry in the UK FSS National DNA Database ( NDNAD ).

 DNA profile

Text of the field designations and text of this form
Data Protection Act Subject Access Request
Search Name ; Search DoB ; Date of search
The National DNA Database is used for different types of data sources; consequently some of the following items may have no data recorded against them if it is not appropriate for the purpose for which the record mas(sic) made.
Name ; DoB ; Alias 1 ; Alias 2 ; Gender ; Country ; Paternity Id ; Ethnic Origin: White Skinned European ; Sample Barcode ; Sample Type 3 - Buccal cells ; Case Class Code:SA - Suspect Control from RCCJ recordable offences ; Case Reference ; Arrest Summons ; Batch Reference ; No in Batch - at NDU ; Gel Number ; Track No ; Test Type: 3 - 3rd Generation System (SGM+)
The following IDs are used to link personal details with the sample and amplified sample details. They have no meaning out side(sic) the National DNA Database. Person ID ; Sample ID
Each DNA sample is tested against a number of different DNA markers or Loci. Each test is expected to detect two values, one from each parent. Sometimes the same result will be obtained from both parents. The Amelogenin marker (Amel) is indicative of the persons gender.
Locus Type           Low      High
Amel                  X         Y
VWA                   1a        1b
THO1                  2a        2b
D6S502                3a        3b
FGA                   4a        4b
D21S11                5a        5b
D18S51                6a        6b
D2S1338               7a        7b
D16S539               8a        8b
D19S433               9a        9b
D3S1358               10a       10b

End of Form

All the actual numbers (weeded) labelled b in the right hand column, are greater or equal to, the numerical values in the middle column marked with "a".

The above DNA profile form is appallingly constructed.
To a layman the X and Y at the top of the columns suggest that the numbers tabulated below the X refer to data from the X chromosome and under Y from the Y chromosome, which is erroneous. The reader of such a table, without any previous knowledge, would assume the figures under the X would relate to the X chromosome and Y chromosome under the Y with immediate implications to blood relatives. The amelogenin row should be removed from the table and placed elsewhere.

Some history of the UK NDNA database

45,000 profiles in the database in 1991
135,000 in 1995
300,000 in 1998
840,000 in spring 2000
over 1 million in 2001
1,886,000 25 March 2003
[Germany had 36,000 in its BKA DNA database in spring 2000 ]
Up till 2002 the figures for false DNA match was about 1 in 500,000
February 2003 dropped to about 1 in 330,000
May 2003 dropped to about 1 in 240,000
If the 'Milly Dowler' case was a false match then the figure drops to about 1 in 200,000 - going down fast now.
"Operation Ruby", reported on August 08,2003 concerning an implicated parishioner of St Paul's church ,Ryhope,Sunderland.
'Milly Dowler'

Cases Highlighting Problems with DNA Profiling

The following is a serious cock-up of this technology from New Zealand
New Zealand farce 26/5/1999 William Fleet murder
New Zealand farce continued 10 Mar 2000
And announcement of a NZ government inquiry at the end of this NZ government file
New Zealand followup
New Zealand farce a bit more
I have not found electronically retrievable reference to this report yet.
Houston tale of leaking roof over "forensic" DNA processing area
And the consequential chaos that ensued which in the States is a life and death matter, with bods on death row, because of DNA profiles processed under holes in a roof.
Houston 07 March 2003, "Seeking an order for a moratorium"
Houston DNA Re-testing 10 Mar 2003
Exposé of USA DNA crime labs as of 26 May 2003
Insight - Inside the DNA Labs

From Ireland
Man freed after DNA evidence deemed not enough
2003-10-14 : A Dublin man on trial for murder walked free today when the Central Criminal Court jury was directed to acquit because DNA evidence alone could not be relied upon. Mr Justice Butler's direction to the jury to acquit on murder and firearms charges followed defence submissions that, as there was no corroborative evidence to support the DNA evidence, the jury should be instructed to acquit the accused Frederick Howe. ...
End Quote

A couple of earlier cases from New Scientist
The Case of Roy Williams
The Case of Terence Hammond

False Matches

And now from the UK
The Case of Raymond Easton or Internet archive source
the severely disabled 'cat burglar' from Swindon,Wiltshire,the case that led to the police having to increase the number of markers ( loci ) tested from 6 to 10 in the UK DNA profiles
A second case where unbelievably someone was sentenced to 6 years in prison for having a "DNA match" after a trawl through the FSS database and the following "corroborative evidence"
"The prosecution relied upon some matters as providing support: firstly, that the applicant was a smoker or, more accurately, that he had admitted in interview that he had been on his way to purchase a packet of cigarettes; secondly, the Crown said it was relevant that the applicant lived in the general locality of the burglaries (Birmingham); and thirdly, that the appellant was a man and most safe crackers were male. " Just because some fag butts were found at the Scene-of-Crime - ask yourself - How many professional burglars hang around smoking a cigarette while on a job ?
The Case of Robert Watters,Birmingham
Primary source for the Watters appeal court judgement is on Butterworths Lexis Nexis.

From the Court of Appeal judgement concerning Regina v. Watters heard on 19 Oct 2000
The other evidence results from more stringent tests that have been done on the DNA material that was available in this case. That is partly as a result of a case in which a 6 point match was found to produce two possible suspects, one of whom had been charged despite living at the other end of the country and had to be acquitted when it was appreciated that the DNA matched a second person.
End Quote

A Case Devastating to the FSS
A story from 14 Feb 2003 that confirms the worst aspect of the above ,the case of -
Peter Hamkin of Liverpool
Implicated as a murderer in a murder that occurred in Florence,Italy a thousand miles away.
and then
Peter Hamkin follow-up 17 Feb 2003
It seems patently obvious to me but to few other people that this is another case of an unrelated false match.
Peter Hamkin follow-up 10 March 2003
and the second page of the article.
I was proven correct .
The only newspaper, of January 2004, that has caught on to all this is Le Monde (23 dec 2003),1-0@2-3226,36-346852,0.html
At least they would appear to use the term false positive matches. I object to the term adventitious match as there is nothing accidental about all this - it is criminal 'scientific' incompetence at best and corruption at worst.

Now there is an Interpol hook-up this disgusting activity will become more and more common unless campaigners like me put a stop to it. I have seen an unconfirmed report that this "match was made" using 6 loci from the Italian profile and 6 from Mr Hamkin's FSS 6 loci profile. So these dangerous bastards have painted themselves even blacker if they, post-Easton, are still making uncorroborated "matches" on 6 loci. From my computer simulation of a large DNA profile database
A simulation of a large DNA profile database - the result being a match on 10 loci in just 2 million 'parthenogenic' profiles i.e. no kinship, relatedness, co-ancestry
of an astounding result. The UK FSS were using 6 loci ,as the forensic statistitians were telling them, chance of false match 1 in 37 million. But I now know that if they had continued to the current (2003) total of 2 million in the NDNAD then there would be more than
27,168 pairs of false matches
1231 triples
110 quadruples
14 quintuples
It beggars belief that the FSS had such faith in 6 loci right up to the Raymond Easton case that forced the issue.

The Italians use 13 loci, 8 of which are the same as the UK set of loci, so maybe 8 loci match - we will have to wait and see what emerges about the case. As Peter Hamkin was arrested in 2001 his profile would have been on 10 loci.

The first, reported, case of a false DNA profile match, to someone in Goettingen ,Germany
göttingen prisoner gottingen thomas klinge gunter heinz hanover bicycle DNA profile DNA profiles DNA profiling Profil d'cAdn Profils d'cAdn Profilage d'cAdn Profilo del DNA Profili del DNA Delineamento del DNA Perfil do DNA Perfis do DNA Perfilar do DNA DNA-Profil DNA-Profile DNAPROFILIEREN profil de dna profils de dna profilage de dna If this German was not incarcerated and had been at the time of the murder then he would have got the Easton/Hamkin treatment ,especially as this bod had a criminal record for sex and violent offences.
The story, in German, in Die Welt
The Goettingen Prisoner story placed here for easy access
20 June 2003 and the 'Milly Dowler' serological sample in Surrey match with a Sunderland parishioner.
From Australia the first instance of an innocent female implicated as a murderer - the Werribee rape victim,October 2003,5478,7442645%255E2862,00.html
"The accuracy of Victoria's DNA system will be on trial during the Jaidyn Leskie inquest next month. The Herald Sun yesterday revealed that DNA found on a bib Jaidyn was wearing the day he is presumed to have been killed matches the DNA of a rape victim. Police have interviewed the 22-year-old Werribee woman and say she is not connected with Jaidyn's disappearance.

There was unidentified DNA found on a bib Jaidyn was wearing the day he disappeared. The bib was found in a plastic bag, with some of Jaidyn's other clothing, in Blue Rock Dam near where Jaidyn's body was discovered in January 1998. All the obvious females who might have come into contact with the bib were DNA tested at the time. Jaidyn's mother nominated a number of other women she thought should be tested and the new investigation ensured each of these woman was checked.

None of them were found to be a match. As a matter of routine, the DNA from the bib was run through the police DNA database to see if it matched any of the thousands of DNA samples taken from criminals and victims and which are stored on the database. It turned out to match DNA obtained from the outside of a condom used by a rapist to rape a woman. Police have interviewed the 22-year-old rape victim and told the coroner they do not believe she was in any way involved in the disappearance of Jaidyn, but can't explain why her DNA was on Jaidyn's bib."

Later appraisal suggests this was another case of unexplainable lab cross-contamination.

Which is the more reliable evidence ? "Evidence" from theoretical forensic scientists or evidence from real life such as Messrs Easton and Hamkin and the Goettingen prisoner.
This is the Birmingham FSS quoted in Forensic Science International 88 (1997) 33-42:
"In recent months we [the FSS] have had a very clear steer from the appeal court that forensic scientists should concern themselves with frequencies and be ready to present to the courts the probability of other individuals possessing the same profile. The UK population is about 60,000,000. The combined TGM and SGM statistics [now called SGM+ ] translates to a frequency of 1 in 1,000,000,000,000,000 (in many billions)."

From Australia the two cases of Nick Lisoff and Marc Renton (contains rather sloppy DNA terminology)

I would be interested in finding confirmation/clarification of any of the following broadcast on 04 Dec 2002 ,9pm on the Sci-fi TV channel in a documentary series this one programme entitled "DNA in the Dock" - [ A US anthropologist discovered a 14 point match between two unrelated people who lived 2000 miles apart. He mentioned that the two samples in question were from South America and Mexico respectively. There was also a mention of a perfect match in two non-family members of a certain small in-bred tribe consisting of a few hundred people [ full reference on my dnay.htm file ] . 300 "matches" in the UK NDNAD ascribed to mistakes,re-tested people giving aliases (an unrelated match of 2 DNA profiles and unrelated conventional fingerprints would be in the billions to one against) etc ].

From "trade" journal Forensic Science International 95 (1998) p30.
Concerning data in the UK DNA database as of 04 October 1996 when there were only 6311 samples from the London area and 573 from the Cardiff area.
"A small number of unresolved duplicate pairs of profiles were present in the regional data :10 pairs within the London region and 1 pair in Cardiff. The most common cause of duplicate entries is the use of aliases by suspects who have been arrested on several occasions. For administrative reasons ,it is not always possible to resolve such duplicates by exhaustive police investigation."
This statement is absolute tosh. At the same time a DNA sample is extracted, from an arrested person, his conventional fingerprints are taken as well. It could not be easier to cross-correlate conventional and DNA fingerprints from 2 data sets. The chances then of a false matching of both types of "fingerprint" would truly be in the trillions to one against. If just one of these 10 is a genuine unrelated false match then you can throw forensic statistics out of the window. Are they telling us that the police are unconcerned about having duplicate criminal records for one criminal - tell that to the fairies. I smell a cover-up of the most grave kind because it concerns people who consider themselves scientists not administrators/politicians and the like.
The PRIORITY is to fully investigate all such occurrances - I have a scientific background and I find the deliberate non-investigation of anomalies to be absolutely abhorrent and an affront to the scientific ethic. There is this incredibly dangerous mindset that they cannot have unrelated false matches so ring-fence them out of consideration.

Bear in mind this was from the situation as it was in 1996 to 1998 and is no different in concept now despite increasing from 6 to 10 loci tested. It is an absolute scandal that I seem to be the only person who seems to be investigating this appallingly lax state of affairs in forensic "science".

My MP agreed to table a written parliamentary question.
If submitted to parliament in the form I had envisageded then the reply would likely have come back as too complex or costly to answer. So more than likely, no reply - was my MP's (been there before ) helpful response.
He advised splitting into 2 questions over time. The first one to get the number of current DNA profile matches for whatever reason answered and written into Hansard. A figure of ???? or whatever would almost guarantee some sort of qualification referring to aliases. Then with any luck there may be more than me and my MP asking that this figure be resolved into the component parts. That is pairs of unrelated individuals with matching DNA profiles and same persons recorded twice or more using aliases.
This is a copy of my letter to my MP as I had heard/seen nothing about it.
15 Nov 2003 by post and 05 Dec 2003 by hand.
" Dear Mr - ,
On 04 July 2003 I visited your surgery at - -. You agreed to ask a written Parliamentary Question. The form of the question to the Home Office was to be something of the cut-down nature, "How many DNA profile matches are within the UK NDNAD ? (National DNA Database)". I have not seen reference to the question or answer on the internet public accesss Hansard site or any follow-up communication from yourself "

Then 8 months later or original
This question and answer in Hansard
5 Feb to 11 Feb 2004
Dr. Whitehead: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many DNA profile matches exist within the UK national DNA database.
Ms Blears: The figures relating to the DNA profile matches reported by The National DNA Database since its inception in April 1995 to January 2004 inclusive are described as follows: a total of 459,903 matches have been reported between DNA profiles obtained from individuals and DNA profiles collected from unsolved crime scenes; and a total of 28,116 scene-to-scene matches have been reported between DNA profiles collected from unsolved crime scenes.
End Quote
Unfortunately not disclosing the far more significant number of matches in the CJ (arrestee ) side of the NDNAD

A New Variant of Miscarriages of Justice

Moved to another file

2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act section 82

Restriction on use and destruction of fingerprints and samples
(1) Section 64 of the 1984 Act (destruction of fingerprints and samples) shall be amended as follows.
(2) For subsections (1) and (2) (obligation to destroy fingerprints and samples of persons who are not prosecuted or who are cleared) there shall be substituted-
"(1A) Where-
(a) fingerprints or samples are taken from a person in connection with the investigation of an offence, and
(b) subsection (3) below does not require them to be destroyed, the fingerprints or samples may be retained after they have fulfilled the purposes for which they were taken but shall not be used by any person except for purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution. "

Note it says "may be retained" not "must be retained"
The effect of this section 82 was confirmed directly, face to face, from the horse's mouth.- January 2002 I bumped into ,socially, the Home Office Minister, John Denham. Some leading opinion on section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.
John Yorke Denham gloating about his coup (New Scientist 24 August 2002 - "The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 swept away the obligation on the police to destroy DNA samples taken from suspects who are acquitted, or where charges are later dropped or convictions quashed on appeal."
I have found nothing in Hansard relating to discussion of this section 82 in parliament so in my books that makes it an illegal imposition.
Helena Kennedy QC on this matter If this article fails to emerge from the Guardian archive then click again.

Sir Alec Jeffreys,inventor of DNA profiling on this matter If this article fails to emerge from the Guardian archive then click again.
Also quoted in a New Scientist article of 05 May 2001
"Deep down they (police authorities) believe that innocent people who've had a brush with the law are more likely than not to be criminals... There is only one way to prevent any abuse (returning to the samples later in a trawl for data matching with physical characteristics say) of the DNA samples - destroy them all after a DNA sample has been obtained... Any checking of results should be carried out on a fresh sample obtained from the suspect... Suspects who are cleared should have the right to remove their DNA profiles or more radically the database should contain everyone's DNA profile,filed at birth."
Sir Alec Jeffreys more recently on this matter

I sent a proper request to FSS Birmingham but they refused to destroy my DNA sample and the derived biometric data.
I have had one of my civil liberties removed by this Dr P E Cage. I did not volunteer to have a DNA sample taken from me and as I have no criminal record I do not see any moral justification for them keeping it.
The only reason to have my DNA profile permanently on record is to stitch me up with a crime at some point in the future - via falsely matching it to some scene-of-crime sample.
On 13 March 2002 there will be a test case on section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. It is against Yorkshire Constabulary, conducted by Howells Solicitors of Sheffield, acting for a Michael MARPER. The grounds being that it be read incompatible with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and must be read down. They can only retain finger-prints,DNA samples etc if there is original and compelling reason e.g. another criminal case.
The following is an update on the high court test case published 23 March 2002 where the background material almost looks as though it was lifted from this file.
Section 82 ,CJPA 2001 Test Case If the article fails to emerge first time click again
Section 82 ,CJPA 2001 Appeal court decision by Justice Leveson and Justice Rose 22 March 2002
More nasties concerning s82 of the 2001 CJPA from justices Waller,Woolf and Sedley

The Wider Implications of DNA Profiles - the Attribution Problem

Beware! Police DNA database and postage stamps
Please be aware all criminals or non-criminals like me (courtesy of section 82 of the 2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act) who have had DNA samples taken from them and the profile placed permanently on the Birmingham Forensic Science Service (FSS) database.
DO NOT lick postage stamps before sticking on envelopes - use damp cloth or sponge.
As evinced in these files there are dangerous and corrupt people around who fabricate testimony and evidence to present to the police. It would have been very easy for any of my opposition to obtain stamps, licked by me ,and now, know my DNA profile is on this database. All they had to do was soak off a stamp. Then use it to dampen the gum on a fresh stamp, stuck to a "bomb threat" letter or smear on clothing to fabricate an "assault" or daub on a cigarette stub (previously smoked through a cigarette-holder) and leave it at a "burglary" or even a murder scene say. Cor! the perfect crime - murder one of your enemies AND get another of your enemies convicted for your crime. Forensic testers will look for the presence of DNA ,not be testing for the presence of gum unless pre-advised to do so .
Previously, to do the same by lifting fingerprints and transferring to a crime scene artefact required substantial knowledge and skill. Now any old moron can falsely implicate anyone if they know they have been arrested and a DNA sample taken from them.

So a public information broadcast for all practising criminals who may read this file
The next time you go out to do a burglary or whatever. A simple way to reduce the chance of you being discovered and also mess up the forensic service more generally. Make a collection of cigarette stubbs,used snot rags /tissues etc from public areas and obtain used gloves, hats ,combs etc from jumble / rummage sales, garage / car boot sales or charity shops. Wheelie-bins would probably contain useful material. Then leave behind ONE of these items near your entry or exit point. DO NOT handle any of these items yourself, keep in a plastic bag until you "drop" it. If the Soco boys find a nice item covered in DNA they are more likely not to do the normal full range of dusting, casting and snapping and proceed to the next assignment. Get enough people to adopt this strategy and the national DNA database will be totally discredited.
Masons solicitor multiple
Surprisingly for a UK law firm it has details of how this pernicious proposal can be defeated by deliberately leaving other people's DNA at scenes of crime. No problem of implicating innocent citizens, as the police only use evidence, with guaranteed association with a crime or criminal - don't they.

Even the police are now concerned how easy it is to 'fit-up' someone (police this time) by planting someone else's DNA at a crime-scene
From 17 Aug 2003
Partial Quote
Police outrage over demand for their DNA


PLANS to force police to give DNA samples have sparked a rebellion among rank-and-file officers. It is understood all eight of Scotland's police forces are about to demand that in future new recruits hand over samples to be included in a national genetic database. This would allow any body matter, such as hair or saliva, found at a crime scene, to be compared with the DNA records of officers, so investigations are not thrown off course through accidental contamination by officers working there. But rank-and-file police fear that calculating criminals with a grudge against members of the force could manipulate the system to damage the careers of innocent officers. Members of the Scottish Police Federation believe criminals could deliberately contaminate the scene with officers' DNA, either to implicate them in serious crimes or to give the impression that they had planted evidence. A federation spokesman said: "A point made by many of our members is that it is relatively easy for anyone so minded to obtain DNA traces of a police officer - for example from a discarded cigarette butt - and to deliberately contaminate a locus with it. "Apart from the suspicion which may or may not fall on the officer, it has the potential to diminish the evidential value of any DNA traces of the real perpetrator of the crime."
End Quote

In the full Scotland on Sunday article the policewoman McKie case and the disputed dermal finfger-prints are referred to as high resolution images - interesting viewing
Another case of fingerprint wrong identification a_blow_to_the_credibility_of_fingerprint_evidence/

Then from the criminal fraternity someone being implicated by person or persons unknown, presumably an enemy of his, in Exeter reported 14 Aug 2003. e=99871&contentPK=6705317
A man accused of burgling a city home after bloody tissues found at the scene matched his DNA profile has been cleared by a court. Jonathan Bowskill said he had nothing to do with the burglary at Alpha Street, Heavitree, in the early hours of November 29. A jury at Exeter Crown Court yesterday found him not guilty. During the trial, prosecutor David Evans said Peter Holmes went to bed and left a window open and his wallet in his leather jacket. He got up at 5am and went to work. He later found the tissues on the floor and his wallet missing. Bowskill told police although he was a heroin addict, he "didn't do burglaries", and did not know how the tissues came to be there.
End Quote

This one I've not found reference to the woman involved being prosecuted for attempt to pervert the course of justice or whatever. It may be just reported fantacising by the prosecution to explain a very awkward situation. But I've included anyway.
Turner was charged with three rapes last year after police matched samples of his DNA to that from fluids found on the victims. Turner claimed he was innocent. He acknowledged that the genetic material taken from the rape victims matched his but argued that it must have come from another man, an unknown rapist with the exact same genetic code. Milwaukee authorities just laughed. They knew that unless Turner had an identical twin -- which he didn't -- the chance of someone sharing his genetic code was about 3 trillion to 1. Turner was convicted in March 1999. A few months later, as Turner sat in jail waiting to be sentenced, something astonishing happened. Police investigating a new rape compared the alleged attacker's DNA with samples from other sex crimes, and found a match. It was Turner, who of course had an ironclad alibi — he was in jail. Was Turner innocent all along? Against astronomical odds, could there really be another rapist with his DNA profile in the Milwaukee area? If so, that would shatter the entire premise of DNA technology. As it turned out, the DNA was indeed Turner's. Milwaukee authorities discovered a clever scam: Turner, determined to cast doubt on the science upon which his conviction was based, had smuggled a sample of his own semen out of jail, concealed in what had been a ketchup packet. Family members then paid a woman $50 to use the sperm to stage a phony rape. Turner wound up being sentenced to 120 years in prison.

This is one of the biggest flaws with DNA profiles. There is no problem in its use to identify a dead body, say, as it is known for certain that the sample came from the body in question. Likewise, no problem in its use as evidence of exclusion from a crime. But and a its a very big BUT unless there is strong independent conventional evidence, as well, how can anyone say where a few cells containing DNA came from.

In the same vein (nudge,nudge) when I first saw this story I did not believe a word of it. But it is all officially documented and even video tape of one of the blood samplings.
... The case unfolded in 1992 when an unwed mother told police she'd been drugged and raped in hospital by her family doctor. The scene was Kipling, Sask., a small farm town where the doctor was not only wealthy, but popular. Few believed his accuser and instead bought into his claim she was bent on extortion. Three voluntary blood tests and seven years later, the semen found on the woman's underwear still didn't match the doctor's DNA, baffling his victim. John Schneeberger was only charged after she hired a private investigator to steal lip balm from his truck to perform an independent DNA test. Weeks later, RCMP plucked 25 hairs from Schneeberger's head and finally matched his DNA to the semen. In 1999, the doctor told a packed courtroom the woman broke into his home, stole a used condom and wiped its contents on her underwear to frame him. Because he needed to protect his family and wealth from this woman, he devised a plan. With a surgeon's scalpel, he sliced deep into his lower bicep and implanted a plastic vein under the skin. In a Penrose drain, he stored another man's blood so that when police came to collect a sample to match DNA, he was prepared. Instead of removing blood from Schneeberger's vein it was drawn from the plastic tube.

Vulnerability of the UK NDNAD

Just for the record the address of where the UK NDNAD store of DNA samples is printed on page 229 of the HMSO "National Asset Register, 2001" in any major UK library
Frontispiece states "Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister, by command of Her Majesty ,July 2001"
Also on the internet at
HM Treasury site
Named with inspired lunacy after Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys the inventor of DNA profiling note not Jeffrey's in the address.
Oldbury Facility, Jeffreys House, 1 Wharfside, Rounds Green Road, Oldbury, West Midlands, B69 2BU: a purpose built industrial building used partly as a store and partly fitted as office and laboratory space. Occupied from 1997 on a 20-year lease until 2017; 1012 square metres.
And further background again in the public domain from 5 May 2001 New Scientist Pages 10-12. (archive free but registration required)
The DNA Police
By David Concar
IN THE US, it would be protected by steel doors and armed guards. In Britain, anonymity does the job. Tucked away on an industrial estate near Birmingham, you'd scarcely know the brick-and-glass building was there-let alone that it houses the biggest collection of human DNA in the world. A collection that's getting bigger and more contentious-by the day. For years, police in Britain have been quietly exercising their right to collect saliva swabs from almost anyone they take into custody. Those swabs now fill scores of industrial freezers in the basement of the anonymous looking building. Upstairs, a database holds over a million DNA profiles based on these samples. And because crime never stops, up to 3000 new samples arrive every day.
End Quote
They have to have this backstop, of stored DNA samples, for everyone profiled because the science is flaky. No one can be sure a particular DNA profile truly represents a DNA sample, until it is multiple-tested. They also need it for cross-comparison on international database trawls, to test with loci not used in the UK.

Technical Problems with DNA Profiles

Lack of Validation

Conventional fingerprint forensic evidence has been around for over 100 years and you would think it was tried and tested technology but not the case. See the cases of police detective Shirley McKie and David Asbury in Scotland Shirley Mckie the forensic fingerprint details are worth downloading to look at.
and another cock-up concerning friction ridge, dermal fingerprints Rick Jackson ,Upper Darby, Pa,USA

I still have not found a proper validation study where someone has taken DNA material ,divided it and sent it to different forensic labs for analysis. The series in Analytical Chemistry "Inter-laboratory Comparison of Autoradigraphic DNA Profiling measurements" part 1 ,Oct 16 1994; part 2 April 1 1995; part 3 June 1 ,1996 and part 4 May 15 1997 relate to RFLP rather than PCR processing.
If tested by different labs, on different machines, but looking at the same loci and the results came back as differing alleles where would all this DNA profiling be then ?
Take some blood samples, divide up and send to different labs to process under normal batch processing ,do 10 loci profiles and collate the results. Not surprising, no-one has done so because I recently found this report in Forensic Science International Vol 86 (1997) p25-33

This experiment limited itself to just 2 of the loci used in the 10 loci UK Forensic Science Service DNA database. 7 blood samples were taken and divided and sent to 16 different laboratories around the world. These were tested knowing the significance and not part of routine (possibly less rigorous ) batch processing .
The multinationals, surprise surprise, do not release this information and no-one outside the industry, unbelievably, would seem to have done such validation. For all I know this industry could be a house of cards build on sand. The nearest I have is from FSI Vol 86,1997,p25-33
Source reference:!&_cdi=5041&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=4d7a6643c27f043e66bfe63e3729a47c
Abstract of the FSI article
7 samples divided ,sent to 16 labs and checked blind on the 2 loci D21 and FGA then as 2 alleles per locus 448 data-points in total. Bear in mind all the labs knew these were validation samples so could easily have been on their "best behaviour". E.g. not (say) using an unbalanced centrifuge in the lab at the same time, that could mechanically vibrate the DNA processor, or (say) not using a known electrically noisy motorised bit of kit that pumps noise spikes down the mains etc etc.
There were 18 errors in that returned data the worst being (23,23) returned as (21,21) i.e. 2 bins away from the "correct".
'Invalidation ' of DNA profiling - FGA
 'Invalidation' of DNA profiles - FGA
'Correct' results (majority in agreement) are in the first two columns. Erroneous results highlighted next to red blobs. Lab '13' would not have been aware of any problems as for all they knew some false de-natured samples could have been included. HUMFIBRA is also known as FGA. Note [8] is Urquart to Moeller conversion formula.

'Invalidation ' of DNA profiling - D21
 'Invalidation' of DNA profiles - D21
So with an error rate of 18 in 448 or 1 in 25, one of the figures in my (un-fudged) profile could easily be incorrect - who would know ? Until it is repeated on different machines, with different personel, at different times, at different labs, with different reagent batches, and a concencus "correct" result emerges, then no-one knows. Again there is the same uncertainty to any SoCo sample, one figure in 20 can easily be wrong by one or more.
The "correct result" [i.e. most labs in agreement (there is a whole treatise just on this aside, as everything in DNA "science" is inferred ) ] from 13 of the labs was for locus HUMFIBRA ( FGA ) 2 alleles per sample and 7 samples
21,25 ; 23,24 ; 22,22.2 ; 23,23 ; 18,23 ; 18,22 ; 23.2,24
but for lab "1" ; 23,24 returned as 22,26
for lab "11" ; 22,22.2 returned as 22,22
and for lab " 13" ; 23,23 returned 21,21 ; 18,22 returned 17,19.2 and 23,24 returned as no result obtained and 23.2,24 returned as no result obtained i.e. just 3 of the 7 samples matched.
Well at least they were honourable enough to report it all.
On the second locus D21S11 better agreement
7 consensus 'correct' results 59,63;63,67;63,65;61,65;61,70;61,63;59,65
- only one lab at variance the 61,65 pair returned as 61,63 ; 59,65 returned as 61,63 and no result found for the 63,67 pair.

As far as I know no-one has analysed and published the results of checking for co-ancestry and independence i.e. say inheriting a 17 on D2 does not predispose to inheriting a 15 on D18 say , by checking hundreds of thousands of such profiles.

In depth grounds for questioning reliability of DNA evidence
Some further exploration of DNA profile problems
DNA Evidence: is it safe to convict?
DNA Evidence: science or smoke and mirrors?

I can be pretty certain my following critique of DNA profiling will not be published in the likes of Forensic Science International.
Proponents of mass DNA profiling like to trot out large googol type numbers giving the probability of 2 people having the same DNA profile, seemingly derived from little more than, some sort of product rule of number of markers and the number of possible sites on these markers. They use some pretty impenetrable statistics to show there is no aliassing between these DNA markers. That is, they are of the opinion that the inheritance of these marker sites is independent. Saying, if you inherit one set of "numbers" on one marker then you are NOT predisposed to inherit a given set of "numbers" on another site. I would rather rely on figures derived from real life.
I tried getting full details from Professor Chaseling but she did not reply to my email enquiries of 20 Jan, 2002 and 14 April ,2002. In Australia a Prof Janet Chaseling of Griffith University did an experiment taking DNA samples from the likes of politicians and blood donors; reported in the Sydney Morning Herald 22/04/2000.
The Sydney article no longer available from the original site
SMH Article
I assumed it would be in her recent FSI article
"Implications for DNA identification arising from an analysis of Australian forensic databases" authors K.L. Ayres, J. Chaseling and D.J. Balding Published in Forensic Science International 2002, Vol. 129 90-98.
but I read too much into the word "implications". Someone anonymously, kindly sent me a copy, of the FSI article. No reference at all to this 7 loci match just observations on the advisability of maintaining separate databases for different ethnic groups. Caucasian, Asian and Australian aboriginal in this Oz situation, if you want to estimate probabilities of false positive matches. Neither Chaseling nor Ayres will confirm this 7 loci match by me emailing them.

From a forensic scientist ,as of October 2002, soon to submit for publishing
" I have examined the Australian forensic databases, and I have found instances of 7-locus matches" ;notice the plural, not the one case, so far released to the public domain.
To my understanding, a definition of a science is, it must be consistent and reproducible which this plainly isn't.
Another problem area for reliability of DNA profiling from Analytic Chemistry 2001 V73,1345 - 1349. When the DNA samples are amplified they are held at specific temperatures but should this temperature fluctuate even marginally from the set temperature then false readings particularly at the longer repeat lengths. "...oscillations in the capillary's temperature result in significant degradation in the number of theoretical plates, the resolution between adjasent peaks and the number of bases of DNA sequence determined from the electrophoresis data. Temperature must be held stable to within 0.1 degree C to obtain long read lengths"
There is a serious problem with locus HUMFIBRA ( FGA ) from Forensic Science International 112 (2000) 151 - 161 "Validation of the AMPFISTR SGM Plus system ... ". e.g. a 19,26 pair of alleles measured by one technique will record as 19,19 on a different technique.

DNA Processing Machines treated as Dishwashers

I was dumbfounded when I read this piece that an American had written, as an aside, on a Usenet golfing user-group.
"Making your own clubs is a lot of fun and can add a lot to your enjoyment of the game. It does not require any sort of high tech qualifications or excess of expertise. My colleagues think it is a big deal that I can fix my thermal cycler (PCR machine) and automated DNA sequencer... it's not. They are simple electrical/mechanical devices and pulling a board or replacing a pump is no different than doing the same for a cheap radio or a dishwasher."
You don't tinker with these sort of machines, however well intentioned. Just moving a wiring loom could upset the calibration. He, being in the States, could have condemned someone to death by his actions.

Lies,Damn Lies and Statistics

The following statistics is something like the "birthday problem" - what is the probability that, in a room with N people in it, everyone has a different birthday? If there are at least 23 people, then the probability that everyone has a different birthday is less than 1/2. In other words, with at least 23 people, you would expect at least one matching birthday. This is, a lot lower than the number of people in a room before there is a probability of someone with a specified birthday

The Australian Chaseling study I am interested in totalled 5,500 from which the DNA profiles were determined using 9 markers. The results showed no matches concerning all 9 markers or any 8 markers but for 7 markers there was a match. For the moment I will assume there are 12 possibilities on each of the 9 markers Here we don't have 365 possible birthdays, but have 12^7 marker position possibilities (or 12^8, or 12^9; in other words, the number of positions per marker, to the power of the number of markers). And have N=5500 people. Assuming that these 8 or 7 of 9 were chosen in advance, i.e., that it was not the case that a set of 7 was chosen, no match was found, so a different set of 7 was chosen, and so on, until finally a match was found. From a proper statistician the maths in this case is

With 7 markers, the probability of at least one match is around 1/3.
With 8 markers, the probability is around 1/30.
With 9 markers, the probability is around 1/350.
With 10 markers, the probability is around 1/4000.
With 9 markers, a sample of N=85,000 gives a probability of at least one match of around 1/2.
With 10 markers, you would need N=290,000.

(Note that the above probabilities are very different from the probability that a specified person matches a randomly chosen marker position set [or equivalently, that a specified marker set matches a randomly chosen person]. The latter is 1/12^(number of markers), again assuming independence and equi-probability.) Or one in 36 million for 7. If there was a city of 85,000 people there is probably 2 people with the same matched set of 9 markers but no one would be aware of this. Neither is likely to have left a hair sample etc at a scene of crime or had their profile registered on a DNA database. In the UK the database held 940,000 in 2001 and increasing at the rate of 3000 a day to an expected 3 million in 2004. So buried in this database, there are probably already numerous matches concerning 9 markers and 3 or so for all 10 and hundreds if the whole UK population is considered. I challenge any forensic scientist with access to this database or similar to reveal the true extent of false matches buried in these data.

Each marker is used twice over ,one from the father and one from the mother of the giver of the sample. There may be 2x 20 possible sites on a marker but some of them are so rare as never in practicality turn up. Varying from one site, on one particular marker occurring with frequency of 0.35 ,two per person ,so approx. 1 in 4 of any person tested down to substantially less than 0.001 for the rarely occurring sites. An unfortunate individual with a set of sites of the most frequently occurring pairs could be in for a rough ride. For the 7 markers below the most common occurrances are 1 in 4,4,5,7,8,15,17 giving a "product rule" of only 1 in 1.1 million, decreased even more if co-ancestry is taken into account.
Result from simulations - for people with the same sort of ancestry as myself, all alleles of my profile have an allele frequency greater than 8 per cent. For that subset of the general population with 4 - fourths English background then there would probably be between 50 and 80 10 loci matches within 2 million such people.
See dnas6.htm file in this series.

Co-ancestry and Allele Frequency

Interestingly, quite a variation in frequency of occurring, between Caucasian and Afro-Carribbean descent. In the following table I have rounded the figures to disguise the figures a bit as they are derived from my actual DNA profile and, similarly, anonymously labelled the markers. Headings are :markers a to g, possible sites per marker excluding rarities ,then for the actual profile and pairs of numbers for each marker the (Caucasian) frequency of occurrance as 1 in x people, then 1 in y people of African descent for the same site pairs if this individual had been African in descent. Number of sites on a locus excluding very rare occurrances of less than .01 ,average number per allele of about 2x6 = 12.
Marker  No of sites     f/Cauc     f/Afr
a	2x5		   110	    110
b	2x6		   20	    30
c	2x7		   60	    50
d	2x7		   20	    30
e	2x8		   30	    70
f	2x5		   10	    30
g	2x5		   15	    25
In the actual profile each marker has 2 numbers (alleles) e.g. 17 and 19 ,the site 17 from one parent and the site 19 from the other parent. This police web-site then gives the likelihood of occurrance of a match on all these 7 pairs of markers by just multiplying the frequencies together so for the 3rd column a (rounded) figure of 1.2 E10 people and the 4th column 2.6 E11 i.e. many orders of magnitude from that derived from a real-life occurrance of 1 match contained within 5,500 .Even including the choice of markers used in the Australian tests, would be a different seven, it is still a large difference between 5,500 and 12,000,000,000. For 10 such markers then, they would have us believe, the probabilities were seriously in the googles. For anyone interested in Civil Rights issues if the above profile had been derived from a scene of crime sample then just from the markers e and f the police would be able to say the suspect was 7 times more likely to be white than black (22 times more likely using all 7 markers). Other combinations would point to a black rather than white suspect or red haired (MC1R variant gene in this case, Prof Rees, Edinburgh University) suspect etc.
New Scientist Article
Acccording to John Stead of Leicester University the THO1 locus can reveal a person's genetic predisposition to Type 1 diabetes.

The 5,500 Australian sample result correlates with the situation of the number of sites per marker effectively being only between 3 and 4 ( 3.4^7 =~5,500) similar to the maximum frequencies of occurrance on each marker.

Even if the Birmingham FSS increased the number of loci tested to 15 then there is still the possibility of a crime scene sample falsely matching someone else's DNA profile already held in the database.

These are allele frequencies for D3S1358,VWA,FGA,D5S818,D8S1179,D18S51,D21S11,D13S317 and D7S820 for Australian Caucasian, Asian and Australian Aborigine backgrounds
Australian allele frequencies
The following info deserves putting in the public domain from the FSI journal article referred to above. There are 4 pages of data on allele frequencies for Australia. So here goes ,ignoring frequencies less than 1 per cent. Figures for single alleles. C - Caucassian, P - Pure Australian Aboriginal, A - Asian. Columns are Locus / no. of possible alleles C/ maximum frequency of all alleles C// no. of possible alleles P/max f of all alleles P // no. of possible alleles A / max f of all alleles A
D3S1358   5  .26 // 6  .39      // 5  .41
VWA       7  .26 // 7  .30      // 7  .26
FGA       9  .19 // 11  .19    // 10 .22
D5S818    6  .39 //  6  .26     // 6  .32
D8S1179   8   .32 // 8   .21    // 7  .19 
D18S51    10   .15 // 11 .21    // 11  .25
D21S11    10  .25  //  13 .24   // 8   .31 
D13S317   7    .31 // 7  .33     // 6  .23
D7S820    7    .23  // 6  .38    // 6  .34
The following people with the most commonly occurring alleles are the most likely to have rude awakenings by the police arresting them due to false matches. That is if their two alleles per locus equal or are within one number of the central value. If any single allele is two or more removed from this central, frequent, value then you are probably fairly safe from false positive matches. The columns in this case centred on the most common allele for that locus in each ethnic group. C / P / A .( There is an anomaly with VWA and Asian origin as there are 2 peaks, one at allele 14 and one at 17 with low frequencies of .03 for 15 and .13 for 16 in between)

Losers of the police/forensic DNA lottery (Australia)
           C    P     A
D3S1358   15 / 15 / 15
vWA       17 / 17 / (14,17)
FGA       22 / 22 / 22 
D5S818    11 / 12 / 11
D8S1179   13 / 15 / 13
D18S51    14 / 13 / 15
D21S11    30 / 29 / 29
D13S317   12 / 11 / 11
D7S820    10 / 11 / 11
And for the UK FSS DNA database and their choice of loci the worst case situation is for UK Caucasians ,Afro-Caribbean and "Indian" Asian from articles
Int. J. Legal Medicine (1997) 110:5-9 and Int. J. Legal Medicine (2001) 114:147-155 placed on
UK SGM+ Allele Frequencies

Assuming equivalence of D8S1179 = D6S502
[ D8S1179 is listed as D6S502 because of a labelling error in the Co-operative Human Linkage Center database from which this STR was chosen (Oldroyd et al, 1995, Barber and Parkin 1996). -Forensic DNA Typing, John Butler, Academic Press, page 72.
Still being printed as D6S502 on FSS forms in 2002 ]
and the D21 /D21S11 alleles I have converted using the Urquhart to Moller conversion on p32 of For. Sci. Int. 86 (1997)

Losers of the police/forensic DNA lottery ( UK )

Allele / Caucasian / Afro-Caribbean / Indian-Asian most common locii
VWA  17  /  15  /  16
THO1 9.3  /  7  /  6
D8S1179 13 /  14  /  14
FGA 21  /  23  /  24
D21S11 30  /  28  /  29
D18S51  14  /  17  /  14
D2S1338 20  /  22  /  19
D16S539 12  /  11  /  11
D19S433 14  /  13  /  13
D3S1358  15  /  16  /  16
( For THO1 adjasent alleles to 9.3 are 9 and 10 )

Frequency of occurrance for these most common alleles 
of loci used in the UK for the Caucasian population.

VWA  0.27
THO1 0.30
D6S502 0.33  (D8S1179)
FGA 0.19
D21S11 0.26
D18S51  0.16
D2S1338 0.18
D16S539 0.29
D19S433 0.38
D3S1358  0.26

The straight product rule of these is only 920,000, that is before factoring in any co-ancestry alliasing between alleles.

Ethnic Normalisation of DNA Profiles

Consider a variant of football pools coupons. Instead of 49 games just consider 10. Here we are not interested in who won but the score line. That is for this purpose a score of 2,1 is the same as 1,2 . With teams in the same league score lines of say 0,1 or 2,2 or 1,2 are far more likely than scores like 5,8 or 1,9. So we have a set of 10 scores consisting of mainly low numbers. Now if we allow games between different leagues then the teams are less matched and the scores are more likely to include higher numbers. The different leagues are then analogous to different ancestral backgrounds i.e. in the UK Celtic, Viking, Anglo-Saxon, other European, African, Asian etc. Generally speaking the majority of people stay within their own ancestral group (or football league in the analogy). "Expert witnesses", quoting likelihood of false matches in billions, are using the whole population case rather than factoring-in common ancestry. Do that and the 10 loci false match chance figures come down to more like 1 in 100,000.
The central i.e. most likely profile for a UK Caucasian and using the 10 UK NDNAD markers of
is notionaly centred on
in the same order, 2 for each marker - one from each parent, for D2 (A,B) see below.

Now my own DNA profile (Caucasian) slightly altered for obvious reasons is
still a bewildering array of numbers but if you take the differences between both sets of numbers you get a profile of (assuming D2 allele 20) and for the fractional alleles like the 9.3 example then 8 minus 9.3 equals -2 for this purpose.
and you start to see things in proportion relative to UK Caucasians. A profile in this representation is far more accessible and far less daunting than the string of large numbers. In this form (my invention unless someone can show otherwise ) is no less valid but has lost the bamboozlement of apparently large numbers and implied rarity. With a touch of antonomasia (or synecdoche, hyponymy, eponymy or whatever) I will call this process Nutteing Ethnicity Normalisation. I only have data for the whole UK population's principal ethnicities . If I was of Asian background then the THO1 value is much more likely to be (6,6) rather than (9.3,9.3) for example. Restrict to more localised/in-bred communities then the situation worsens.

The closer you are within plus or minus 1 of a "score draw" (0,0) for each of the 10 then the more likely there will be a false match sometime in the future to YOUR own DNA. It would have been comforting to see some 3s to make sure I was well out of the firing line. Incidentely as far as European D3 alleles is concerned, allele 18, is most common for the Baranya Romany population of Hungary ,fascinating where this sort of conjecture can lead one.

Only considering data for UK Caucasians.
Table of Modes (M) and M + or -1 and M + or -2 allele frequencies of occurrance (% ,per cent, of the population) for the 10 UK FSS NDNAD loci
Locus / M / M+-1 / M +- 2
VWA 27 71 88
THO1 30 45 56
D6,D8 33 68 84
FGA 19 49 63
D21 26 51 74
D18 16 43 71
D2 14 28 39
D16 29 74 82
D19 38 78 91
D3 26 65 84
So in forensic science terms (unique identifier) D19 is worst as only 9 percent of population have alleles outside of +-2 of the mode and 38% in the modal group. Best case is D2, which is the triple peak one, with nearly equal frequency peaks at alleles 17,20 and 24 Note THO1 is highly assymetric - the peak is at 9.3 but only 1 % of people have an allele higher than 9.3

In the following I will only consider the situation equivalent to myself, or worse. There will be many people further away from the all (0,0) situation than myself ,especially if non-Caucasian. My normalised profile again
Now just considering myself and people in a worse situation than myself. For the first pair of alleles ,permutations from 0,1 and 2, is 3
so combined is 3,3,2,4,2,4,6,2,3,6
Then making the assumption of no co-ancestry ,no unknown half-cousins etc ,so all independent, then multiplying together gives only 124,418.
From my simulation (see end of file ) of people with similar background to myself ie all alleles having a frequency more than 8 per cent I now know this figure is less than 270,000 to one

Normalisation sequences for UK Afro-Caribbean
UK Asian
Oriental (NK = not known )
so marginally distinguishing from UK Caucasian by THO1 and D18
and the 5 extra loci TPOX,CSF1PO,D7,D13,D5
Italian allele frequencies
Glasgow, Scotland population (not autochthonous - unspecified parental lineage)
unfortunately 2 separate allele peaks on loci THO1 and D18 but a distinct variation from the UK Caucasian average on locus D16
Glasgow allele frequencies
And another very localised result from FSI 95 (1998) p27-37 if a profile was from the Cardiff/Neath area then if the VWA allele was (16,16) then twice as likely to be from someone from Cardiff than Neath (data from 743 samples)
A central German normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as above
German and Austrian SGM allele frequencies
A Slovenia normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as above
Slovenia allele frequencies
An Austria normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as above
Austrian allele frequencies
A Czech normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as above
Czech allele frequencies
A New Zealand (Caucasian) normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as above
New Zealand allele frequencies for Caucasian, Maori, Samoan, Tongan, Nuiean and SE Asian descent
A NZ East Polynesian normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci ,in same order as above
A NZ West Polynesian normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as above
A NZ Asian normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as above

Showing how much difference can be found in different sub-groups within the same geographical area - compare the following 2 sets
Taiwan Han population normalisation sequence
and the Taiwan Bunun population normalisation sequence

And just to show not to take this sort of analysis too seriously the figures for an ethnic group you would assume was most genetically removed from all these ethnic profiles - Australian Aborigine
not so different from the rest.

For Israeli populations using
Israeli allele frequencies
for loci
Normalisation sequence for Jewish Israeli
Normalisation sequence for Arab Israeli

Above data derived from journal articles
Int J Legal Med (1997) 110:5-9
Int J Legal Med (2001) 114:147-155
Forensic Science International 114 (2000) 7-20
F S I 129 (2002) 90-98
F S I 116 (2001) 187-188
FSI 122 (2001) 189-195
FSI 119 (2001) 107-108
FSI 122 (2001) 181-183
FSI 115 (2001) 107-109
FSI 97 (1998) 53-60
FSI 132 (2003) 84-86
J Forensic Science Sept 2002 ,V47,N 5
IJLM (2002) 116: 184-186
Including the electronic-version-only journals are available in print form via Inter-Library loan and the British Library Document Supply Centre costing about 2 pounds per article and 2 weeks turn-around

From source
Allele frequencies of 10 STR loci from the AmpFISTR SGM Plus in the South Polish population.
A South Polish normalisation sequence ,same UK FSS loci, in same order as above
So main differences from UK Caucasian is on D18 and D2

My profile (assuming D2 Allele 20 UK subgroup ) normalised relative to UK Caucasians is
"Normalised " relative to Afro-Caribbean is
Some 3s ,evidence, but of course not conclusive indication, that I am not of Afro-Caribbean origin.
Now "Normalised" relative to Asian using best case D2 allele of 19 is
Now 3 examples of 3s is strongly but of course not conclusive indication I am not of Asian origin (again true as far as I know). I pity the poor sods who have a normalised profile something close (i.e. -1,0 and 1s) to the average Joe

I hope their NDNAD records are flagged so plod doesn't keep arresting them.
A further test for my simplified ethnic analysis for a profile case study included in
Forensic Sci. Int. 119 (2001) p20
The situation was a DNA profile derived from semen in a rape, but was it from the rapist reported as Afro-Caribbean or the victim's sexual partner, Caucasian , who had left the country.
It was from the time when they were using 6 loci. The profile for VWA,THO1,D8,FGA,D21,D18 was
so normalised against UK Caucasian gives
and against the UK Afro-Caribbean norm
So the 4 and 5s strongly suggest the profile was not likely to be Afro-Caribbean.
This agrees with the FSS formal numerical analysis which deemed the sample to be 28 more times likely to be Caucasian than Afro-Caribbean and the pursuit of the rapist via DNA database trawl was abandoned.
Interestingly and disturbingly this profile is more removed from the UK Caucasian average than my own (6 loci only ).

The D2S1338 Anomaly in the UK

As time goes by more and more data will come available concerning ethnicity. I suspect the split peaks of 17,20 and 24 in the UK allele frequency distribution of locus (marker) D2 (D2S1338) goes back to something like Celtic or Anglo-Saxon origin (research in progress).

Until I have found out the significance of alleles 17,20 and 24 on D2S1338 I cannot improve on my normalisation factors. I am trying to find population analyses of D2 and Welsh or Scottish or Irish versus Germanic/Flemish to see if it corresponds to Celtic/Anglo-Saxon split. For the moment comparing data on D2 in the South Polish population and UK population then allele 17 may relate to Saxon and allele 24 to Celtic ancestry. Again, data consistent with my hypothesis from the D2 Central German data below. A test for this would be a study on D2 in an autochthonous (same ethnicity of parents and grandparents) population in deepest Wales say. If anyone does know the inside gen could they tell me ? For the moment, for ethnic normalisation, choose the peak allele/s that closest matches the given allele. More data /info required for loci/alleles UK Caucasian D2 alleles 17,20 and 24 ; Asian D2 alleles 19 and 23 ;Oriental VWA alleles 14 and 17.

Of course anyone in the UK reading this and has obtained their DNA profile from the FSS, I would be interested in seeing what the results of my normalisation process produces, on their profile.

International Normalisation Data Relating to AmpFISTR SGM Plus DNA Profiles

Nutteing Ethnicity Normalisation Sequences
VWA THO1 D8S1179 FGA D21S11 D18S51 D2S1338 D16S539 D19S433 D3S1358
19 & 23
South Chinese
Taiwan Han
Taiwan Bunun
12 & 16
S. Polish
NZ Caucasian
NZ E Polynese
NZ W Polynese
NZ SE Asian
Central German
E. Indian
Texas Black
Aus. Aborigine
13 & 15
VWA THO1 D8S1179 FGA D21S11 D18S51 D2S1338 D16S539 D19S433 D3S1358
NK=Not Known, & indicates separated peaks so use most appropriate values in given situation

To use the above table write your own profile numbers and then underneath each number write out each of the 20 numbers of the normalisation sequence. Subtract in each of the 20 numbers the second line element from the first line element .

Chinese data from data/fyxzz/200001/001.html
The pairs in the first 2 tables represent first South Chinese / North (Han) Chinese and the second pair of tables are for Chinese Uygur / Hui data
Taiwanese data from Forensic Science Journal 2002,1;31-37
Japanese, E. Indian and Texas Black data from Toronto CFS
For USA readers using the CFS data
Relative to USA Black gives a Nutteing normalisation profile for
D3,vWA,FGA,D8,D21,D18,D5,D13,D7,D16,THO1,TPOX,CSF of
Relative to USA Caucasians gives a Nutteing normalisation profile for
D3,vWA,FGA,D8,D21,D18,D5,D13,D7,D16,THO1,TPOX,CSF of
For species non-Chauvinism from FSI article 112 (2000) p151-161, mentioned before, by FSS, Birmingham staff using SGM+
DNA profile of a Chimpanzee named - Bobby
Amel. X,Y ; D8 (10,12) ; D21 (28,29) converted ; vWA (12,12) ; FGA (17.3,23.3) ; D3 (14,14) ; THO1 (6,7) ; D2 (21,22) ; D16 (9.3,9.3)

For a forensic scientist,George R. Carmody of Ottawa (, who has placed his DNA profile on the internet for
Nutteing normalised to Caucasians gives
Just one 3 and a lot of 0s,rather close to the 'Average Joe'
Nutteing normalised to Blacks gives
Doing full allele frequency analysis he is 1070 times more likely to be Caucasian than Black. That was generally through the loci, only 2 of the 26 alleles showed a 'Black' frequency greater than ' Caucasian'. His picture looks decidedly Caucasian.

Disturbing Developements for the Orwellian/Kafkaesque Future

Antoni Imiela Case

My Usenet posting of 23 Oct 2002
Title: Serial rapist and those 3000 DNA swabs
The only information (as released to the media) the police have so far is he is white , aged 30 to 50 and may live in London, Surrey, Kent or Berkshire. But they do have the suspect's DNA profile. So how come they are only swabbing 3000 targets to find a match, what is their criteria ?

Previous mass swabbs have been for a village or part of a town where there was an offence but these offences were spread over 4 or 5 counties. Buried in these DNA profiles is an indication of the person's ethnic background. I know, from my own DNA profile, just concerning the alleles (numbers) on just 2 of the 10 loci (markers) i.e. D18S51 and D16S51 I or anyone else would know I was 20 times more likely to be white than black (true). With the computer and data systems available to the police I am sure there are combinations that would similarly give a greater likelihood of being say Greek or Polish or Zambian origin or whatever. From that construct a list of surnames of that origin. Especially if this rapist's profile has thrown up a rare locus/allele combination. The PNC Boolean computer search would then be (men on PNC for sex crime now aged 30 to 50) AND (never been DNA profiled ) AND (living in one of the 4 counties) AND (having surname relating to ethnicity)
It is the last factor that seriously cuts down the possibilities.

There is a specific gene that expresses as red hair for example. (supplemental- In November 2003 in an Amsterdam conference a company reported 98% success rate at determining eya iris colour from DNA ). Given a complete DNA sample is available, there are more and more physical characteristics that are becoming dicernable with medical research. In the obsessive genealogy (family history) groups there are people taking DNA samples and profiling the different branches of their own families. Now when this data gets cross-referenced to PNC computers then there is real big brother, sort-power. Unfortunately the police will have to swab all active and past milkmen in this country to make full use of the facility. End Quote

Then my follow-up posting 2.5 months later
Title: Operation Orb /Serial rapist / Charged suspect / DNA profiling
This posting gets a bit technical but there are fundamentally important implications. The following is a follow-up of a posting I made 23 Oct 2002 (title: Serial rapist and those 3000 DNA swabs ). I would be interested in anyone's thoughts on my reasoning. It could imply a new triumph for the DNA profiling technology or the start of more abuse of process or infringement of civil liberties and racist overtones.
Anyone would think I had hacked into PNC and Holmes, concerning the Home Counties serial rapist "of being say Greek or Polish or Zambian origin or whatever" . My posting 23 Oct 2002
Google Archive article
On 04 Dec 2002 an Antoni Imiela was arrested as suspect for the "Trophy Rapes". He was German born but of more significance here his surname and so probably his genetic origins would be Polish. Looking at a Polish site (in Polish) at there is a table of allele frequencies for the (South) Polish population using the SGM plus 10 loci (markers) as used in the UK. 7 of the loci/allele groupings are much the same as the UK. But for 2 ,that is, for D18S51 ,UK 14 and Poland 16 and for D2 UK triple and Poland 17. I would suggest the DNA profile obtained after one of the rapes showed (centred on ,as 2 alleles per locus) D8 /16 and D2 /17. This would have lead perhaps to the (only) 3000 DNA samples out of the whole population of London and the Home Counties. i.e. only men of right age and Polish surnames. Over the 6 weeks or so those 3000 would have been reduced to perhaps just a page of (Polish) names that had not ,for the usual reasons, been traced and profiled. I would suggest Mr Imiela was one of these names circulated to police in the Kent area and stopped in a traffic stop-check.

Now, when profiled, did his profile exactly match the rapist's profile ? If it did (or near match) then his solicitor should have demanded a full 15 loci profile to be made of the rape sample and his client's sample. But are there independent forensic labs that could do this with, proof of sample identity and custody ? If there was a full 15 loci match on both samples on the same batch process on the same machine with the same thermo-cycling with ruled out chance of cross-contamination/"sleight of hand" etc then I'm afraid he would be very much bagged to rights. If not a match, on 10 loci let alone 15, i.e. absolute confirmation of exclusion, what are the grounds for his continued detention? Remember there was pre-selection so he was nabbed in effect on 8 loci and not a full 10.

Hannah Foster Murder Case

And another suspicious case - my Usenet posting of 12 April 2003
Re: Murder of Hannah Foster -Southampton teenager
Release to the media that the prime suspect is of Asian background. Don't release why there is such a designation, i.e. no eyewitness. At the same time don't confirm they have obtained DNA profile of the suspect. If they have no DNA profile what harm in saying so.

Post "Lawrence" they must not show racial bias. A DNA profile can easily show up an ethnic likelihood. If the profile showed alleles centred on THO1(6),FGA(24) and D18(14) in the common alleles then 5 times more likely to be Asian rather than Caucasian background. It only takes ONE allele in the 1 to 2% frequency of occurrance such as D16(8,any) or D19(14.2,any) and it is pushed to 20 times more likely, two such and 60 to 100 times likely.

If you go to the Asian newspaper sites this supposed suspect is fully named (full 3 names) because in India he is considered innocent. Reason quoted for leaving Hampshire - close relative in a coma in India since December and intervening time selling his house to move to India to be close to her.

Compare with UK media and this suspect "fled the country". Now ,of course, before 6 Hampshire Police officers go on a jolly to India they confirmed whether he left the UK in a pre-planned ,orderly ,manner or "fled". Well of course they did - they would be crass idiots not to, wouldn't they. Left pre-planned then just get local Indian police to do a routine call-on to confirm a few details. If "fled" then yes go off to India.

Meanwhile the Southsea connection is downgraded to minor area of investigation, the real suspect perhaps being Caucasian but with a colonial grand-parent or whatever. I've no idea which version is correct but the Indian newspaper versions carry an otherwise irrelevant reference to a family dispute and implication that an "aggrieved" in this dispute informed UK Crimewatch. Now where have I come across people in an awkward family dispute deliberately lying to the police to "solve" an awkward family situation.

and my follow-up 10 May 2003

Here is the chronology as I see it.
14 March 2003 murder of Hannah Foster
19 March release to the media police searching for an Asian as suspect murderer.
26 March Crimewatch program about the murder.
An "aggrieved" in a family dispute takes the opportunity to stitch-up her Asian relative by anonymously informing Crimewatch. Knowing that her relative had left the country a few days after the murder and that he lived fairly local to the abduction site. Then the rest takes a momentum of its own

English language version of Indian newspaper report 10 April 2003 so accessible to Hants police as easily as myself.
"In fact, Maninderpal has been attached to his mother who in December last year received a serious head injury after an accident with a bus. Since then she has been in coma. He wanted to come and settle down in India. That is why he sold his flat in England. He has some problems with his in-laws," says Mr I- holding that Maninderpal had gone to England in 1994 on marriage basis.
His wife is a simpleton, says I -, but it is the "mother-in-law, who has been the trouble maker". The only other time Maninder came to India was in 1997, he said revealing that Maninderpal did not even come to attend his wedding. "Our family has been passing through a tough time. Even after more than four months, my mother is in coma. After two months in the Intensive Care Unit at the PGI, the doctors advised us to take her home. Since I live on the first floor of a flat in Sector 44, we moved to a vacant flat of a relative in Phase X of SAS Nagar because of my mother," adds I- Singh.
End Quote

Easy for police to confirm whether Maninder had sold his flat and enquire at Home Office/Foreign Office about passport problems. Both being reasons for the timing of Maninder's pre-planned journey to India.
Now police are, in all probability, searching for a totally innocent bod and investigation for the real killer is put on the back-burner and any possible leads gone cold.

Tony Jasinskyj

Background reported story (with added twaddle)
His DNA profile placed in the public domain by BBC1 programme "Watching the Detectives" on 13 Aug 2003
Normalised relative to UK Caucasians is
(-3,-1)(0,0)(-1,1)(4,5)(-1,-2)(-1,2)(-1,1)(0,-1)(-2,-1)(0,4)(0,1) Allele frequencies range from 4% to 38% except for one interesting exception. That is D19 18.2 is very rare ,in many countries with small databases, not one recorded case. In the UK Caucasian it is about 0.2% so 1 in 250 people. In Central Europe though D19 18.2 is 5 times more common than the UK.
The rape and murder was of a Marion Crofts, 14, between Fleet and Aldershot, 06 June 1981. Tony Jasinskyj was a serial wife-batterer but no criminal conviction until 2000 and after kicking his wife he was arrested and DNA sampled. He was one of 10,000 males interviewed at the time in 1981 and lived and worked about 1.5 miles from the murder site, but no suspicion as to being the murderer until the DNA profile match with crime scene semen stain. Spot the error in the following recording of interview by Aldershot police.

CID : FACT, your semen is on her jeans, YOUR semen, explain this please.
Jasinskyj: She could quite possibly picked it up somehow
CID: WHERE ?,comes out of your penis that's how you should know.

In court 3.5 weeks of prosecution case and 6 hours of defence case ,only one witness, Jasinskyj - no DNA expert (say) for the defence.
Prosecution QC: Where did your DNA come from ?
Jasinskyj : It's planted, someone put it there

30 police re-investigating, 15,000 documents, 3 full profiles taken from different bits of the victim's clothing ,how many man - hours ? must be many thousands.

Nowhere was there mention of extended loci re-testing. And repeated over and over again the equating of DNA profile with DNA, as far as uniqueness presumption. No one informed him that a DNA profile is not unique, and that there is a far more rational reason how a DNA profile matching his could have been found on the girl's clothing.

Death knell for DNA profiles?

The following is a copy of an email (25 April 2003)I sent to the inventor of DNA profiling. He had replied to my previous two technical queries but not to this email

To Prof Sir Alec Jeffreys
Since your reply to my query last year I have learnt a lot about DNA profiling.

Recent report by Reuters concerning your recent speech.
"At the moment, we have a criminal DNA database ( NDNAD ) of about 2 million profiles in the UK," he told reporters, as scientists met at Britain's top scientific body, the Royal Society, to celebrate the discovery of DNA 50 years ago." "The real problem in a typical crime is that even if you get DNA from a crime scene, you can't pick up a suspect because they don't have a record. So one possibility is to extend the database to include the entire population."

These are the principal reasons against such a move

Unrelated false matches
Ask Raymond Easton of Swindon whether he thinks the NDNAD should be expanded Newspaper report or original URL ZM.html
Then again just in the last few months ask Peter Hamkin of Liverpool, newspaper report or original URL id=12718961&method=full&siteid=50061
( supplemental - since this em, the Gottingen prisoner case )

Lack of reported independent validation
This is the last publicly reported proper validation exercise in DNA profiling in the forensic literature that I can find. By proper I mean dividing up some samples ,sending to 16 (in this case) different laboratories ,testing blind and collating the results Forensic Science International vol 86 (1997) p25-33 Threr were 448 data-points and an error rate of 17 in 448 or 1 in 26. Some not just 1 allele out but some 2 alleles out from the "true" profile. Frankly I am amazed this report ever got published.

Unresolved matches in the NDNAD (National DNA Database)
From Forensic Science International 95 (1998) p30. Concerning data in the UK DNA database as of 04 October 1996 when there were only 6311 samples from the London area and 573 from the Cardiff area. "A small number of unresolved duplicate pairs of profiles were present in the regional data :10 pairs within the London region and 1 pair in Cardiff. The most common cause of duplicate entries is the use of aliases by suspects who have been arrested on several occasions. For administrative reasons ,it is not always possible to resolve such duplicates by exhaustive police investigation."
This published statement is absolute tosh. At the same time a DNA sample is extracted from an arrested person his conventional fingerprints are taken as well. It could not be easier to cross-correlate conventional and DNA fingerprints from 2 data sets. The chances then of a false matching of both types of "fingerprint" would truly be in the trillions to one against. I have a scientific background and the idea that such anomalies are not immediately and thoroughly investigated is an insult to the wider scientific community. These unresolved false match numbers have increased to 300 now according to ch4 documentary "DNA in the Dock". Not resolved because the results would be devastating to the FSS (Forensic Science Service)

Too close for comfort
The modal profile for a UK Caucasian (data from various FSI and Int J Legal Medicine articles 1997 to 2001) is (17,17)(6&9.3)(13,14)(21,21)(29,30)(14,14)(A,B)(11,12)(14,14)(15,16) for loci VWA,THO1,D8,FGA,D21,D18,D2,D16,D19,D3 Now my own DNA profile (Caucasian), slightly altered for obvious reasons (17,19)(8,9.3)(13,13)(20,22)(29,29)(13,15)(18,19)(12,12)(12,14)(16,18) still a bewildering array of numbers but taking the differences between both sets of numbers one gets a normalised profile of (A,B assuming D2 allele 20 as triple peaked allele frequencies at 17,20 and 24) (0,-2)(2,0)(0,1)(1,-1)(0,1)(1,-1)(2,1)(-1,0)(2,0)(-1,-2) This normalisation process, starkly shows, how close my profile is to the "average Joe" with a consequential much increased likelihood of being arrested just because my profile matches some scene of crime sample somewhere in ,now, Europe (post Hamkin) not just the UK. That is, before factoring in errors, in arrestee or crime scene profile, co-ancestry or possible non-independence of alleles across loci. I just hope the "average Joe" with normalised all (0,0)s is flagged up on the NDNAD.

You won't be surprised to learn that I find the construction, expansion and trawling of the NDNAD absolutely repugnant.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Sir A. Jeffreys" []

Sent: Friday, January 11, 2002 8:35 AM
Subject: Re: DNA Database and s82 of the 2001 Criminal Justice and Police Act...

They hound your family, even after death, and through your children.

Joseph Kappen Case

This family now has a stigma attached to them that they cannot get release from.
Case of Joseph Kappen
"He is named as Joseph William Kappen, who at the time of the murders was 32 years of age and lived with his family in Port Talbot. He was working as a bus driver and on a casual basis as a doorman at local clubs."
By the sins of the children
Operation Magnum: "He checked it to see if it contained the DNA profile of someone who could be related to the killer. This was the first time the NDNAD had been used in this way.
The search produced a list of more than 100 men who could be related to the offender due to similarities in their DNA profiles. This intelligence, combined with existing evidence held by South Wales Police, led to one local man becoming a strong suspect."

World's End Murders

Repeated again in Scotland - Helen Scott and Christine Eadie murders
"It is understood Lothian and Borders Police, who already have a DNA profile of one of the men they believe was responsible for the World's End murders, will begin a second mass screening of potential suspects later this year using the same process.
By eliminating non-related profiles, police hope they will be able to whittle down the list of suspects. A police source said: "We could be looking for a father and getting to him through his son." "

Gafoor Trawling

And in the same manner ,Jeffrey Gafoor
"(Jeffrey) Gafoor's genetic fingerprint was not held in the national DNA database, which contains the profiles of more than two million criminals, but his 15-year-old nephew's was -- for a minor car crime". More detail from someone directly involved with the Gaffoor case
Debate with Forensic 'Scientists'

A New Racism ?

Proceedings of the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights ,22 May 2003
Letter submitted from Lord Falconer
Part Quote
... A typical DNA profile on the database would consist of a string of paired numbers, each pair relating to a specific marker (e.g. 14,17; 6,9.3; 13,16; 20,22; 29,31; 18,21; 17,19; 11,12; 14,16; 16,17; X,Y)...
End Quote
He could of said that this profile shows a male who is 68 times more likely to be Caucasian than Afro-Carribean. It is quite a straightforward calculation when you have the relevant data from International Journal of Legal Medicine 1997 v110:5-9 and 2001 v114 147-155
But of course it was for a Human Rights committee so shtum on that aspect. The Caucasian combined frequency being 8.06x 10^-18 and Afro-Caribbean 1.19x 10^-19 so 80.6/1.19 = 68
Normalised relative to UK Caucasians is

Technical note - the 18,21 pair on D18S51, glaringly obvious in the "Nutteing Normalised" presentation as (4,7) is interesting because the 21 allele occurs in less than 1% of the general population. It is quite conceivable that this D18, (18,21) was deliberately altered from someone's actual profile as it was only being given as an example of structural representation.

Un-investigated Spontaneous Mutations

In 2003 a Colin Waite was prosecuted and sentenced on a 19 point match not 20 point match. A 19 point match and one point mis-match is excuplatory evidence , not evidence of guilt. There was no DNA profile expert for the defence and a forensic scientist Fay Southern managed to get this one past the defence. I've only seen a newspaper report of her testimony rather than transcript. She appears to have used the cover of "spontaneous mutation". Perfectly valid if proven but there was no reference to anyone having done so, the other key-phrases are heterogeneity and somatic mosaicism. Most dramatically displayed by people with different coloured eyes, where the mutation occurs at the embryo stage of developement.

It is theoretically possible for someone to show 2 differing DNA profiles if one sample is from, say, semen and the other, say, buccal cells. A mutation can occur in a cell and over time by division then this mutated cell-line form a substantial proportion of that cell-type. Male mutation rates for the loci used in SGM+ (from American Association of Blood Banks data ) are for
vWA 0.3%
THO1 0.01%
D8 0.2%
FGA 0.3%
D21 0.15%
D18 0.21%
D2 0.02%
D16 0.11%
D19 0.1%
D3 0.13%
Most of these mutation rates are significantly more than the average locus, probably precisely the reason these loci were chosen for forensic purposes in the first place. This fudge can only be applied within 1 allele from the original allele - any further is extremely rare. A 13 year-old male has had 36 sperm-cell divisions,age 20 then 200 divisions, age 30 then 430 and by age 45 then 770 divisions. If they are relying on mutation then there should have been further biological testing to confirm what is otherwise conjecture. Otherwise finding DNA profile matches using any 19 numbers from 20 then that increases the chance of false matches 50 fold or more.

John Doe indictments

For American readers here is a published USA DNA Profile, from the Denver Post 17 Aug 2003,1413,36~53~1575322,00.html
Arapahoe County investigators know who bludgeoned three members of the Bennett family to death in their Aurora home on Jan. 16, 1984.
He is D3S1358: 15/16, vWA: 17/17, FGA: 22.5/ 25, D8S1179: 12/13, D21S11: 30.2/31, D18S51: 13/ 14, D5S818: 12/12, D13S317: 11/12, D7S820: 7/9, D16S539: 10/11, THO1: 6/9, TPOX: 8/11, CSF1PO: 11/11 and DQ alpha 4/4
Using the Toronto CFS data I've frequency analysed on 13 of the loci
Again there is a zero element in the table for FGA 22.2 for the black (as CFS defined) population. Caucasian and Asian also as defined by the Toronto CFS.
Results on all 26 alleles excluding 'black' data. He is 30 times more likely to be Caucasian than Asian.
On 25 alleles for all 3 sub-groups.
29 times more likely Caucasian than Black
13 times more likely Caucasian than Asian
Then factoring in a less than minimum figure for 'black' FGA 22.2 then you can multiply those figures by greater than 3 so 90 times and 40 times more likely Caucasian.
Relative to USA Caucasians gives a normalised profile from
D3,vWA,FGA,D8,D21,D18,D5,D13,D7,D16,THO1,TPOX,CSF of
ok 2 that are 3 away from the multi-mode but still surprising for a profile that contains one allele frequency of 0.3% and 2 of 0.8%, 22 of the 26 normalised alleles are 0s and 1s .
So close to the modal USA Caucasian that they should fairly soon arrest their man - not necessarily the right man, of course, but what does that matter.

Second US John Doe,DNA profile from
11 Nov,2003
Supposed to be a Caucasian rapist of a former Tillery Elementary School teacher, Arkansas
D3S1358: (15, 16), vWA: (18, 20), FGA: (21, 23), D8S1179: (11, 12), D21S11: (28, 30), D18S51: (12, 14), D5S818: (11, 13), D13S317: (9, 13), D7S820: (11, 12), D16S539: (12, 12), THO1: (7, 9), TPOX: (8, 9), CSF1PO: (10, 12), PENTA E: (7, 11)
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US Caucasians
Only one allele, 3 away, from the multi-modal 'Average Joe'
Doing allele frequency analysis on all but the Penta E, he is 7 times more likely to be Caucasian than Black.

Third US John Doe,DNA profile from Wisconsin
Unknown ethnicity
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US Caucasians
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US Blacks
The final pair (7,7) of CSF1PO are rare, both in Black or Caucasian populations, so highly significant
For the first 12 pairs,doing allele frequency analysis there is equal probability of being Black or Caucasian but that final (7,7) would suggest more than 600 times more likely to be Black than Caucasian , or of course from some under-represented population. Possibility of a Gafoor trawl here. On a commercial medical site I saw reference to a cell line from the mammary gland of a 56 year-old Black woman with CSF1PO (7,8) close enough to be of interest to anyone doing a Gafoor Trawl if there was no (7,7) in their database.

Fourth US John Doe,DNA profile from California, ethnicity not known
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US Caucasians
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US Blacks
Doing frequency analysis, over 5 MILLION times more likely to be Black than Caucasian generally through the loci but especially D5 (8) and TPOX (6).

Fifth US 'John' Doe, a Jane Doe, DNA profile,Caucasian
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US Caucasians
Giving Nutteing Normalised Profile on 13 loci relative to US Blacks
Doing frequency analysis 10 times more likely to be Caucasian than Black mainly from D5 (9).

Post Script

I have no criminal conviction,no criminal record or court appearance at any time. Because of corrupt Wiltshire Social Workers ( story - nutteing3 in a search-engine ) I have been drawn into this Kafkaesque world.
After the CPS dropped all this nonsense I wanted to retrieve my involuntrarily extracted DNA sample and data but by then snagged by s82. I sent of my 10 GBP,after being told this was necessary for removal ,more lies. Instead I get my DNA profile in the post. Concerning the FSS forms at the top of this file. The second line of text on the above form ending "the record mas made". THIS IS A DYSLEXIC ERROR - letter reversal/inversion - not a typing error, w and m are nowhere near on a keyboard (also occurs in dyslexics concerning letters u and n, d and b etc). The other indicator for dyslexia is this erroneous initial letter is the same as the initial letter of the next word. Typing letter q, e, a, s or d instead of w is just sloppy fingers on the keyboard a letter m indicates a sloppy mind. If this person is involved with the likes of labelling DNA samples or batches then god help us. What do defence attourneys make of such evidence of incompetence when it arrives on their desks from this country's supposed leading national forensic laboratory. On 14 January 2002 I received another recorded letter from this lot in Birmingham. Enclosed was the same 2 sheets as previously; a printout from the DNA database and a covering letter that the incompetent Dr P E Gage put his signature to. The only differences (same 2 spelling/proof reading errors) was change of date and natural variation of signature or very subtle mimiograph of course. These incompetent idiots don't even know that what they think is D6S502 on the 6th chromosome is in fact D8S1179 on the 8th chromosome. Only one of the 10 markers used in the UK NDNAD. If this is representative of the competence of Birmingham Forensic Science Service then all I can say is be grateful the UK no longer has capital punishment.
( I would be interested to hear from anyone else with such examples of incompetence of this shower in Birmingham). This was the standard of care shown by the public face of the FSS - what on earth was going on behind closed doors ? This file and supplementatry files is the result. If the world's forensic science services find the contents of this file,uncomfortable - tough titty. Different people around the world have highlighted small fractions of the problems analysed in this file. But I seem to be the only one who has explored the full enormity of the confidence trick played on the world by people who call themselves scientists. Over 700,000 pages on Google containing the words DNA and profiles. I'm proud to say, putting just those two words in the Google search box, returns this page at the top of the heap. Just putting the two words DNA and profile in the search box then this file comes second in 1,240,000.

This is the only place you will be able to read such material other than
Le Monde 23 December 2003
outside the UK has published a lot of the material (cribbed ? ) from this site. Nothing mainstream published in the UK because the special branch or their ilk must have a "D notice" or somesuch in place.
I interested a Nick Davies, crime writer for the Guardian newspaper but he will not communicate with me now.
Alec Jeffreys was perfectly happy to communicate with me, while I was learning, but not now.
My MP was quite happy to ask a written parliamentary question but he will not communicate with me now. I am one of the few to stand up against the dangerous powers-that-be in this blighted country.

I would be interested to hear from any whistle-blowers (anonymously if required ) from any of the world's forensic science labs, with the inside gen on any of the material exposed on this site and related sites.
email Paul Nutteing ,remove all but one dot

A lot of the contents of this file, plus other material, 'peer reviewed' on the main forensic science user-group

It shows the very dangerous blinkered mindset of forensic scientists. I have to assume the same attitude is prevalent within the police and the judiciary.

A simulation of a large DNA profile database - the result being a match on 10 loci in just 2 million 'parthenogenic' profiles i.e. no kinship, relatedness, co-ancestry

You too, with just an ordinary domestic low-spec pc, can show that the worlds forensic statisticians and scientists are wrong.
A simulation of DNA profile 'families'
A simulation of DNA profile families with consanguinity
A simulation of DNA profile 'families' for 6 generations
dnas.htm revisited with all alleles represented
dnas.htm revisited for >8 percent allele frequency subset (similar ancestry )
Simulation of Taiwanese Tao and Rukai populations to explore the effect of within and without ancestral clusters
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